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VOLUME I

FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES--VIETNAM

Ernest F. Bairdain, Ph. D.
Edith M. Bairdain, Ph. D.

25 May 1971

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This research was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense under ARPA Order 1474 and was monitored by the U. S. Army Missile Command under Contract Number DAAH01-70-C-0217. Views and conclusions expressed herein are the primary responsibility of the author or the contractor, and should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of USAMICOM, ARPA, DOD, or any other agency of the Government.

HSR-RR-71/6-Wn

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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Submitted by:

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<u>ARPA Order Number:</u>	1474
<u>Program Code Number:</u>	W2-9-UX013-01-D1-DZ
<u>Name of Contractor:</u>	Human Sciences Research, Inc. 7710 Old Springhouse Road McLean, Virginia 22101
<u>Effective Date of Contract:</u>	25 August 1969
<u>Contract Expiration Date:</u>	25 June 1971
<u>Amount of Contract:</u>	\$660,878.00
<u>Contract Number:</u>	DAAH01-70-C-0217
<u>Principal Investigator and Phone Number:</u>	E. Frederick Bairdain Tiger 4014 - 4661
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<u>Short Title of Work:</u>	Psyop Research

PREFACE

This is Volume I of a two-volume research report entitled, "Psychological Operations Studies--Vietnam." Together, the two volumes constitute the final report covering the results of some 17 months of basic and applied research in psychological operations in Vietnam. The project was executed and the final report written on-site in the field during the period between September 1969 and June 1971, under the sponsorship of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense.

The present volume deals mainly with basic research and theory, discusses requirements for developing psychological operations as an expanding body of scientific theory and method, and describes research conducted in conjunction with specific psychological operations campaigns. The basic research, focused on measurement of psyops' effectiveness, also tested salient propositions relating psychological operations and defection.

Volume II (Confidential) is devoted to the applied research component of the project. It reports on a number of specific research tasks designed to provide "quick response" to immediate psyop needs identified by a Project Advisory Group composed of representatives of the civil and military psyop community. The applied research tasks are generally of two sorts--collection and analysis of critical data from VC and NVA prisoners of war and defectors, and analysis of the impact of selected government publications upon the general public. A special feature of this volume is a report on the impact of the First Cambodia Operations on VC and NVA attitudes. Volume II also includes three classified appendices which belong with Volume I.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project was approved and funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Additional support was provided by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Vietnam under the direction of Edward J. Nickel, Minister-Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs and Director of JUSPAO.

Thanks are due to the many officials from ARPA, JUSPAO, and MACJ3-11 who participated in a Program Advisory Group which provided sponsorship and guidance for two-thirds of the total effort.

The project benefitted greatly from the wise counsel and insightful analysis of psyop problems provided by Martin F. Herz, Minister-Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs in Vietnam. The interest and support of ARPA-V Directors, Colonel Arthur F. Mitchell and Colonel Ephraim M. Gershater, and ARPA-V Program Managers, Lieutenant Colonel N. C. Sibley and Lieutenant Colonel Albert A. DeProspero was most helpful.

The understanding and assistance of Lawrence J. Hall, Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs and Deputy Director of JUSPAO; Arthur S. Hoffman, Acting Assistant Director of JUSPAO; and Francis S. Bourne, JUSPAO Research Officer were a major factor in being able to continue to press ahead even when things seemed most difficult.

Special thanks are due to Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General of Military Region 3 and to Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam of Military Region 1 for their generous assistance in the work devoted to measurement of psyops effectiveness. The many courtesies of Major General Tran Van Trung, head of the General Political Warfare Department, greatly facilitated the work.

The close cooperation of the Center for Vietnamese Studies, and its Director, Mr. Nguyen Khoa Phon-Anh made it possible to undertake many tasks that otherwise would not have been feasible.

The great ability and tireless dedication of Miss Le Thi Que, HSR's Vietnamese Research Supervisor, was a major factor in the timely completion of the study.

Suggestions received from Colonel Jess B. Hendricks, Chief of the Psyops Division in the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Tambe, Chief of the ARPA-V Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences who reviewed this manuscript in draft form, were greatly appreciated.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

APT	Armed Propaganda Team
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
CDTC	Combat Development and Test Center (ARVN)
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CVS	Center for Vietnamese Studies
DMA	Data Management Agency
FDD	Field Development Division
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
LSD	Local Survey Detachment
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

MACJ3-11	Psychological Operations Directorate of the Military Assistance Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MR1, 2, 3, 4	Military Region One, Two, Three, Four
MOI	Ministry of Information
NLF	National Liberation Front (Communist)
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
OPPR	Office of Policy, Plans and Research (JUSPAO)
PAAS	Pacification Attitude Analysis System
PAG	Project Advisory Group
P&D Plan	Pacification and Development Plan
POW (or PW)	Prisoner of War
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RL	Rural Development
RVN	Republic of Vietnam (The South Vietnam Republic)
SVN	South Vietnam
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army Republic of Vietnam
USIS	United States Information Service
VC	Viet Cong
VCi	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VIS	Vietnamese Information Service

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- Adaptation Level - represents the pooled effect of three classes of factors: stimuli immediately in the focus of attention; stimuli having background or contextual influence; residuals from past experience with similar stimuli.
- Adaptation Level Theory - assumes a neutral point or region of sensory functioning at which stimuli coinciding with Adaptation Level are indifferent or ineffective, stimuli above Adaptation Level have a given character, and stimuli below Adaptation Level have an opposite or complementary quality.
- Aperiodic Conditioning - response habit conditioned on irregular reinforcement schedule.
- Conditioning - an act or response learned in association with rewarding or punishing stimuli.
- Construct - a concept, formally proposed, with definition and limits explicitly related to empirical data; a small bit of theory which may or may not be validated by empirical evidence.
- Constitutive - relating to or depending on constitution; a constitutive definition for example, is a formal equation which expresses the relationship of two or more constructs in terms of each other.
- Correlation - relation of two variables so that change in one is accompanied by a corresponding or parallel change in the other; positive change in one variable may accompany either positive or negative change in the other variable.
- Criterion - an external basis for judgment; a comparison object, rule, standard or test for making judgment; a behavior goal by which progress is judged.
- Deduction - mode of reasoning that starts with premises or propositions and attempts to derive valid conclusions therefrom; inference is said to have two forms: deductive and inductive. The former begins with established truths or truth claims, the latter with fact or observation.
- Effective - producing a decided, decisive, or desired condition or occurrence traceable to a cause.

Empirical - related to facts or experience; based on factual investigation.

Epistemic - of or relating to knowledge or knowing

Explication - to give a detailed explanation of; to develop the implications of

Indicant - any phenomenon that can be taken as a sign of the presence or operation of a given other phenomenon

Induction - reasoning from a part to a whole, from the particular to the general or from the individual to the universal

Latent Structure Analysis - a probabilistic model for estimating latent structure underlying certain forms of observable data

Monotonic - pertaining to two variables so related that, for each value or magnitude of one, there is one and only one value for the other

Phenomenon - a datum of experience; that which is open to observation in contrast to that which is known only by inference

Propaganda - any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly

Psychological Operations - the planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives

Rationalization - process of concocting plausible reasons to account for one's practices (behavior) or beliefs; no conscious criterion warns the individual that he is creating a defense or justification unconnected with his true motivations

System - the set of orderly and persisting interrelations between parts of a whole

Suggestible - Ready to accept suggestion from another and to modify one's behavior in accord therewith

Theory - a general principle, supported by considerable data, proposed as an explanation of a group of phenomena; a statement of the relations believed to prevail in a comprehensive body of facts

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES IN VIETNAM

SUMMARY

The progress and results of a sixteen-month field study of psychological operations (psyop) in Vietnam are summarized very briefly here. The contract stipulated three goals, four objectives, and five specific requirements; when distilled, two specific areas of work are highlighted.

1. Basic research on methodology for measurement of effectiveness of psychological operations (psyop), leading to formulation of general theories and systematization of psyop -- in brief, creation of a science of psyop.

2. Applied quick-response research on current high-priority problems facing the psyop community in Vietnam.

Problem

The advent of ultimate weapons has force-fed the growth of new strategies. As a result, some new military functions have been created. Others have decreased in importance or disappeared, while others have grown greatly in significance and use.

Psyop -- the subject of this study -- is an area that has grown rapidly in importance and scope of effort in recent years. No more evidence of its importance is needed than the recent re-definition of the term in the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff's specialized dictionary of military terminology. "Psychological operations" (psyop) was expanded to include psychological warfare (psywar) and is...

"...the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, and friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives."

The still-developing and expanding area of psyop has not been institutionalized. Its directing agencies and its practitioners now face critical demands for which they are relatively unprepared because low levels of manning and effort in the past have not provided opportunities to acquire pertinent training or experience. Additionally, pertinent reference materials are few, scattered, and largely outdated. Problems continually arise whose solution requires research skills, specific pertinent knowledge, and other resources that are neither expected nor possible in the present order of military staffing. There exists not only an urgent need to meet ongoing requirements for conduct of psyop in the field but also the problem of meeting the demand that psyop effects be measured to justify the continuance of psyop.

Research Effort

Contractual requirements stipulated that technical man-hours in the field be divided in a 1:2 proportion between basic research on methodology for evaluating psyop effectiveness (Program I), and applied research on current psyop problems (Program II).

Program I is composed of tasks selected at the discretion of the research team; Program II consists entirely of tasks selected by a Program Advisory Group made up of members of the psyop community.

Two Senior Scientists, the Project Director and Research Director, focused attention on basic research and directed the activities of four Research Scientists who concentrated on applied research tasks. A team of eight Vietnamese interviewers was trained in use of specially tailored data-collection instruments and worked for the duration of the contract under the direction of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor.

Research Approach. As described in the original project proposal¹, it was intended that research tasks performed under Program II would be structured to provide tests of insights and theories formulated under Program I, through cooperative efforts with the Vietnamese psyop community.

Exigencies of wartime conditions, time pressures, and the sudden shifts of interests and priorities that characterized PAG-controlled work under Program II, placed considerable limitations on its use for both purposes. However, a close relationship was maintained with the Center for Vietnamese studies, the only such Vietnamese-controlled non-profit institute in Vietnam and a case study of the Tinh Thuong Campaign was conducted in close cooperation with the Vietnamese POLWAR officers in charge.

Methodology. In terms of difficulty, the need for innovative and creative use of standard research methodology was paramount. Under wartime conditions, the researcher cannot interfere with operations; there is no possibility of experimental manipulation or controlled variation. The researcher therefore must work with what he can where and when he can find it. Within the framework of a total systems approach, the traditional scientific method of empirical study, formulation of hypotheses, test, revision, and recycling was used at all times. Specific well-established techniques were used such as literature searches, document abstractions, controlled observation, and questionnaire and interview surveys. The way in which classical methods and specific techniques were applied and the finding of situations in which they could be applied called for constant creative effort.

Samples. Approximately 1,000 NVA and VC prisoners and ralliers were given interviews averaging more than three hours in length. A precedent was set when HSR was able to interview NVA prisoners captured in Cambodia at the first-stage collection centers along the Cambodian border; many were reached within one day of their capture. These early interviews, a "first" for research in Vietnam, were uniquely informative.

In another major area of effort, questionnaire surveys covered more than two thousand Vietnamese civilians.

Results/Principal Findings

A foundation theory for psyop has been developed; two derived theoretical constructs have been tested and validated.

Leaflets and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts are identified as the only media that consistently reach a majority of the enemy military. Leaving aside the question of relative inherent potential for effectiveness

within the entire range of media, under current operating practices in Vietnam, these are the only two effective media in terms of number of enemy military reached.

Effectiveness of psyop messages has been measured for NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners; psyop messages affect the decision to rally for approximately two-thirds of both NVA and VC ralliers.

The effectiveness of small-scale psyop activities in three categories has been measured. As predicted from psyop theory, two types of activities were found to be effective in terms of producing ralliers under specified conditions, and the third was ineffective as predicted.

The quality and efficiency of messages has been questioned continually by psyoperators. A study of the process by which a rallier arrives at the decision to rally provides convincing evidence that messages overall are adequate for their purpose. The message development procedure formulated in a preceding feasibility study in 1968 can now be crystallized.

Principles for evaluation of effectiveness of large-scale complex psyop projects have been formulated and their application demonstrated in two case studies. Results indicate that specific problems in data-collection and interaction with the intelligence community, which now hinder both daily operations and research activities, must be solved before the psyop community can make productive use of a psyop evaluation system.

An approach for processing intelligence data designed to enable systematic classification and definition of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to enemy defection has been conceptualized; the concept has been elaborated into procedures for analysis, and a set of terms required to make necessary distinctions when treating vulnerabilities and obstacles has been developed.

Evaluation of four major JUSPAO publications has shown them to be highly effective in terms of reaching their intended audience.

In total, more than twenty reports were released in the field for quick-response applied research tasks.

Recommendations

1. With effectiveness established under such conditions as those that exist in Vietnam and a tested general theory to work from, psyop has come of age. Now is an appropriate time to take stock of psyop, to consolidate what has been learned, and to create a design for the future.

2. A philosophy based on research evidence and tested principles of business management has been proposed to provide (1) a meaningful consistent concept of the nature of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to defection, and (2) an effective consistent approach to dealing with vulnerabilities and obstacles. Acceptance of this philosophy and its embodiment in policy and doctrine is needed to instill the internal coherence and unity of purpose that is now lacking. Under present conditions which allow great freedom to experiment and innovate, the wheel is re-invented constantly.

3. The authorized organization structure and staffing of psyop units requires reconsideration, particularly for the Research and Analysis (R&A) function. The quality and products of the R&A function are the keystone of psyop. If adequate coverage of the very broad area of concern for R&A defined in FM33-1 is to be achieved, the issue of personnel qualifications and competence must receive priority attention.

4. Establishment of a psyop research center, advantageously located in the Southeast Asia-Pacific area, responsible for directive consultation on current operations and for research to consolidate and extend psyop knowledge is an immediately obvious suggestion that would meet many needs. There are opportunities now for work on and study of tactical psyop -- both small and large psyop projects -- and short and long-term strategic psyop that are not likely to recur any time in the foreseeable future.

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FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES - VIETNAM

SECTION I
SCOPE OF PROBLEM

FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES - VIETNAM

SECTION I
SCOPE OF PROBLEM

Requirements

A program of psychological operations studies was conducted in Vietnam between September 1969 and January 1971 in response to a long-felt need within the Psyop community for ability to measure the effects of psychological operations and a concurrent short-term need for research designed to meet current urgent operational problems.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR) for interdisciplinary research tailored to meet the two above-mentioned needs, working with and through military and governmental agencies concerned with psychological operations in Vietnam.

Scope

The contract described three goals for the research programs to be conducted:

- a. Development of a systematic program of operations research to provide effective and continuing support of psyop objectives in Vietnam.
- b. To provide research for the psyop community that will enable them to more effectively evaluate psyop in Vietnam through identification and development of operational criteria as a base for valid measurement of effectiveness.

c. To provide a theoretical and empirical basis from which the psyop community can implement a system of operational evaluation of its activities in order that it may more effectively meet the changing needs of psyop in a counterinsurgency and nation-building environment.

Objectives

Four general objectives were described:

a. To measure the effectiveness of psyop programs by developing and validating criteria with which to measure effectiveness according to the specified aims of the psyop campaign.

b. To develop a system for operational measurement of the effectiveness of psyop programs.

c. To assist in the establishment of a continuing system of evaluation capable of being employed by psyoperators.

d. To help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyop in an insurgent environment.

Specific Requirements

Five requirements of the contract were specified:

a. A study of current psyop programs in Vietnam to identify significant factors requiring further systematic research and development.

b. Formulating and establishing criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of psyop measures proposed or utilized.

c. Concurrent with the above, formulate and initiate a systematic program of applied research to provide effective and continuing support of psyop objectives. While it should reflect appreciation of fundamental theory and principles, this program shall emphasize research on problems of immediate need and application and shall be inherently interdisciplinary in character.

d. Develop through cooperative research and training a related action research capability within the Vietnamese intellectual, academic, governmental, and military communities. This indigenous capability will be encouraged to develop into a task force capable of initiating and sustaining independent research contributing to psyop programs.

e. Conduct research studies within the program defined above to determine the effectiveness of the selected action techniques and to accomplish specific psyop objectives.

Special Restrictions

The contract was based upon a letter of agreement between the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), the Psychological Operations Division (MACJ3-11) of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), and the Advanced Research Projects Agency Research and Development Field Unit in Vietnam (ARPA RDFU-V).

The three-part agreement specified that two professional researchers -- or two out of every six man-months in the field -- would be devoted to work on criteria development, more descriptively termed "methods for measurement of psyop effectiveness", under the operational control of the Director, ARPA-V.

Four of the six professional researchers (i.e., 4 out of every 6 man-months of effort) would constitute a quick-response team responding directly to the research requirements of a Program Advisory Group (PAG) composed of representatives from JUSPAO, MACJ3-11, and ARPA-V.

By the terms of the agreement, "it is the responsibility of the PAG to select research problems, assign priorities to research tasks, and monitor the progress of research to insure that research fulfills the requirements of the user agencies".

The agreement specified that MACJ3-11 would control the choice of the first priority task -- that is, the first task to be undertaken by the HSR quick-response team but all subsequent tasks would be assigned a priority by JUSPAO (i.e., JUSPAO would determine the selection of all but the first PAG task).

In the agreement it was stated that the four-man quick response team was in itself an experiment to determine if quick-reaction research can fulfill the research requirements of the psyop community in the field.

Early History

Because it had been emphasized during negotiations of the contract that no firm selection of tasks had been made by the PAG, and because specific requirements of the contract stipulated that HSR was to conduct a survey of all ongoing and proposed psyop activities in Vietnam to identify significant current issues, it was assumed that task selection in Vietnam would be a collaborative effort and that a wide range of tasks would be available from which to choose. Based on this assumption, the HSR proposal described an approach in which two lines of attack would be conducted concurrently:

- a. A deductive approach would be used to develop theory, concepts, and methods for criterion selection and application.
- b. An empirical approach would be adopted for PAG quick-reaction tasks; these tasks were conceived of as providing a laboratory to confirm, modify, or extend theory and methods developed through a deductive approach.

Information made available to ARPA-Washington from the field and distributed at the initial bidder's conference identified a set of six tasks included in the request for proposal as representative of the kinds of tasks that would be undertaken by the quick-response group. It was emphasized that these tasks were in no way to be thought of as tasks that actually would be undertaken. As a result of that information, specific requirement "a" in the contract stipulates conduct of:

"A study of current psyop programs in Vietnam to identify significant factors requiring further systematic research and development."

Based on this requirement, it was proposed that HSR would conduct the survey and consult with the PAG to define and execute tasks identified as currently important to the psyop community. These tasks would be selected and designed to serve several purposes; i.e., they

would bear on significant psyop issues and attempt to provide a timely solution to current problems in response to Specific Requirement "c"; they would be designed to work with Vietnamese psyoperators, in response to Specific Requirement "d"; and most important, the quick-response tasks would be designed to provide case studies for measurement of effectiveness and generally facilitate development of effectiveness concepts or methodology. However, when the HSR team arrived in Vietnam it was discovered that the six tasks listed in the request-for-proposal as "examples" were not examples but were in fact the actual work to be done. This is demonstrated both by the lists of tasks obtained from JUSPAO and endorsed by MACJ3-11 upon arrival in country and secondly demonstrated by the fact that, of the five tasks undertaken for PAG, Tasks 1 and 2 and 5 are among the six sample tasks originally proposed. Task 7 was a situational surprise development having the highest priority.

Being contractually bound to undertake PAG-generated tasks, rather than being able to participate in identification and selection of PAG applied research tasks as had been expected, placed some limitations on the extent to which PAG tasks could be made to serve as vehicles for development of a Vietnamese action research capability as described in requirement "d".

Staffing and Scheduling

To design and execute the research activities implied by the goals, objectives, and specific requirements of the project, approximately sixty-six man-months (six technical personnel for almost eleven months each) spread over one calendar year in the field were allocated. In addition, four man-months were provided for preparation of a Final Technical Report at the HSR home office in McLean, Virginia.

Man-months of effort in the field were to be split in a 1:2 ratio between man-months allocated to basic research on criteria development and quick-response applied research efforts.

Seven major task statements were approved by the PAG. Upon receipt of each approved task statement HSR prepared detailed task research plans, workflow analyses, and schedules for each task. Five of the seven major PAG tasks were activated. Demonstrating in practice that the sponsors' emphasis on flexibility and quick-response was not

misplaced, the PAG discontinued each of the five tasks after an initial preliminary report was made, well before completion of the activities listed in the task research plans.

Because a very large body of unprocessed data accumulated as work on each PAG task was stopped short of completion, at the request of the PAG the term of the contract was extended for a total of 15 man-months for PAG quick-response tasks and 10 man-months for criterion methodology work. This situation occurred because the PAG suspended work on Tasks 1 and 2 at about their midpoint and suspended work on Tasks 3 and 5 to enable an immediate shift of all HSR resources to the top-priority Cambodian Operations Survey -- Task 7. As indicated by the modified task research plans on which the extension was based, the added time allowed only partial completion of the original task research plans.

Unfortunately, the contract extension was in doubt as the initial contract neared completion and instructions were received from the ARPA-V Program Manager to begin preparations for return to CONUS in July 1970. These preparations had to be reversed late in August 1970 when it was decided to extend the contract to process and report upon the already-collected but not yet processed data.

As a consequence of the administrative shifts, the contract effort really represents two "contracts" or two periods of effort -- one of ten calendar months duration and a second of five calendar months duration -- rather than one consecutive period of effort for fifteen calendar months. This point requires emphasis because the length of the span of time in which field work can be performed places severe restrictions on the kinds of psyop activities that can be studied, i.e., the time frame for many psyop from initial conceptualization to impact and effect if any, is much longer than the total duration of the contracted effort. For example, the objective of many tactical psyop is to induce rallying or surrender but the "incubation period" for consideration of the act of rallying is about two years. National-level strategic psyop are programmed on a yearly basis and the time frame in which their major basic objectives may be realized can extend over several years.

Reporting Format

The work to be reported under Program I - Criterion Methodology is internally coherent and systematically organized while the work reported

under Program II - Quick-Response Applied Research is a heterogeneous collection of unrelated tasks which have already been reported in full. Therefore, the Final Technical Report is divided into two volumes:

Volume I treats work on criteria development conducted under Program I and consists largely of new material.

Volume II consists of already-completed and published reports of quick-response tasks performed under Program II plus some elaboration of method, procedure, conclusions, and recommendations.

A deliberate effort has been made to avoid all unnecessary specialized terminology and jargon, whether social science or military.

Summary

In very brief summary, two researchers were allocated 22 man-months in the field to work on development of methods for selecting and formulating criteria for evaluating effectiveness of psyop. After completion of work planned during this period and preparations for return to the United States were nearing completion, a 10 man-month extension was added for two researchers.

Four researchers were allocated 44 man-months in the field to design and conduct quick-reaction applied research studies of issues selected by a PAG; after completion of work planned during this period and preparations for return to the United States were nearing completion, a 15 man-month extension was added for three researchers.

Comment

Although all possible safeguards have been used and interpretation is, by policy, always on the conservative side, the reader is urged to regard the figures and statistics offered here with the caution and prudence appropriate for wartime conditions.

The data is internally consistent; the logical analysis is step-wise, conservative, and simplistic (i.e., no inappropriately sophisticated statistical operations have been performed; the mathematics are appropriate for the quality of the data); and interpretation is straightforward and has been kept to a minimum. The reader, therefore, can be confident that the statistics quoted provide a more factual basis for judgment than would purely subjective estimates.

Nevertheless, cross-cultural research data must be treated with caution even under peace-time conditions. In war-time, when many otherwise non-existent factors are operating, even more caution is advisable.

SECTION II

INITIAL THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS
LEADING TO SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYOP

SECTION II

INITIAL THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS LEADING TO SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYOP

A first theory for psyop is proposed which relates effectiveness of psyop to such factors as the conditions under which a psyop appeal is made, the recent history of members of the target audience, the timing of the receipt of the appeal, and the quality and appropriateness of the message. Two theoretical constructs are formulated and supporting data are described in this and later sections. The reasons why these actions are important and necessary, although they may appear to be laboring what is obvious, are explained in detail in this section.

Development of a Science

This section draws heavily upon the work of many established authorities to describe what a science is and the evolutionary process by which a science comes into existence. The process, regardless of the subject matter of the science-to-be, almost invariably involves identification of a small body of validatable fact, theory, and general law through patient examination and analysis of a large and amorphous assortment of equally plausible but incorrect "fact", theory, personal experience, insight, intuition, logic, speculation, myths, and illusions. Specific applications of the content of this section will be noted repeatedly throughout the remainder of this volume.

Definition and Objectives of a Science

A science can be conceived of as consisting of a body of theory on one hand and a body of data in the form of empirical evidence on the other. When an adequate supply of rules of correspondence exists which relates one to the other, a science exists (Torgerson, 1958).

In the preceding section, goals "a" and "c"; objectives "b", "c", and especially "d"; and specific requirements "a" and "c" immediately will have alerted the scientist and researcher to the fact that the tasks described -- development of broad theoretical principles and systematic methodology for an as-yet-unsystematized field of activity -- actually require conceptualization and development of a whole new science. All readers will recognize that this is not an easy task and certainly not a short-term undertaking, particularly when the techniques that are involved are those of the still-developing social and behavioral sciences and the data base is to be collected under wartime conditions in an environment which cannot be controlled or manipulated experimentally.

The Role of Measurement in Science

The principal objective of a science, other than the description of empirical phenomena, is to establish, through laws and theories, general principles by means of which the empirical phenomena can be explained, accounted for, and predicted. In carrying out this objective, sciences concern themselves with gathering and comparing data in order to establish the correlations, mathematical equations, and theories that are the goal of inquiry: in other words, research is conducted. The ability to measure is one of the most important factors that enable these processes to be carried out. In large part, measurement enables the tool of mathematics to be applied to science (Torgerson, 1958); so, to a very considerable extent, development of ability to make usable measurements is one of the important early steps in development of a science.

Before the place of measurement in science can be discussed, it is informative to consider the nature of science itself. Scientific disciplines differ from one another in many ways. The ways in which they differ have often been used as a basis for various classifications of the sciences. One method of classification is based on the degree to which theoretical procedures or explanations are used as contrasted with correlational procedures or explanations (Margenau, 1950, pp. 27-30). The distinction here is between a science that consists largely of statements describing the degree of relationship among more or less directly observable variables and a science that attempts successfully to derive, account for, or explain these relationships from principles that are not immediately given, but lie beyond straight empirical knowledge. Although no science is all correlational or entirely theoretical in this sense, yet it is clear that sciences do differ considerably in the degree to which they rely on one or the other level of explanation. It should also be noted that all sciences begin as largely correlational, and progress toward the theoretical as they develop. For example, physics and chemistry are examples of the best-developed theoretical sciences. In contrast the social sciences, in an early stage of development are correlational, as are most of biology and psychology also.

To provide perspective on both the importance of being able to conduct measurements and the difficulties involved in being able to make measurements, it must be noted that the sciences would order themselves in largely the same way. i.e., less developed to more developed, if they were classified on the basis of the degree to which satisfactory measurement of their important variables has been achieved.

The development of a theoretical science would seem to be virtually impossible unless its variables can be measured adequately. One of the primary differences between the social and behavioral sciences on the one hand and the physical sciences on the other lies in the procedures used for measuring their important concepts.

The general points made in the preceding paragraph can be illuminated by considering in a brief and oversimplified way, the structure of a well-developed science such as physics compared with the structure that seems typical of the less well-developed social and behavioral sciences. Needless to say, psychological operations, if the term "psychological" is meaningful, belong to the latter. It will be seen that certain differences involve to a considerable extent the measurement problem.

The Structure of a Well-Developed Science

Science can be thought of as consisting of theory on the one hand and data (empirical evidence) on the other; interplay between the two is what makes a science. The theoretical side consists of "constructs" and their relations to one another. "Constructs" can best be thought of as small bits of theory which may or may not be validated by empirical evidence. The empirical side consists of the basic observable data. Connecting the theoretical and empirical sides are rules of correspondence which serve the purpose of defining or partially defining certain theoretical constructs in terms of observable data. In part, these rules have to do with the process of measurement. This situation can be diagrammed in the manner shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of a Well-Developed Science

In this diagram, the area to the right of the vertical line stands for the observable data. The area to the left of the vertical line corresponds to the theoretical space. The circles within this space stand for the theoretical constructs. Double lines indicate rules of correspondence (also called operational definitions or rules of interpretation) between theoretical constructs and observable data, and single lines connecting two constructs indicate a theoretical connection between the two. Single lines thus stand for the formal, logical relationships between constructs, whereas the double lines give the empirical, experimental procedures relating a construct to the data.

A single line might, for example, indicate that the volume of a sphere is proportional to the cube of the radius, whereas, the double line would give the rules for determining experimentally the length of the radius or the volume of the sphere.

In terms of Figure 1, physics can be characterized as having many constructs, many rules of correspondence, and a great many connections between the constructs. The rules of correspondence are often operational definitions of quantities - rules that enable assignment of numbers to represent quantities, which in turn enables substitution of formal mathematical symbols for empirical events. Hence, the connections between the quantitative constructs can be in the form of mathematical equations.

The multiplicity of connections between quantitative constructs expressed as mathematical equations enables us to progress from one set of observables through a rule of correspondence into the theoretical space. Within this space, progress can be made from one construct to another via mathematical transformations, finally returning again to a different set of observables via different rules of correspondence. Comparison can then be made between the "predicted" result and the observations. As already pointed out the ability to "predict" accurately and reliably is one of the main objectives of a science and existence of this ability is one of the chief distinguishing characteristics of a well-developed science.

With an established theory, this procedure can be used in place of actually carrying out the second set of experiments; given certain data, the remaining steps can be computed. With an untested theory, the procedure can be used in its verification, by actually carrying out the second set of experiments and comparing the experimentally obtained values with those predicted by the theory.

Constructs and Connections

In a sense, a set of constructs with formal connections forms a model. When certain of the constructs are connected to the empirical world by rules of correspondence, the model becomes a theory, and as such, is subject to empirical test. A model lacking terms subject to empirical interpretation can be evaluated only on logical grounds and is not subject to empirical test. Until empirical interpretation can be given to a sufficient number of its terms, the model, along with all of its terms, lacks empirical import, and does not constitute a scientific theory.

In a satisfactory theory, the set of constructs is characterized by two different types of definitions. A given construct may be defined in terms of other constructs in the set. Thus, for example, time might be defined as the independent variable in the equations of mechanics. In Figure 1, formal connections represented by single lines can be considered equivalent to definitions of this type. A formal equation expressing the interrelation of two or more constructs can be thought of as defining any one of the constructs in terms of the others. Thus force can be defined constitutively as the product of mass and acceleration. Equivalently, mass can be defined as the ratio of force to acceleration, and acceleration defined as the ratio of mass to force. These kinds of definitions are called constitutive definitions. Constructs that have one or preferably more constitutive definitions possess theoretical or systematic import (Hempel 1952, pg. 39).

As against the constitutive definition of constructs, which must, of and by itself, be circular, a satisfactory theory contains constructs that are also defined, not in the terms of other constructs in the set, but rather, directly in terms of observable data. Thus, periods of time might be defined in terms of one or another periodic system, such as the rotation of the earth. Indeed, as was mentioned above, a model does not become a scientific theory until a sufficient number of its terms possess such operational or epistemic definitions. In Figure 1, the rules of correspondence represented by double lines can also be considered as operational or epistemic definitions. A given construct may possess several constitutive and several epistemic definitions.

It should be immediately noted that, in order to be useful, all constructs must possess constitutive meaning (Margenau, 1950, pg. 236), that is, they must permit themselves to take part in the formulation of laws and theories. However, it is not necessary that all constructs possess an operational definition directly; rather it is necessary only that a sufficient number in any system be operationally defined. On the other hand, although constructs need not themselves possess operational definitions directly, they must at least be connected with observable data indirectly through other constructs that do. Constructs with neither direct nor indirect empirical meaning can serve no explanatory purpose at all.

Sciences in Early Stages of Development

Social and behavioral sciences are among the less well-developed sciences. Even though there is a wealth of observables and perhaps an oversupply of constructs, there is unfortunately, a shortage of important connections. Without stretching the point too far, a typical situation might be diagrammed something like that in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of a Developing Science

In Figure 2, there are two sets of constructs within the theoretical space. Those on the right are interconnected with one another, each with a rule of correspondence connecting it to the observable data. Those on the left are also interconnected with one another but with no operational definitions. Further, there are dotted lines connecting the two groups of constructs. These dotted lines are a new feature that did not appear in Figure 1.

In this schematic diagram, the set of constructs on the left in Figure 2 might represent the "socially or behaviorally important" concepts that someone might have in mind when beginning construction of a theory of personality, or of social behavior, or of intelligence. These concepts might relate to, for example, socioeconomic status, tension, intelligence, learning ability, satisfaction, motivation, attitude, etc.. In Figure 2, the connections between concepts indicate theoretical relationships between these concepts. Most often in the social and behavioral sciences, these connections are expressed verbally rather than mathematically, and with a good deal less rigor than is found in the more advanced sciences. For example, there might be such statements as:

"the intelligence of an individual is a product of his heredity and his environment";

"an individual's achievement in a given area is a function of his aptitude and motivation";

"intelligence is the ability to learn".

However, more precise statements are made occasionally. In one theory of personality, it is stated that

"--other factors being equal, the degree of satisfaction is roughly proportional to the amount of tension that is reduced per unit of time" (Kluckhohn and Murray, 1948).

This statement could be expressed mathematically as:

$$s = k \frac{dT}{dt}$$

This equation could thus be considered as expressing a set of formal connections among the three constructs of satisfaction, tension, and period of time.

The constructs on the right side of Figure 2 all possess operational definitions - rules of correspondence relating them to observable data. Very often they have the same names attached to them as those previously discussed. For example, they might be:

"Intelligence" as defined by a score on a particular intelligence test.

"Socioeconomic status" as defined by some particular weighted sum of income and job prestige as determined by ratings.

"Motivation" as defined by period of time of food deprivation.

"Learning ability" as defined by the difference in total score between a particular pre-test and post-test with a specified amount and kind of interpolated practice.

These latter constructs have rules of correspondence which enable numbers to be attached to objects possessing them. The degree of relationship between the constructs, as expressed by correlation coefficients or other mathematical terms, is then determined. This is indicated in Figure 2 by the single lines connecting the constructs on the right. It is therefore possible to determine the relationships between intelligence and socioeconomic status, between motivation and rate of learning in a maze, or between aptitude and achievement.

It is important to note that this operationally defined intelligence, socioeconomic status, etc., is not universally agreed to be the same thing as the theoretically defined term having the same name. Hence, the dotted lines. In these sciences the concept is often one thing and a measure of it is another. The operationally defined construct on the right is an indicant (Stevens, 1951) or an index of the equivalent on the left. At best, the two are presumed to be monotonically related to each other. At worst, merely a positive correlation of unknown magnitude is presumed to exist. A dotted line then stands for a presumed relationship between the construct with operational meaning and the equivalent concept which possesses a wealth of constitutive meaning.

It is instructive to examine what happens to the process of verification or rejection of a theory in the type of situation described by Figure 2. As described earlier, in physics it is possible to pass from one set of observable data through operational definitions into the theoretical space, travel across the theoretical space from one construct to another via constitutive connections, return to the plane of observation via other operational definitions, and finally predict the results of a different set of observations. The theory can then be accepted or rejected, depending upon the agreement between the predicted and the observed data. In the social and behavioral sciences, as in Figure 2, essentially the same procedure is carried out except that part of the journey in the theoretical space is over the dotted lines. If the predictions made using the constitutive connections agree with the observed data, the theorist can be happy for evidence has been added in support of his theory. If disagreement is found, however, the theorist is not necessarily made unhappy. He may conclude that the theory is incorrect. He may equally well conclude that the operationally defined variables are, after all, not really measures of the corresponding constitutively defined variables, but are only presumed to be related to them. In that case, the theory may still be correct and the experiments are simply inappropriate. It can be seen that, in the kind of situation described above, statements expressing the relationship between the more theoretical concepts are immune, to a fairly large extent, to adverse results obtained in determining experimentally the relationship between their operationally defined mates. Intelligence can thus remain the ability to learn, even though most experiments show that intelligence, as operationally defined, is virtually unrelated to learning ability as independently defined operationally (Woodrow, 1946). This, of course, is not a particularly happy state of affairs. The concepts of theoretical interest tend to lack empirical meaning, whereas the corresponding concepts with precise empirical meaning often lack theoretical import.

In summary, one of the great problems in the development of a science is the discovery or invention of constructs that have, or are likely to have, both empirical meaning and theoretical significance.

Science and Common Sense

Theoretical constructs, particularly in the early days of a developing science, may be nearly indistinguishable from simple common-sense notions or prescientific conceptions. Though they may have a great deal of common-sense meaning attached to them, the meaning is

not specified precisely. The terms are thus somewhat vague, and more often than not are complex; in the section of this volume titled "Definition of Concepts and Terminology", it can be seen that this statement describes the current state of several terms important for psyop. Before a satisfactory state of affairs is reached, it is necessary somehow to transform these inexact and complex concepts into exact ones which can be specified precisely; this necessary task has been called the task of "explication" (Carnap, 1950). Though this task seems common to all sciences, it is a particularly acute need in those disciplines that are in their initial stages of development. It is especially true at the present time in the social and behavioral sciences, where an immense amount of time has been devoted to construction of complex and elaborate theoretical superstructures based on unexplicated, inexact constructs.

When a rule of correspondence is devised for relating a prescientific concept to observable data, the act represents an explication of the original concept. The purpose is to replace the original concept with one that is defined more precisely. It is only after such a substitution has been made that the empirical investigation of hypotheses concerning theoretical connections can proceed. Unfortunately, there are virtually an unlimited number of ways in which such rules of correspondence can be devised. Since each way is an operational definition of the explicated concept, and since different ways ordinarily lead to different results, it is clear that the problem of determining which way -- if any -- is likely to prove fruitful is a serious one. The best of theoretical models is of no use if rules of correspondence are chosen unwisely or unfortunately. Yet they must be chosen since models, without constructs which are anchored firmly to observable data, have no scientific import whatsoever.

Often the problem of establishing a rule of correspondence for relating a construct to observable data reduces to the problem of devising rules for the measurement of the construct. This is not always so, however, since many of the constructs useful in science are intrinsically unmeasurable.

Summary

The structure of a science was pictured as a complex interplay between theory and data, the theory side consisting of a network of constructs and their interconnections, and the data consisting of observable phenomena of the world, i.e., research data.

Linking the theory with data are the rules of correspondence which are operational definitions or rules governing interpretation. The formal connections between constructs on the one hand and the rules of correspondence on the other establish two different kinds of definitions which are used in science. The former were called constitutive definitions and the latter operational or epistemic definitions.

Constructs, to be useful in science, must possess both systematic and empirical import. By systematic import is meant simply that the construct must be such as to lend itself to the formation of multiple connections with other constructs in the structure. By empirical import is meant that the construct must be connected, either directly or through other constructs, to the observable data. One of the important concerns in science is the search for or the invention of constructs with both empirical and systematic import. In this concern the processes of concept formation and theory formation go hand in hand. In the discussion of social and behavioral sciences, it was noted that a tendency exists for concepts to have either operational or systematic import, but not both. This is illustrative of the comparatively underdeveloped status of these disciplines (Torgerson, 1958).

A Theory For Selective Use Of Psyop

In Vietnam, although psyop has been conducted for several years on an increasingly larger scale, the primary foundation for the total psyop effort has been forced to depend upon the previous experience (if any) of personnel in other areas, and upon intuitive approaches or experimentation based on subjective reasoning.

Psychological operations (psyop) has increased rapidly in importance as a military weapon in recent years but the state-of-the-art remains largely undefined. Because of urgent operational demands, knowledge has not been consolidated, and it has not been possible to measure the effectiveness of psyop programs with any degree of accuracy. There is an urgent need to institutionalize what is being learned by experience to improve the quality of psyop.

Psyop is a government function that has increased rapidly in scope and significance since the advent of ultimate weapons and acceptance of the concept of limited warfare. Convincing evidence is found in the recent redefinition of psyop by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff which expands coverage of psyop to include communications to all hostile, neutral, and friendly nations in support of national objectives for both war and peace.

To date very little effort has been allocated to creation of an overall theoretical model for psyop, or even to the development of a validated empirical data-base which might enable evaluation of specific isolated activities. The meager efforts that have been made in attempting to evaluate psyop have been directed toward the identification of independent generally applicable criteria, i.e., criteria that can be used in the measurement of all or most types of psyop. Results of these efforts indicate that such criteria do not exist. In actual fact, criteria applicable only to a small set of related psyop activities are very difficult to identify and validate because of the many interacting factors that affect psyop targets, and because psyop is conducted in highly complex situations where most non-psyop factors have much greater significance and impact than does the psyop.

Despite the discouraging picture presented in the immediately preceding paragraph, there is another approach that does not attempt to find independent general criteria and has proven to be productive. In several instances, it has been possible, in relatively uncomplicated situations, to so design research studies that psyop effectiveness has been demonstrated and the conditions under which a given type of psyop activity can be effective can be specified.

In summary, history indicates that effectiveness criteria cannot be selected and applied across-the-board independently of the nature of the psyop and the context of the situation in which the psyop is executed. However, there is reason to believe that the effects of psyop can be measured, the characteristics of psyop which can be effective under certain conditions can be specified, and the conditions under which different types of psyop are effective can be identified.

In what follows, "Sensory Overload", the first theoretical formulation for measurement of psyop effectiveness and its research data base is described. The theory of Sensory Overload is solidly based in established neuro-psychophysiological theory plus hard data from the battlefield.

Sensory Overload: A Theory For Selective Use Of Psyop

A factual analysis of the actual conditions in which mass defections have occurred and a clinical analysis of resultant psychological states of the military personnel involved has generated the fully explanatory concept of "Sensory Overload" (Bairdain and Bairdain, 1968).

There is proof that a specific combination of circumstances consistently has rendered soldiers in battle vulnerable to invitations to defect; and in such cases the instructions have been given and they have been followed.

Theory and Dynamics

The concept of "Sensory Overload" originates with the paper cited. Its opposite though similar-in-end-effect counterpart, "Sensory Deprivation", has been studied extensively in experimental laboratories for military purposes.

Sensory Deprivation is the blocking-out or elimination from consciousness of all sources of stimulation which may impinge on the human organism; total elimination of all stimuli is not possible but may be approached only under laboratory conditions. On the other hand, Sensory Overload, which is the result of an excessive amount of incoming stimulation, often occurs under real-life conditions; a war-time battle is an excellent example.

"Sensory Overload" is brought about by a combination of inputs to the human electro-chemical neural system including physical abuse such as wounds, hunger, fatigue, injury, and disease; mental abuse such as fear or prolonged immediate concern over physical integrity or death; and other sensory modality abuse such as deafening incessant noise (aural), terrifying sights of death and injury (visual). Also included are touch-complex and proprioceptive inputs such as the heat-wave of nearby Napalm, the air-pressure of an exploding bomb, or awareness of one's quivering or failing reflexes, etc. The end result of both deprivation and overload is total disorientation or loss of contact with the real world.

Convincing evidence already exists that excessive stimulation can disrupt neural functioning and create a psychotic reaction. The "double approach-avoidance" experiments with animals in laboratories are an excellent example. Starved by food deprivation, a rodent is locked in an alleyway with food at both ends. When he approaches the food, he receives a severe electric shock; this happens as he successively approaches the food at either end. Finally he goes into a state of frenzy or sinks into a motionless stupor, faced with a choice of starving or being hurt. The frenzy or state of violent agitation or delirium is associated with overload and the stuporous state with deprivation. The end result in both cases is complete disorientation.


The diagram in Chart 1 shows the gradient along which the human psychological state moves. As the "normal" or accustomed volume/intensity of total sensory inputs decreases or increases, the human psychological state moves from normal ability to tolerate this type of stress toward the limits of tolerance. In the case of overload, as stress (i.e., sensory loading) increases toward intolerability, the subjective psychological state of any individual moves through successive phases representing progressively diminished contact with normal subjective reality.

At an intermediate point between "mental equilibrium" and "overload" a zone (portion of the gradient) exists that represents a state of "Heightened Suggestibility". While in this zone the X factor that causes rational humans to continually risk their lives in battle (life-long conditioning, habit, values, beliefs, etc.) approaches being in balance with or over-balanced by the total discomfort of their total situation. When this balance point is reached, the strong control over behavior normally exerted by habit, training, and conditioning is greatly diminished and hold upon reality is weakened. When this occurs, the most basic and strongest of all instincts -- self-preservation -- regains primacy and the individuals subjected to sensory overloading are ready to be influenced to action by any outside agency that offers a means to "leave the field," i.e., that offers an opportunity to escape the near-intolerable situation. In effect, "recent stress" plus "a way to escape" overcomes the restraining effect of habit, past conditioning, and military training.

When intensity or duration of overload pushes the human past the zone of "Heightened Suggestibility", all grip on rationality has been lost and an automaton may be produced whose behavior may be, by subconscious determination, self-protective (such as hiding or fleeing)

CHART 1

SENSORY OVERLOAD



*Zone of optimal vulnerability to psyop appeals to defect.
 "Suggestibility", by definition, is a more-than-normal state of readiness to accept suggestions and act at least partially in accord with them (English and English, 1959).

or may be analogous to the "berserk" or "amok" state in which aggression without apparent recognition of the odds or danger to the self is the usual behavior. Whichever form it takes, the faculty of logic or reason is no longer present to be invoked by appeals. Therefore the timing of receipt of psyop appeals is an important consideration. Received too early, the subject is not sufficiently motivated to respond; received too late, the subject no longer can comprehend the message and react rationally; received at the right time, when his emotional state is in or near the zone of Heightened Suggestibility, he may very well respond with the desired reaction.

Summary

To summarize: Properly integrated conditioning by hard weapons and psyop creates a point in time during a battle when issuance of instructions on how and in what way to defect will be effective and will be acted upon. The stress by itself is not enough to cause defection. The factor that tips the scale in favor of defection is the well-timed provision of instructions on "how to leave the field". The concept is: stress will be endured if there is no other choice. However, the stress suddenly seems much greater and less endurable if a choice such as a way out suddenly becomes available. Obviously, generalization to other situations, characterized by lesser degrees of pressure, is possible.

Implications

Analysis of the battles in which mass defections occurred and the events which occurred during the month prior to the battles identified many similarities in the circumstances under which the battles were fought; additionally, many similarities were found in the psychological states of those who defected.

One important common factor was inclusion of psyop in planning and operations; part of the psyop programs involved cessation of fire coordinated with presentation of broadcast messages. This common factor and the many other similarities identified in the pre-battle period and in the self-reports of the psychological states of those who surrendered strongly support the belief that it is possible to specify tactical and operational conditions under which psyop appeals for defection can be effective and also specify the kind of psyop program that will be effective

under given conditions. This ability would represent an immediate increase in effective effort and eliminate the need for continual repetitive measurement of such programs. Additionally, identification of the need for existence of proper combinations of target audience conditioning (target audience recent history), timing, specific immediate conditions, and appropriate psyop appeals makes it possible to explain why the same form of psyop works in one instance and not in another that may seem much the same.

Based on the theory of Sensory Overload, two propositions or constructs are proposed.

Theoretical Construct 1: Psyop and High External Pressure

Defection is most likely to occur as an immediate response to psyop messages when appeals are received in the context of some form of military pressure. Where timely messages are received, the opportunity exists, and defection is feasible in the situation, the potential for inducing defection varies together with the degree of pressure (up to a maximum of intensity and duration that varies situationally).

Theoretical Construct 2: Psyop and Internal Psychological Pressure

In the absence of exposure to immediate High External Pressure, defection may occur because of the cumulative effects of a lengthy series of unrewarding, frustrating, difficult, and intermittently dangerous experiences which greatly outweigh any positive features in the total situation. By a process of rationalization -- explained well by "adaptation-level theory"-- the act of defection recommended in the psyop messages can come to be regarded as more and more plausible and advantageous. The incubation period for defection on this basis is from one to two years depending on the individual and the situation through time.

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SECTION III

DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

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DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

In order to deal efficiently with psyop and the problems of "measurement of effectiveness of psyop", it is necessary to be sure that a precise shared understanding exists for these three key terms and for all other significant psyop concepts and assumptions. If such do not already exist, definitions must be constructed; this is an all-important first step toward systematization of a still-developing and expanding activity.

Definitions In Dictionaries, Literature, And Popular Use

Several methods were used to investigate the meaning, substance and content of psyop: general dictionaries were consulted; special dictionaries were checked; manuals, training materials, and orientation materials were reviewed; and users and psyop personnel were polled.

Need for Definition of "Psyop"

Non-specialized dictionaries do not contain the term "psyop" or "psychological operations".

In 1968, the definition of the term "psychological warfare" (psywar), a predecessor of the term "psychological operations" (psyop), was changed in the specialized dictionary of military terminology approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term was reduced in scope to limit its application to hostile foreign groups with the result that psychological warfare is now defined as "the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives".

The newer and broader term "psychological operations" ("psyop") was defined to include psychological warfare and is defined as "the planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives".

This definition, appropriate at the highest policy levels, must necessarily undergo considerable elaboration before it reaches the operating level. Consequently, a survey was made of psyop manuals, papers, and briefing materials used to orient psyop personnel newly arrived in Vietnam.

The Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 33-1, which represents doctrinal guidance at the operating level, repeats the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition of psyop and also defines the two key terms included in that definition:

Propaganda is defined as:

"Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly".

Examples are leaflet messages or loudspeaker broadcasts containing instructions on how to rally.

Other measures are defined as:

"Actions - military, political, economic, social, or others - which assist in accomplishing psyop objectives by influencing the opinions and behavior of people".

Examples are demonstrations, rewards, elections, etc.

Review of other manuals, papers, and briefing materials indicated that, even where the JCS dictionary definition was quoted as a point of departure, much variability characterizes lower-level interpretations of that definition. A typical definition given in a set of briefing

materials is: "Psyop is anything any of us do to change another person's mind about something" (certainly an extraordinarily broad charter) and "Psyop officers are responsible for keeping their commanders informed of the psychological implications of each operation conducted by the unit", (clearly presuming possession of professional competence in applied dynamic behavioral psychology, if the advice of the psyop officer is to be taken seriously).

To establish the definition and concept of psyop that prevails at the working level, abstract and operational definitions of psyop were discussed with 65 individuals with varied types of involvement in psyop in the United States, Thailand, Korea, Okinawa, and Vietnam; four general types of definitions were prevalent:

- Psyop is nothing more or less than a massive advertising or marketing campaign; it is a selling job.
- Psyop is an information program; a way of communicating with the enemy; a "war of words"; "paper bullets".
- Psyop is a trick to deceive or confuse the enemy.
- Psyop is propaganda ("Propaganda" in turn, proved to be associated with lies or untruths).
- One semi-humorous description was given occasionally in conjunction with more serious definitions; "Psyop is something they (the enemy) are much better at than we are".

Need for Definition of "Effectiveness" of Psyop

Essentially the same approach used to investigate the meaning of "psyop" was used to analyze the meaning and implications ascribed to the term "effectiveness" in relation to psyop.

In non-specialized dictionaries, the noun "effect" is defined as "that which is produced by an agent or cause; immediate result".

"Immediate" in the sense applicable to the definition quoted here means "direct" or "without intermediary or intermediation". "Effectiveness", as a variant of "effect", is defined as "the producing or the object of producing a particular impression". These definitions are not particularly informative or helpful for the purposes of this study but the connotation of immediacy that may be associated with the term "effect" may have some explanatory value; i.e., many individuals seem to assume that effectiveness implies that psyop must produce almost immediate effects.

A survey, involving both documents and discussions, of earlier attempts to deal with the question of psyop effectiveness showed that counts or indexes of effort were the main substance of previous studies and proposals. While information about the amount of effort expended is desirable for accurate evaluation of effectiveness of any given psyop, it is not in itself an indication of effectiveness.

The issue of effectiveness had also been discussed with the sample of 65 people involved with psyop. Their definitions of effectiveness were distributed fairly evenly among four themes:

- "Effectiveness is absolute; it (psyop) either is or it isn't".
- "Effectiveness is very simple; if a psyop does the job it is supposed to do, it is 'effective'."
- "Effectiveness is in the mind of the psy-operator; he knows what he is trying to do".
- "Effectiveness means it works or does not work".

About half of the group also offered operational examples. For instance;

- "We broadcast a rally appeal - someone who hears it rallies - that appeal is effective. If no one rallies, it is not effective".
- "We drop some leaflets with a rally message. People rally carrying those leaflets. That leaflet is effective".

Need for Definition of "Measurement" of Psyop Effectiveness

Webster's dictionary defines the noun "measurement" as the "act or result of measuring something". In turn, the transitive verb "measure" is defined as "to ascertain the extent, degree, or capacity of, by a standard; hence to estimate".

The realization that a "measure" is an "estimate" which implies some degree of latitude in "measurement" may be quite surprising to many who have always accepted the connotation of great precision that everyday usage ascribes to the term "measure". That all "measures" can ultimately be proved to be "estimates" is indicated by the fact that a whole sub-section of psychology has evolved bearing the name "psychophysics". One of the basic assumptions of the seven classical methods of psychophysical measurement is essentially that "no single measurement is an accurate measure". Fortunately, another equally hallowed principle is that, "under appropriate conditions and controls, errors in measurement of the same phenomenon will revolve around a midpoint and tend to cancel each other out". The important inference to be drawn is essentially that an average of multiple measurements of the same item will be more valid than any single measurement.

From another point of view, the word "measure" has extraordinary flexibility. Lorge, a well-known educational psychologist concerned with measurement and testing has found that "--in a count of its occurrence in a sample of about two million words, the word 'measure' occurred more than four hundred times and was used in forty different ways". (Lorge, 1951).

The versatility of the word "measure" and its derivative "measurement" has been dwelt upon at length because the variability of the meaning noted here is not usually thought to exist. More important, the legitimate and documented existence of variability in meaning and usage indicate that people may differ considerably and frequently in the meanings they ascribe to the term "measure". This, in turn, may be a partial explanation of the history of difficulties associated with arriving at measures of psyop effectiveness. Specifically, too great a degree of precision and immediacy or both may have been presumed to be necessary for psyop effects to be valid. Also, people working together or separately may have been working with or talking in terms of different meanings of the words without recognition of the differences; such a situation would certainly produce conflicting or ambiguous results.

Manuals and training materials devote little space to measurement of effectiveness, if the issue is mentioned at all. A 180-page evaluation of U.S. Army Psyop in Vietnam conducted by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam contains a glossary of 40 terms none of which concern measurement of psyop effectiveness. Effectiveness, in this study, was judged in terms of the adequacy with which psyop units accomplished their primary mission of providing support to other units rather than in terms of effects of psyop upon the enemy.

FM 33-1, the Department of the Army Field Manual titled Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968 mentions "Evaluation of Psyop Effectiveness," noting that "--Psyop effectiveness is hard to measure." Direct indicators of effectiveness are listed such as responsive action by the target audience, individual reports, observers reports, and contents of captured documents. Indirect indicators mentioned are enemy counter measures such as troop movements, combat actions, atrocities, counter-propaganda, censorship, jamming, and restrictive orders. Methods to make use of these indicators or evaluate the results of use of the indexes are not discussed.

The Guide for Psychological Operations in RVN, published in April 1968 with a cover letter from General Westmoreland, contains a lengthy discussion of the problem of "measurement of psyop effectiveness". The style of treatment is knowledgeable and persuasive but it describes difficulties involved in trying to deal with the general problem; it offers no solutions for the problems, and the basic issue of the precise meaning of "measurement" is not touched upon.

Psyop personnel tend to focus attention on problems or aspects of psyop that represent difficulties when attempting to measure results; these themes are usual:

- Most psyop have no immediate or short-term effects.
- Most types of psyop do not have an effect that can be seen. How can you tell what happens because a VC looks at a poster or reads a poem on a leaflet?
- The effects of most psyop can't be predicted in advance so it is hard to know what to look for.

The "psychological" component of psyop remained elusive at the conclusion of these efforts. Consequently, it was considered necessary to investigate the meaning of psyop through other means of definition.

Definitions Derived From Analysis Of Organization, Practice, And Personnel

A survey of definitions in dictionaries and manuals, and discussions with psyop personnel produced definitions in terms of words and concepts. Psyop can also be defined in terms of the organization structure established to manage and execute psyop, the activities given the name of psyop, and the pattern of training and experience that characterizes the personnel engaged in psyop activities.

Psyop Organization and Administrative Structure

JUSPAO is responsible for providing policy and guidelines for all U.S. civilian and military psyop within Vietnam. It publishes several magazines and newsheets for different segments of the RVN population and designs and develops some but by no means all psyop themes, messages, and other materials. One of its most important functions is its advisory relationship to the Ministry of Information (MOI) of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

On the civilian side, moving down the organizational ladder, in each military region an individual, attached to the Deputy for CORDS, functions as the "Regional Director for Psyop" although the formal organizational titles vary. Within each military region in most provinces, responsible to the "Regional Director", there is an Assistant Province Advisor for Psyop (APA/Psyop) whose general responsibility is to be influential in or involved in whatever psyop occurs within his province.

MACJ3-11 interprets or relays to the U.S. Military forces throughout the country the policy guidances received from JUSPAO. It also coordinates the military psyop support for national objectives, and provides staff supervision for the Fourth Psyop Group. The 4th Psyop Group, because of its importance, is discussed separately in a later section.

The Psyop Officer, usually a Major or Lieutenant Colonel, in the G5 Section of the field forces responsible for an entire military region, generally passes along requests for large-scale psychological operations to the various supporting psyop units and coordinates complex psyop. There are also Psyop officers at division and brigade levels.

The 4th Psyop Group is under the administrative control of USARV and receives staff guidance from MACJ3-11. It is the chief implementing arm for psyop in Vietnam. One of its four organic battalions is located in each military region, usually under the operational control of the G5.

Psyop in Practice

The 4th Psyop Group is the main military action element -- the workhorse for psyop in Vietnam. Both the responsibilities and activities of the 4th Psyop Group as defined by FM 33-1 and the actual operating practices were examined.

FM 33-1: Statement of Functional Capabilities and Responsibilities. The Psyop Manual, FM 33-1, within the framework of military terminology and emphasis, describes the activities undertaken by a psyop unit such as the 4th Psyop Group as functional capabilities; these are command and control, operational, and supply and maintenance. The activities associated with each of these functions are reproduced here from the manual:

a. Command and Control.

1. Commands PSYOP units.
2. Performs detailed planning of PSYOP programs and prepares plans and orders.
3. Provides administrative and logistical support for organic and attached units.
4. Recommends appropriate allocation of PSYOP resources within the supported command.
5. Conducts PSYOP in support of the unit to which assigned or attached.

b. Operational.

1. Development.

- (a) Conducts research and analysis and develops appropriate plans to support PSYOP.
- (b) Develops radio and television scripts, speeches, proclamations, pamphlets, demonstration plans, rumor campaigns, posters, and similar material for production.

2. Production.

- (a) Prepares propaganda tapes and video tapes in the appropriate languages.
- (b) Prints and prepares printed matter for dissemination to include trimming, folding and packaging.
- (c) Operates and maintains radio and television broadcasts.
- (d) Produces and directs radio and television broadcasts.
- (e) Operates a central broadcast studio and dispatches broadcasting teams to field transmitters.
- (f) Loads leaflet bombs, shells, dispensers, and packages.

3. Dissemination.

- (a) Disseminates printed propaganda material.
- (b) Stockpiles propaganda material for delivery and maintains catalogues of types and quantities on hand.
- (c) Conducts "live" and taped loudspeaker and radio broadcasts.
- (d) Conducts film and television operations.

4. Research and analysis.

- (a) Develops detailed background and area study material.
- (b) Identifies and verifies target audiences and their susceptibilities.
- (c) Formulates PSYOP intelligence requirements for collection by intelligence sources.
- (d) Monitors enemy PSYOP for information on propaganda trends.
- (e) Evaluates the effectiveness of enemy PSYOP.
- (f) Evaluates the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP.
- (g) Maintains liaison with other intelligence agencies.
- (h) Provides guidance and information support to propaganda development and production teams to insure that propaganda output is appropriate.
- (i) Remains responsive to the guidance and requirements of command and control elements.

5. Current intelligence.

- (a) Provides essential elements of information to collection agencies.
- (b) Collects information and develops intelligence.
- (c) Analyzes intelligence to determine and verify the current vulnerabilities of target audiences.
- (d) Identifies incidents, situations, and opportunities for exploitation by PSYOP.
- (e) Interrogates prisoners and translates foreign language printed material.

c. Supply and Maintenance

1. Plans and coordinates logistical requirements for PSYOP units and teams.
2. Procures and distributes standard and non-standard items of equipment and supplies.
3. Performs field maintenance on reproduction and electrical equipment.
4. Provides minimum vehicle maintenance capability.

The functional capability "c 4 (a)" titled "Operational" - "Research and Analysis" - "Develops detailed background and area study material" is worthy of special mention. The activities subsumed under this title are also listed in the manual with the comment that the items shown are not a complete list but are intended to provide guidance, i.e., the list is illustrative which means that an even larger list of subjects is of concern; the listed items are:

a. Sociological.

1. The origins and development of ethnic divisions and characteristics of the people.
2. Cultural development, to include ethnics, mores, folkways.
3. Education.
4. Social stratification and mobility.
5. Mobility.
6. Religion.
7. Taboos, prejudices, and sensitivities.
8. Conditions of rural life.
9. Conditions of urban life.
10. Forced labor.
11. Unsolved and/or conflicting issues.
12. Public welfare and health

b. Political.

1. History, development, and structure of present government.
2. The party infrastructure.
3. Foreign policies, historical alliances, and animosities.
4. Relationship between military hierarchy and civil elements.

5. Law enforcement agencies and procedures.
6. Intelligence and security.
7. Propaganda.
8. Subversion potentialities.
9. Biographies of key personalities.

c. Economic.

1. Manpower potential.
2. Industrial potential.
3. Agricultural potential.
4. Economic potential.
5. Trade unions.
6. Taxation.
7. Trade
8. Finance.
9. Availability of consumer goods.
10. Economic freedoms or restrictions.
11. Market systems.

d. Armed Forces.

1. Organization and history.
2. Strategic mission.
3. Tactical doctrine.
4. Political control and indoctrination methods.
5. Intelligence and security organizations.
6. Discipline.
7. Characteristics, training, loyalties, and morale of enlisted personnel.
8. Characteristics, training, loyalties, and morale of officers.
9. Equipment, weapons, and logistic capabilities.
10. Biographies of general officers and other key personnel.
11. Paramilitary organizations.
12. Prestige factors among military services or units.

Results of Analysis of 4th Psyop Group Operations. As part of the study designed to define psyop in terms of the activities given the name of "psyop", an analysis was made of the 4th Psyop Group Monthly Operations Reports for ten months in the period between November 1969 and October 1970. The analysis was made to identify and classify psyop activities, psyop-related activities, and non-psyop activities as they relate to psyop media, targets, and objectives.

Table 1 shows the total range of activities of field teams classified under five major functions: Disseminate, Generate, Educate, Mediate, and Administrative.

Disseminate involves all aspects of transmission of psyop messages.

Generate involves acquisition of information and development and provision of psyop materials.

Educate extends from simple demonstrations to conducting regularly scheduled classes in various subjects; such activities may be much more appropriate as a civic action function.

Mediate involves activities which represent relaying requests from other units or groups of any type within their area of operations and/or distributing or lending materials or equipment to these units or groups; this group of activities is very similar to the activities of the civic action function as it has been practiced at this level within Vietnam.

Administrative is the directive, coordination, supply and maintenance support to others engaged in psyop activities.

Table 1A shows a further breakdown of the Dissemination function presented in Table 1. A key-word-in-context approach was used to classify the nature of what is disseminated.

The terms in the body of the table can be used for more precise elaboration of the more general terms listed under the Sub-Function/Activity category in Table 1.

Almost any combination of two or three items -- one from each of the three categories of "verb", "modifier", and "noun" -- that is meaningful in the context of psyop describes something done by 4th Psyop Group field teams or the content or objectives of psyop messages transmitted in some form by them. For instance, 03-09-17 is "Announce GVN elections", 12-07-37 is "Explain friendly civilian resettlement".

A well-conceived descriptive term that seems inclusive of virtually all activities is "military communications services" or "communications services".

TABLE 1
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES

Major Function	Sub-Function/ Activity	Media	Target	Immediate Objective
01 Disseminate	01 Airdrop	01 ALS-Live	01 Enemy	01 Allow capture
	02 Broadcast	02 ALS-QR Tape	02 Enemy-civilian	02 Collect intel-ligence
	03 Display	03 ALS-Tape	03 Enemy-military	03 Defection
	04 Distribute	04 A-V Equipment	04 NLF	04 Desertion
	05 Handout	05 Earlyword	05 NVA	05 Enhance GVN
	06 Operate	06 Films	06 NVN	06 Facilitating action
	07 Provide	07 GLS-Live	07 VC	07 Rally
	08 Show	08 GLS-QR Tape	08 VCI	08 Self-induce capture
	09 Supply	09 GLS-Tape	09 Misc. - enemy	09 Surrender
	10 Televisé	10 Leaflets		10 Surrender
	11 Misc.	11 Leaflets-QR	20 Children	11 Win friends
		12 Letters	21 Friendly	12 Erode enemy morale
		13 Magazines	22 Friendly-civilian	13 Increase friendly morale
		14 Newsheets	23 Friendly-military	14 Counter enemy propaganda
		15 Newspapers	24 GVN	15 Counter enemy actions
		16 Novelties	25 Neutral - ?	16 Misc.
		17 Pamphlets	26 Refugees	
		18 Pictures	27 Villagers	
		19 Posters	28 FWMAR	
		20 Radio	29 Misc. - friendly	
		21 Slides	30 Misc.	
		22 Tapes		
		23 Television		
		24 Word-of-Mouth		
		25 Misc.		

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES

Major Function	Sub-Function/ Activity	Media/ Content	Target	Immediate Objective
02 Generate	20 Analyze	06 Films	01 Enemy	20 Audience analysis
	21 Design	10 Leaflets	02 Enemy-civilian	21 Improve psyop materials
	22 Develop	11 Leaflets-QR	03 Enemy-military	22 Improve psyop methods
	23 Make	12 Letters	04 NLF	23 Improve psyop coordination
	24 Produce	13 Magazines	05 NVA	24 Improve psyop management
	25 Research	14 Newsheets	06 NVN	25 Improve psyop practices
	26 Study	15 Newspapers	07 VC	26 Improve psyop effectiveness
	27 Survey	16 Novelties	08 VCI	27 Increase knowledge of friendly culture
	28 Misc.	17 Pamphlets	09 Misc. - enemy	28 Increase knowledge of enemy
		18 Pictures		29 Provide psyop materials
		19 Posters		30 Misc.
		21 Slides	20 Children	
		22 Tapes	21 Friendly	
		30 Analyses	22 Friendly-civilian	
		31 Audiences	23 Friendly-military	
		32 Evaluations	24 GVN	
		33 Intelligence data	25 Neutral - ?	
		34 Plans	26 Refugees	
		35 Procedures	27 Villagers	
		36 Programs	28 FWMAF	
		37 Proposals	29 Misc. - friendly	
		38 Propaganda	30 Misc.	
		39 Questionnaires		
	*40 Radio programs			
	41 Reports			
	42 Schedules			
	43 Studies			
	44 Surveys			
	45 Survey data			
	46 Survey instr.			
	47 Tapes-QR			
	48 TV programs			
	49 Misc.			

* Continuation
of Media /Content
Column

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES

Major Function	Sub-Function/ Activity	Media/ Content	Target	Immediate Objective
03 Educate	40 Advise		20 Children	40 Increase capa- bilities
	41 Assist		21 Friendly	41 Increase loyalty to GVN
	42 Demonstrate		22 Friendly-civilian	42 Increase self- sufficiency
	43 Instruct		23 Friendly-military	43 Improve efficiency
	44 Teach		24 GVN	44 Improve health/ hygiene
	45 Train		25 Neutral - ?	45 Improve morale
	46 Misc.		26 Refugees	46 Improve perform- ance
			27 Villagers	47 Misc.
			28 FWMAF	
			29 Misc. - friendly	
			30 Misc.	

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES

Major Function	Sub-Function / Activity	Media / Content	Target	Immediate Objective
04 Mediate	06 Provide	04 A-V Equipment	20 Children	40 Increase capa-
	07 Supply	70 Building ma-	21 Friendly	41 bilities
	50 Assist	terials	22 Friendly-civilian	41 Increase loyalty
	51 Distribute	71 Clothing	23 Friendly-military	42 to GVN
	52 Lend	72 Food	24 GVN	42 Increase self-
	53 Package	73 Materials	25 Neutral - ?	43 sufficiency
	54 Refer	74 Money	26 Refugees	43 Improve efficiency
	55 Relay	75 Ordnance	27 Villagers	44 Improve health/
	56 Support	76 Other units	28 FWMAF	44 hygiene
	57 Misc.	77 Requests	29 Misc. - friendly	45 Improve morale
		78 Supplies	30 Misc.	46 Improve perform-
		79 Transportation		46 ance
		80 Equipment		47 Misc.
		81 Misc.		

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES

Major Function	Sub-Function/ Activity	Media/ Content	Target	Immediate Objective
05 Administrative	61 Arrange	44 Plans		22 Improve psyop methods
	62 Attend	46 Programs		23 Improve psyop coordination
	63 Coordinate	52 Schedules		24 Improve psyop management
	64 Direct	85 Agreements		25 Improve psyop practices
	65 Forecast	86 Arrangements		29 Provide psyop materials
	66 Manage	87 Delivery		60 Maintain psyop efficiency
	67 Plan	88 Logistics		61 Support
	68 Supervise	89 Operations		62 Misc.
	69 Misc.	90 Personnel		
		91 Projects		
		92 Production		
		93 Psyop		
		94 Working re- lationship		
		95 Misc.		

TABLE 1-A
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 4TH PSYOP GROUP ACTIVITIES:
FRACTIONATION OF THE "DISSEMINATION" FUNCTION

Verb	Modifier	Noun
01 Advise	01 Civic	01 Actions
02 Allow	02 Civilian	02 Arguments
03 Announce	03 Coming	03 ARVN
04 Appeal	04 Drama	04 Attitudes
05 Attack	05 Enemy-civilian	05 Attrocities
06 Condemn	06 Enemy-military	06 Beliefs
07 Counter	07 Friendly-civilian	07 Capture
08 Counteract	08 Friendly-military	08 Cooperation
09 Enhance	09 GVN	09 Danger
10 Entertain	10 Local	10 Dates
11 Erode	11 NLF	11 Death
12 Explain	12 NVA	12 Defeats
13 Expose	13 Security	13 Defection
14 Increase	14 VC	14 Dentcaps
15 Induce	15 Misc.	15 Desertion
16 Notify		16 Disparities
17 Praise		17 Elections
18 Promote		18 Entertainment
19 Publicize		19 Events
20 Reduce		20 Explanations
21 Self-induce		21 Extinction
22 Threaten		22 GVN
23 Talk about		23 Health/hygiene
24 Turn in		24 Loyalty/allegiance
25 Warn		
26 Misc.		
		25 Losses
		26 Meetings
		27 Medcaps
		28 Morale
		29 Opinions
		30 Paramilitary
		31 Policies
		32 Principles
		33 Programs
		34 Propaganda
		35 Rally
		36 Relocation
		37 Resettlement
		38 Rewards
		39 Security
		40 Show
		41 Statistics
		42 Surrender
		43 Threats
		44 Victories
		45 Weapons
		46 Warnings
		47 Misc.

Psyop Personnel: Education, Training, and Experience

The education, training, and experience of personnel engaged in a specialized activity provides an excellent means for defining the content of any given activity and for estimating the quality of such activities; therefore, it is useful to consider the backgrounds of psyop-erators and psyop managers at all levels.

In JUSPAO, which sets policy, although graduate training and advanced degrees are frequent particularly in political science, none are in psychology and few are in the social or behavioral sciences. No individuals were found at the field team or psyop battalion level who possessed advanced degrees in psychology or related social sciences.

Over a three-year period, few if any psyop officers in the G5 field forces in any of the four military regions were found to have graduate training in psychology; this was true also for the civilian "Regional Directors" under the DEP/CORDS and their subordinate assistant province advisors for psyop. One marine reserve colonel, recalled to active duty especially to fill the position of psyop officer in Military Region One (MR1) had a Ph.D. in Political Science; perhaps because of his credentials, he exerted an unusually strong influence in MR1.

In the Fourth Psyop Group Headquarters at any given time during the past three years, there may or may not have been one or two officers with graduate training in psychology; this has been true also for MACJ3-11. When such personnel are available, they are almost always assigned to research functions rather than being concerned with conceptualization and design of psyop.

Summary

Based on an empirical analysis of everyday operations of psyop units plus the results of a survey of the qualifications, background, training, and experience of personnel involved in psyop at all levels from individual action in the field to the highest level of policy formulation, it must be concluded that there is little or no input of competent professional knowledge of dynamic applied psychology to most aspects of psyop. For that reason the name "psychological operations" is misleading even if interpreted very loosely.

To provide perspective upon this conclusion it should be noted that a doctorate is stipulated for almost all positions within the United States that require any independent judgment to be exercised in psychological matters. Minimal requirements for participating membership in national professional associations are two years of graduate training plus a year of paid experience or an appropriate doctorate. Most local professional associations have similar requirements. An individual is virtually unemployable without at least a Masters Degree in any field requiring knowledge and application of psychology.

If current minimum requirements for employability as a psychologist represent a realistic standard, then it must be concluded that what is now called "psychological operations" are not "psychological operations" in the sense of incorporating competent professional knowledge of principles of dynamic psychology when designing and executing psyop. There is no implication that it is necessary for a psyoperator or for a psyop manager at any level to be a psychologist or social scientist (although it is imperative that he be an astute manager). However, from a quality assurance, quality control, or cost effectiveness standpoint psyop can only benefit from availability of expertise in pertinent disciplines. It is logical and desirable that those responsible for conceptualization of psyop theory, formulation of psyop policy, training of psyop personnel, design and execution of psyop programs, development of psyop materials, and evaluation of all aspects of psyop should routinely receive the benefits to be gained by incorporation of expert knowledge of psychology and other pertinent social and behavioral sciences. Actually, normal prudence dictates that this be done for the same reasons that professional expertise is utilized in other matters of consequence. For instance, although almost everyone regardless of occupational specialty knows something about legal or health matters, who does not employ an attorney to advise on or deal with important legal issues or a physician to prescribe for or deal with serious illnesses?

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SECTION IV

MEASUREMENT OF PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS:
MEDIA , MESSAGES, AND SMALL-SCALE PSYOP

SECTION IV

MEASUREMENT OF PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS: MEDIA, MESSAGES, AND SMALL-SCALE PSYOP

Individuals involved with psyop, the pertinent literature, and instructional materials and manuals are agreed that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to measure the effectiveness of psyop. The conclusion that psyop effectiveness is almost impossible to measure can be agreed if restated with these qualifications: "It is extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of many forms of psyop under many types of conditions".

The several sub-sections within this section define the major problem hindering successful measurement of psyop effectiveness, present evidence that psyop messages are effective, describes the results of empirical tests of two theoretical constructs, provides evidence that certain types of small-scale psyop are effective and explains why other seemingly similar psyop are not productive in the same way.

History

It has been noted earlier that initial attempts to measure effectiveness of psyop used indices of the amount of effort expended or materials used as criteria rather than measures of the kind and amount of psyop effects in terms of changes in the target audience consistent with the psyop objectives.

Other approaches to the task of measuring psyop effectiveness have used intermediate criteria such as evaluation of the extent to which a psyop unit is able to carry out assigned missions and the extent to which the time and resources of psyop units are utilized.

Later efforts at psyop measurement, recognizing the need for greater penetration of the basic problem, concentrated on attempts to identify independent general criteria which could be used for measurement of effectiveness of most or all varieties of psyop; these attempts were uniformly unsuccessful.

Basic Problem in Attempts at Measurement

Recognition of the applicability and pertinence of some practical analogies could have saved the time spent in the efforts to identify independent generally applicable criteria. The analogy described here both explains the problems encountered earlier and describes the problem that must be solved now.

The engineer, mechanic, or production worker knows well that an almost endless number of instruments are required to measure what seem to be only slightly different aspects of what appear to be very similar materials or products; also conversely, many different instruments are needed to measure different aspects of any one production item. For instance, in a transistor manufacturing process, a microscopic wafer of crystal -- a microdot -- may first be measured and cut to size by a grid, a simple metal instrument with cross-hatched lines that looks like graph paper. Later it will be tested for conductivity by an extremely complicated and expensive electronic instrument which produces wavy lines on a cathode ray tube display device that are interpreted by the operator to arrive at a measurement based on patterns of the shape of the lines. Still later, another instrument, perhaps related to sonar, may be used to check for structural flaws, the measure of which is shown by reading the position of a needle on a clock-type dial. Finally, a "go - no go" measuring device which provides a simple electrical impulse may be used to check the faithfulness with which the microdot, now encapsulated as part of a transistor, performs the impulse transmission or rejection function for which it was designed; this reading may simply be the flashing-on or not-flashing-on of a light on an instrument panel.

In the previous paragraph were described four different methods of taking measurements by four different instruments, using four different types of measurement indices, each interpreted against different types of standards or criteria, which are required for measurement of a transistor's potential for effectiveness at four different stages during its manufacture. There is a very direct analogy to the tools required for measurement of psyop effectiveness. Four different types of psyop under four different sets of conditions, having four different primary objectives, will require at least four different measuring instruments (methods) which may give four different types of readings for measurements, which will be based on four different sets of standards (criteria). There is little reason to wonder why generally applicable criteria for measurement of all psyop could not be found.

The analogy accurately describes the problems faced today by those concerned with measurement of psyop effectiveness. There are innumerable formulas and measurement devices available in already-developed or partially developed sciences and disciplines, especially in the behavioral sciences. If those that exist are not satisfactory, it is relatively easy for more devices to be created. But, the problem that remains is the wide gap between having available means of measurement and making validatable data-supported measurements. This gap cannot be crossed until the necessary exploratory work is done to determine validatable, data-supported guidelines, i.e., rules of connection, that indicate which measuring device is to be used on which type of psyop under what conditions. However, the measuring device and criteria must be appropriate to the subject of the measurement. Try, for instance, to measure the diameter of a marble with a wooden ruler, or the value of a large diamond by weighing it on a scale. It may be done, but there are intervening steps that must be taken; for psyop, it is the logic of these steps that must be developed and supported to move psyop knowledge out of the arena of personal conviction into the realm of science.

Hopefully, this analogy will have served to make the point that much of the difficulty previously experienced in work on measurement of psyop effectiveness stemmed, not so much from the intrinsic ambiguity of the subject matter -- but rather from the failure to (1) distinguish between the approaches appropriate to different aspects or types of psyop and (2) failure to distinguish between measurement of the effectiveness of a unitary basic psyop activity, such as a psyop communication (messages) and the effectiveness of complex psyop projects which are multi-faceted, multi-dimensional, and characterized by multi-problems.

This section, in addition to defining the basic problem of measurement, contains a description of a conceptual approach to systematic evaluation of psyop effectiveness generalized from a basic theory of the dynamics of psyop effectiveness based on the interaction of psycho-physiological functions, external situational and internal psychological stress, and psyop; analyses of results of a series of studies which establish the effectiveness of the fundamental unit common to all psyop -- media and messages -- without which psyop does not exist; and results of studies of small-scale psyop selected for empirical tests of two theoretical constructs derived from the basic theory.

A Conceptual Approach
To Measurement Of Psyop Effectiveness

A basic theory for psyop has been proposed in Section II which (1) attempts to explain the general process by which the human mind and body function in reaction to reception of externally and internally-originated stimuli of various kinds, various intensities, and varied patterns of transmission rates; (2) attempts to describe the typical pattern of human reaction to varied kinds, levels, and assortments of stress; and (3) relates the interaction of psychophysiological processes and external stress-inducing conditions to potential for psyop exploitation.

Illustrations of some of the abstract terms used here are:

- "externally-originated stimuli" - noise heard, things seen or smelled,
- "internally-originated stimuli" - jumping nerves, dry throat, fluttering stomach,
- "various intensities" - deafening noise, low whistle,
- "pattern of transmission rates" - regular spaced fire, intermittent sporadic firing.

In illustration why such factors as "pattern of transmission" must be considered and how variation in "transmission rate" causes different psychological effects, consider a typical reaction to a B-52 bombing pattern. If it is steady, the targeted individual lies wherever he is, thinking "when will it stop?" But if it is erratically spaced, his thought is "will it start again?" Which is more disruptive for the individual? Clearly, the latter thought. The psychological basis for this? It lies in the "laws of learning".

Regular spacing represents normal "conditioning" and will very quickly condition the individual to an awareness that the discomfort is over when a certain length of time has passed without the next bomb exploding; the individual relaxes and future-oriented anxiety decreases. But if the spacing is erratic and duration of bombings vary in length, exposure to the erratic variation represents "aperiodic conditioning"

with which is associated greater or more intense "expectancy", i.e., "waiting for the second shoe to drop". The last bomb heard is not identified as the last that will drop by the simple passage of a specific amount of time; therefore, the expectancy persists longer with consequent greater stress being generated internally. Irregular occurrence of the bombing raids may allow the expectancy and associated higher stress to continue with only moderate decrease between bombing raids.

The relationship of the increased stress to psyop? The added sensory loading created by the increased stress represents one more factor nudging the targeted individual upward along the gradient of tolerance for stimulation toward the zone of "Heightened Suggestibility". In that zone, he will be receptive to defection appeals. In this connection, some individuals, military and civilian, have asked, "Why go to all this trouble in a situation where you've got that M-16?" The answer, which the authors do not have, appears to be solely a function of military orders, objectives, and judgment.

Theoretical Constructs for Psyop

Based on the general theory described in Section II, two derived constructs have been formulated titled Theory 1: Psyop Effectiveness in Relation to Degree of External Pressure, and Theory 2: Psyop Effectiveness in Relation to Degree of Internal Psychological Tension.

Theoretical Construct 1: Psyop Effectiveness in Relation to Degree of External Pressure. Defection is most likely to occur as an immediate response to psyop messages when appeals are received in the context of some form of military pressure. Where timely persuasive messages are received, the opportunity exists, and defection is feasible in the situation, the potential for inducing defection varies together with the degree of pressure (up to a maximum of intensity and duration that varies situationally).

Theoretical Construct 2: Psyop Effectiveness in Relation to Degree of Internal Psychological Tension. In the absence of exposure to immediate high external pressure, defection may occur because of the cumulative effects of a lengthy series of unrewarding, frustrating, difficult, and intermittently dangerous experiences which greatly outweigh any positive features in the total situation.

By the largely unconscious process of rationalization* -- explained well by adaptation-level theory** -- the act of defection recommended in the psyop messages can come to be regarded as more and more plausible and advantageous. The incubation period for defection on this basis is from one to two years depending on the individual and the situation through time.

Five major assumptions are important in the general theory and any derivations:

1. The history of the targeted individuals' experiences over the preceding two-year period is important in creating attitudes positive or negative for defection; the last month previous to finding himself in a pressure situation in which he receives psyop appeals is crucial.
2. The absence or presence and, if present, the degree of external pressure extant is a major determinant of receptivity to a psyop appeal.
3. The timing of receipt of psyop appeals is a determining factor for receptivity to appeals, especially when high external pressure exists.
4. The internal psychological status of the targeted individual is the dominant factor governing receptivity to psyop appeals under all conditions.
5. Implied in points 1 - 4 is consideration of the degree of appropriateness of the psyop-recommended action in the context of the situation in which it is received.

*The process of concocting plausible reasons to account for one's practices (behavior) or beliefs; no conscious criterion warns the individual that he is creating a defense or justification unconnected with his true motivations (which he also does not know).

**Adaptation-level (AL) theory assumes a neutral point or region of sensory functioning at which stimuli coinciding with AL are indifferent or ineffective, stimuli above AL have a given character, and stimuli below AL have an opposite or complementary quality. The AL represents the pooled effect of three classes of factors; stimuli immediately responded to or in the focus of attention; stimuli having background or contextual influence; and residuals from past experience with similar stimuli. Quantitatively, AL is a log mean of these three classes of factors, weighted according to relevant dimensions of effectiveness, e.g., intensity, frequency, affective value, quality, etc. (Helson, 1947).

A very significant implication of this set of assumptions is that not all psyop can be measured for effectiveness. Some psyop in certain situations can always be measured, some can be measured in some situations but not in others; and some psyop -- though perhaps theoretically measurable -- can never be measured within the limits of what is realistic in terms of acceptance of the amount of effort and expense required over an extended period of time.

The psyop that can always be measured in some situations are of the simplest kind: an appeal to a surrounded enemy unit is an extreme example; an appeal to the enemy when there is some reason to believe he is in a receptive state of mind at the immediate moment is another example.

In conducting empirical measurement studies of field operations, three factors are controlling; the psyop message must be adequate to evoke the desired response; the conditions prevailing must allow the response to occur if the intent to respond is created, and the message must reach the target audience.

Consequently before testing theory, studies were undertaken to determine whether or not psyop messages -- as they are conceived and used in current general practice -- do in fact influence enemy behavior.

The next section reports the results of a true foundation study for psyop. The absolute requirement for success of any form of psyop is that a message reaches a target; this is true no matter what form the message takes and no matter how it gets to the target. It is appropriate, therefore, in a study of psyop effectiveness, to begin with assessment of the effectiveness of psyop's basic unit -- messages.

Effectiveness Of Psyop Messages: A Foundation Study

Psyop comes in many shapes and sizes -- ranging from mini-scale person-to-person up to maxi-scale nation-to-nation. But ultimately, even the most grandly conceived psyop reduces to a communication reaching a target -- no communication, no psyop. In 1968-69, when rally messages accounted for 95% or more of leaflet production, it was not inappropriate to say that rally leaflets was essentially the sum of psyop directed at the enemy; the situation has changed moderately since that time.

Requirements for Effective Psyop Messages

It will be seen in this section that leaflets and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts are the media that reach the largest number of enemy troops most often. Supplementary data shows that appeals to rally or surrender are the most frequently used themes in the messages carried by these media. Research under wartime conditions prohibits experimental manipulation and it is necessary to find and work with existing real situations rather than creating them for the researcher's purposes. Therefore, the effectiveness of psyop messages making rally and surrender appeals using leaflets and airborne loudspeakers will be the focus of concern in this section.

Selection of Criteria

The first issue in consideration of effectiveness is "what is effectiveness?". A search for answers to this question requires selection of criteria appropriate to the subject being studied (i.e., the phenomenon selected for measurement). In evaluating the effectiveness of rally or surrender appeals, the most demanding criterion is that rally or surrender occurs immediately in response to such an appeal;

a less restrictive criterion is that the desired response occurs ultimately rather than immediately. A still less strict criterion is consideration of rallying or surrendering whether or not the action takes place. If any of this family of criteria is met, the message has been effective in some degree.

Being overly strict in specification of criteria also would mean being somewhat unrealistic or impractical in evaluating psyop; there must be some acceptable relationship between effort expended to transmit the messages and the amount of return for the effort. The second issue to be considered in effectiveness, then, is the question of "yield" or productivity; the basis for selecting criteria for evaluation of this issue appears to be purely a matter of subjective opinion in most cases unless someone can be persuaded to make arbitrary decisions that trade off danger to life against expense in dollars and effort.

For clarity of analysis, interpretation and discussion of the issues of "whether effective" and "how effective" cannot be treated simultaneously.

Unfortunately, separate treatment of the two issues results in tedious, lengthy, and monotonous restatements of the same issues. In what follows the question of "whether effective?" will be treated in detail; the issue of "how effective?" will be treated in more global fashion.

Requirements for Effectiveness

In order to focus analysis tightly and sharply on the issue of effectiveness, a sequential set of requirements that must be met for psyop messages to be effective has been postulated and a question which tests whether psyop messages meet each requirement has been formulated. These "requirements", in relation to the section titled "Development of a Science" may be regarded as first attempts at formulating and providing support for "theoretical constructs". The requirements are based on the experience of HSR senior researchers gained from studies in Vietnam during 1966 - 71 and consultation to psyop-related programs at Fort Bragg, logical analysis of the experiential history of military psyoperations embedded in the psyop manuals, and conclusions from interviews and discussions with more than sixty psyop officers. The requirements and associated questions are listed here followed by the research data pertinent to each postulated requirement. These requirements for psyop effectiveness and the associated test questions, ordered here in logical sequence are:

Requirement 1. Means of transmission of a psyop message must exist within the span of perception of target audience members.

Question: What media enable communication to enemy personnel?

Requirement 2. The message carried by the proximate media must come to the attention of members of the target audience, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or by relay.

Question: Are messages actually received by enemy personnel?

Requirement 3. The words and phrasing -- the language of the message -- must be understandable to the target audience.

Question: Are the words and phrasing of the psyop messages understandable with normal ease?

Requirement 4. The theme or content of the message (with some specific exceptions) must be judged by members of the target audience to be comprehensible.

Question: Is the content of the message -- the theme -- comprehensible to the enemy?

Requirement 5. The content must be sufficiently believable for the target audience to ascribe some degree of credibility to the message.

Question: Are the messages judged by the enemy to be credible?

Requirement 6. The persuasive power of the message in the context of the situation in which it is received by the target audience must not be disproportionate to the danger and potential consequences involved in taking the action recommended in the message. To be effective the recommended action or an equivalent action must be taken or receive some degree of consideration.

- a. Were the psyop messages the dominant factor or a major contributing factor in evocation of the desired action (or an equivalent action)? *
- b. Were the psyop messages a facilitating factor in the decision to take the recommended action (or an equivalent action)?
- c. Did the psyop messages receive serious consideration (whether or not the action or an equivalent action is ever taken)?
- d. Did the psyop messages receive brief consideration even though it may have been quickly rejected?

Source of Research Data/Procedure

The data treated in this section includes the responses of 100 VC PW's and 200 NVA PW's interviewed in all four military regions in Vietnam in 1970. Specially-designed questionnaires were developed for each type of prisoner.

Also included are the responses of 100 NVA ralliers and 100 VC ralliers who were interviewed at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon and other Chieu Hoi Centers in MR2 and MR3 between July and November of 1970. Specially tailored questionnaires were designed to further elaborate and check findings from similar earlier studies of these two types of ralliers conducted earlier. All interviews -- averaging approximately three and one-half hours for PW's and slightly over two and one-half hours for ralliers, were conducted by experienced HSR-trained interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor and an HSR Research Scientist.

*A requirement that psyop be judged the "sole factor" would be extremely unrealistic and incorrect; a basic tenet of clinical psychology is "multiple causation": paraphrased, the rule says; "Every bit of behavior has many causes".

Test of Research Results Against Requirements for Effectiveness

The test question for each requirement for media effectiveness is applied in sequence to the research data obtained on VC and NVA ralliers and PW's.

Requirement 1: What Media Enable Communication to Enemy Personnel?

Even a perfectly conceived psyop could not possibly have any effect upon the members of a target audience unless the media is effective in terms of reaching the target audience.

Table 2 shows the extent to which the physical means of emitting a psyop message were within the span of perception of members of the target audience. The proximity of nine types of media -- leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, radio sets, newspapers, magazines, ground loudspeakers, posters, television sets, and psyop novelty items was surveyed for four classes of enemy: NVA Hoi Chanh, VC Hoi Chanh, NVA PW's and VC PW's.

TABLE 2
ENEMY PROXIMITY TO MEANS FOR
TRANSMITTING PSYOP MESSAGES

<u>Media</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>		<u>Prisoners</u>	
	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(200)</u>
Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
Heard Airborne Loudspeakers	100%	88%	81%	70%
Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
Saw Newspapers	34%	16%	20%	11%
Saw Magazines	13%	06%	10%	05%
Heard Ground Loudspeaker	09%	05%	04%	01%
Read Posters	07%	02%	03%	--
Saw Television Sets	04%	02%	07%	02%
Saw Psyop Novelty Items	01%	02%	--	--

Comment. The results shown in Table 2 demonstrate conclusively that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the mechanical means for transmission of psyop messages which are seen or heard by a large majority of VC and NVA personnel. Accordingly, these three media will be the focus of further attention. Statistics for other media will be shown where available but without comment.

Three media are effective means for attempts to reach enemy personnel with psyop messages (under current practices in Vietnam).

Requirement 2: Are Messages Actually Received by Enemy Personnel?

Physical proximity -- i.e., being within sight or hearing -- of means of transmission of psyop messages does not necessarily mean that messages reach the enemy. Leaflets can be left untouched, the sound of airborne loudspeakers can be audible but unintelligible, and radios may not be in operation or may be tuned to non-psyop channels. To have the chance to be effective, it is necessary that the target audience attend, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the psyop message.

Table 3 shows the extent to which messages carried by the three effective media register upon the four categories of enemy being treated.

TABLE 3
MESSAGES THAT REACH LARGE NUMBERS
OF VC AND NVA PERSONNEL

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
<u>Leaflets</u>				
% in Sample Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% of "Saw Leaflet" who "Read Leaflet"	81%	97%	31%	44%
<u>Airborne Loudspeakers (ALS)</u>				
% in Sample Heard Sound of ALS	100%	88%	81%	70%
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% of "Heard Sound" who "Heard Clearly"	89%	98%	78%	81%
<u>Radio</u>				
% in Sample Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
% in Sample Heard Broadcasts	69%	43%	21%	17%
% of "Saw Radio" who "Heard Radio"	70%	62%	21%	25%

Comment. The results shown in Table 3 make it clear that a very large majority of ralliers -- both VC and NVA -- did read leaflets before they rallied.

Although all of the samples of NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners had similar exposure to leaflets, there is a large difference in the number of ralliers that read leaflets and the number of prisoners that did so. The number of VC ralliers who read leaflets (86%) is three times as large as the number of VC PW's who read them (27%); similarly, the number of NVA ralliers who had read leaflets (93%) is two and one-third times the number of NVA PW's who had read them (39%).

The differences in leaflet-reading behavior between ralliers and prisoners was investigated by analysis of narrative responses. Those in the PW samples mention their cadres' insistence that it is strictly forbidden to read leaflets and the existence of strict surveillance and controls as reasons for not picking up and reading leaflets. Other reasons mentioned consistently explain that such an act would be disloyal or unthinkable. In contrast, the ralliers do also mention surveillance but a much larger percentage indicate that it is possible to escape such controls if it is so desired; many have some type of grievance. The contrast in attitudes between the ralliers and PW's suggests the existence of personality, ideological, and motivational differences between the two groups. This notion is furthered by the fact that the pattern of the responses of both ralliers and PW's is much more alike than is the pattern of VC ralliers compared to VC PW's or NVA ralliers compared to NVA PW's.

A large majority of ralliers and prisoners heard the sound of airborne loudspeakers. For the ralliers, to hear the sound was essentially equivalent to hearing the message clearly although not necessarily on all occasions. Among the prisoners, a somewhat smaller percentage heard and a smaller percentage heard clearly on fewer occasions. The option to ignore a leaflet is easily exercised but the same option does not exist in the case of airborne loudspeaker broadcasts; because there is little or no choice about hearing or not hearing such messages, the findings must be interpreted with caution.

About half of the rallier samples -- somewhat more VC than NVA -- heard radio broadcasts and slightly less than one-fifth of the PW samples heard radio broadcasts. The questions used as internal checks on the consistency of individual responses disclose that in each

sample a large majority of those who do listen to radio broadcasts listen solely or mainly to music, opera, or "news", all of which apparently have little relevance to psyop appeals. The relationship of "news" to psyop could not be determined within the limits of this study.

In summary, of the three media that reach the enemy in sufficiently large numbers to enable execution of studies, leaflets were clearly effective in getting messages to virtually all enemy personnel who become ralliers but were read by only about one-third of the prisoner samples.

Airborne loudspeakers did not reach enemy personnel with the same completeness of coverage as did leaflets although they do reach a larger percentage than any other media.

Radio broadcasts could reach useful segments of the enemy audience but, because the content of what is heard is ambiguous, radio is not identified here as an effective medium for psyop under current conditions in Vietnam.

Requirement 3: Are the Words and Phrasing of the Psyop Messages Understandable with Normal Ease?

Once the psyop message has reached its target, as a minimum requirement the words, phrases, and style of composition must be characterized by normal intelligibility for communication to occur. Table 4 shows the pattern of reactions to the language used in leaflet messages.

The issue of "hearing words clearly" is so intricately involved with the issue of "understanding words" in a verbal message that the distinction could not be maintained satisfactorily; in effect, the terms appear to be interchangeable. Therefore, airborne loudspeaker messages were not included in this series of questions because of their known brevity and simplistic construction in order to conserve time and expand coverage of indeterminate issues.

TABLE 4
INTELLIGIBILITY OF LANGUAGE
USED IN LEAFLET MESSAGES

<u>Media</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>		<u>Prisoners</u>	
	<u>VC</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>NVA</u>
	<u>(100)</u>	<u>(100)</u>	<u>(100)</u>	<u>(200)</u>
<u>Leaflets</u>				
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% who "Read Leaflets"	92%	100%	96%	90%
who "Understand Words"				

Comment. Table 4 shows clearly that the language element of the message is almost completely effective in that no problems are indicated in understanding the individual words.

Requirement 4: Is the Intent of the Message -- The Theme -- Comprehensible?

It is quite possible to understand all of the words that make up a message without gaining any understanding of the intended content or theme of a message.

For the psyop message to have the chance to be effective, the target audience must feel that they understand the message. Despite this fact, the psyoperator's actual intention which may be quite different from the "intent" perceived by the target audience -- and which is presumably embedded in the content of the message -- does not have to be recognized consciously or understood by the target audience for the message to have a chance to be effective. It can be said with confidence that conscious understanding is not necessary for effectiveness because what is known of dynamic psychology makes it clear that one does not necessarily know whether, when, how, or by what, one's thinking and emotions may be affected. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that artfully contrived messages with hidden meanings could

influence the readers' attitudes and emotions in some significant way that the reader does not consciously recognize. However, the nature of current operating practices in the field that govern the composition of psyop messages does not encourage the notion that sophisticated messages with hidden intent and impact are the rule -- or that they occur at all by deliberate intent.

Instances where the psyoperator's intent is to cause confusion or perplex others may seem to be an exception to the need for an assumption of understanding on the part of the target audience but it is not actually so. The psyoperator's intent is for the reader to become confused about the issue treated in the message; except in unusual circumstances, it is not intended that the reader be confused about the meaning of the message.

Table 5 shows the extent to which target audiences report they have understood the intent or themes of psyop messages.

TABLE 5
UNDERSTANDING OF THEME - INTENT OF MESSAGES
THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

<u>Media</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>		<u>Prisoners</u>	
	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(200)</u>
<u>Leaflet</u>				
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% of "Understand Words" who "Understand Content"	100%	100%	100%	100%
<u>Airborne Loudspeaker</u>				
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% of "Heard Clearly" who "Understand Content"	98%	98%	89%	91%

Comment. The category "Understand Some" is interpretable in two ways: analysis of narrative elaboration of the respondent's initial answers disclosed that the "Understand Some" response may be interpreted correctly as, "understood some part or all of all messages received" or "understood some part of some of the messages received".

It is obvious by inspection of Table 5 that when messages were read or heard, the recipients felt they understood part or all of some or all of the messages received.

In summary, leaflet messages and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were effective in the sense that those who read or heard the messages judged that they understood the theme or content of the message.

Requirement 5: Are the Messages Judged by the Enemy to be Credible?

Having reached a target audience -- to have an opportunity to be effective, i.e., evoke a desired reaction -- the content or theme of the message must be judged to be believable. The credibility of a message does not have to bear any relationship to its "truth" or degree of "untruth" as judged by some set of arbitrary standards. "Believability", or the willingness to ascribe credibility, exists in the mind of each individual recipient of a message.

Table 6 shows the judgments of believability of messages made by the four types of enemy samples.

TABLE 6
CREDIBILITY ASCRIBED TO MESSAGES
THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

<u>Media</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>		<u>Prisoners</u>	
	<u>VC</u> (100)	<u>NVA</u> (100)	<u>VC</u> (100)	<u>NVA</u> (200)
<u>Leaflet</u>				
% in Sample Understand Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	79%	83%	14%	25%
% of "Understand Content" who "Believed Message"	100%	89%	54%	71%
<u>Airborne Loudspeaker (ALS)</u>				
% in Sample Understand Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	86%	76%	22%	28%
% of "Understand Content" who "Believed Message"	99%	90%	39%	54%

Comment. As is the case for the data shown in Table 5, the category "Believed Some" is interpretable in two ways: qualitative elaboration of the respondent's initial answers disclosed that the "Believed Some" response may be interpreted correctly as "believed some part or all of all messages received" or "believed some part of some of the messages received".

It can be seen by inspection of Table 6 that more than three-quarters of all the rallier samples ascribe some degree of credibility to some or all of the messages received through either media. When only those who read or heard and understood the messages are considered, about nine out of ten ralliers -- whether VC or NVA -- ascribed some degree of credibility to the messages. Remembering that the average number of leaflets read by the rallier samples is about twenty, it can be said that "the rallier who read leaflets came to believe them." About one-fifth of the prisoner samples found some of the messages credible in some degree. Airborne loudspeaker messages were heard and believed in some degree by a large percentage of the ralliers sampled and by about one-fifth of the PW samples.

In summary, leaflets were effective in the sense that almost all in the VC and NVA samples who did rally, and had read or heard and understood messages, believed some or all of what was said in some or all of the messages. About one-fifth of the PW samples ascribed some degree of credibility to messages read or heard.

Summary

In brief summary, psyop leaflet and airborne loudspeaker messages are found to be effective in that they did reach large majorities of each type of sample, are understood, and are ascribed some degree of credibility.

Decision To Rally:
Influence Of Leaflet Messages

Studies cited earlier demonstrated the pre-eminence of leaflets and airborne loudspeakers as effective media in the sense that they do reach the enemy, are understood, and have some credibility; other studies described in the next sub-section of this report document the effectiveness of rally or surrender appeals using such media. The studies treated in this section were specifically designed to investigate the influence actually exerted by the messages. The studies also test Theory 2 by investigating the reasons and reasoning processes whereby the notion of rallying first gains a foothold in the enemy soldier's thinking, grows in plausibility, and is later transformed into the act of rallying. Theory 2 assumes that the reasoning processes which lead to rallying are characterized by a lengthy incubation period for individuals not exposed to unusual military or situational pressures.

Procedure

Two hundred ralliers were interviewed in early 1971. A sample of 100 VC ralliers was composed of four sub-groups to cover four elements within the VC organization: combat force, support force, guerrilla force, and civilian force. A sample of NVA ralliers was composed of two elements, 68% combat and 32% support.

Arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, at the Chieu Hoi Center in Bien Hoa, and at several other province centers by a trained all-Vietnamese team of interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor. Individuals were selected at random from administrative records and assigned to the appropriate category until 25 protocols had been obtained for each of the four categories for the VC group. Individuals were selected at random as available until 100 NVA protocols had been obtained.

Interviews required from one and one-quarter to one and one-half hours. Each was conducted under adequate conditions for privacy and freedom of response.

One portion of the comprehensive interviewing procedure used with these samples was designed to identify the extent to which the psyop messages affected the enemy soldier's thinking and behavior, specifically

in relation to defection. Another portion is designed to identify the ways in which the act of rallying first enters an individual's thoughts, the reasoning processes and emotional linkages involved in coming to accept rallying as a possible action, and the reasons for making and acting on a decision to rally.

Narrative elaboration of responses was obtained which provide a check on the validity and reliability of initial brief answers. These responses provide useful descriptive detail and, if necessary, can be subjected to latent structure analysis to resolve inconsistencies.*

Results

Table 7 shows the percentages of the two separate groups and the combined total sample who had read leaflets, claimed to remember particular types of leaflets, and could validate this report to a considerable extent by accurate recollection of themes or wording.

TABLE 7
ATTENTION TO PSYOP LEAFLETS

<u>Question</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>(200)</u>
Read leaflets before rally?	87%**	89%**	88%
Remember particular types?	87%	89%	88%
Describe message content?	87%	89%	88%

*Latent structure analysis is a method used in the social sciences for scaling replies to questionnaires based on the assumption that contradictory or partially inconsistent replies can be explained in terms of the "latent class" or "latent distance" found in deeper underlying attitudes; the logic of the analysis resembles that of factor analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954).

**VC read an average of 19 leaflets; NVA read an average of 20.

The percentage of the VC and NVA samples who read leaflets before rallying approaches being identical with the percentages found for other similar samples shown in Table 3 in the sub-section titled "Effectiveness of Psyop Messages."

Influence Exerted By Leaflets

The results shown in this section relate to Requirement 6a and 6b.

Requirement 6a: Were the Psyop Messages a Dominant Factor or a Major Contributing Factor in Evaluation of the Desired Action (or an Equivalent Action)?

Requirement 6b: Were the Psyop Messages a Facilitating Factor in the Decision to Take the Recommended Action (or an Equivalent Action)?

Questions 6a and 6b of Requirement 6 are specifically applicable to enemy ralliers because the fact that they ultimately rallied validates their introspective reports.

Table 8 shows data obtained from NVA and VC soldiers who actually did rally.

Four different attitudes toward rallying that existed prior to the reading of psyop messages are examined. Ralliers had read an average of approximately twenty leaflets before rallying; a large majority of the leaflets concerned rallying.

TABLE 8
EFFECT OF PSYOP MESSAGES ON
DECISIONS ABOUT RALLYING

Position Relative to rallying before reading leaflets	NVA (100)		VC (100)	
	Leaflets played part in decision to rally	Would not have defected if had not read leaflet	Leaflets played part in decision to rally	Would not have defected if had not read leaflet
<u>"No Prior Consideration"</u> Did not consider defection before reading leaflets	37%	32%	26%	21%
<u>"Considering Other Method"</u> Considering another means of defection before reading leaflets	06%	03%	19%	03%
<u>"Undecided Re Method"</u> Undecided about how to rally before reading leaflets	18%	07%	15%	03%
<u>"Already Considering Rally"</u> Wanted to rally even before reading leaflets	11%	05%	20%	03%

Comment. The results in Table 8 show that within the "Prior Consideration" group, 32% of the NVA ralliers and 21% of the VC ralliers had not considered any form of defection prior to receiving psyop messages and judged that they would not have rallied if the messages had not been received. This pattern of reaction to the psyop message indicates the leaflets to have been a dominant factor in the act of rallying. This group, then, meets the requirements for psyop message effectiveness described in 6a (above).

Thirty-five percent of NVA soldiers and 54% of VC soldiers (the "Considering Other Method", "Undecided Re Method", and "Already Considering Rally" groups) had already been considering either a specific different method of defection or several alternative methods of defection (one of which might be rallying) or were already considering rallying before having read rally leaflets. Within these three groups, 15% of NVA and 9% of VC soldiers would not have rallied if they had not read rally leaflets. This pattern of reaction to psyop messages indicates the leaflets to have been a major contributing factor in the decision to defect by means of rallying. This group, then, also meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6a (above).

An additional 5% of the NVA and 5% of the VC "No Prior Consideration" group judged that they eventually would have defected by some means even if they had not read leaflets; in their case, reading leaflets was a facilitating factor in their choice of rallying as a means of defection. Within the "Considering Other Method" group, 3% of the NVA and 16% of the VC group judged that they eventually would have defected even if they had not read leaflets: the same belief was held by 11% of the NVA and 12% of the VC "Undecided" group. For these individuals, leaflets tipped the scales toward rallying. This pattern of reaction to psyop messages indicates that the leaflets had a facilitating role in the final decisive act of rallying in that the leaflets caused rallying to be chosen rather than some other form of defection. This group, then, meets the requirements for effectiveness described 6b (above).

Of those in the "Already Considering Rally" group, 6% of the NVA soldiers and 17% of the VC soldiers judge that they would have rallied even if they had not read leaflets recommending rallying. Content analysis of their narrative responses, which provides qualitative elaboration in the form of reasons for most answers, indicates that a majority of both groups had prior information about the Chieu Hoi Program from relatives, friends, or other sources; the sources may or

may not have been motivated by psyop programs given such names as "Induce VC Kin to Rally". In overall context it appears certain that this group would have had at least a minimal interest in the leaflets' subject and would therefore meet the requirements described in 6b which stipulates only brief consideration of the appeal even if quickly rejected. In the interest of conservative interpretation, no conclusion is drawn for this somewhat ambiguous group.

Table 9 shows the data presented in Table 8 reorganized to relate groups defined by their attitude towards defection before and after reading leaflets and the extent to which psyop messages affected their behavior.

In brief summary, 32% of a sample of NVA ralliers and 21% of a sample of VC ralliers maintain that psyop leaflet messages were a dominant factor in the thinking that eventually led to their rallying. Fifteen percent of the NVA and 9% of the VC samples judged that the messages were a major contributing factor in their decision to rally; 19% of the NVA and 33% of the VC samples feel that the psyop messages were a facilitating factor in arriving at the decision to rally.

An additional 6% of the NVA and 17% of the VC sample had read leaflets and later rallied but, because they had already been considering rallying before having read the leaflets, the contribution of the psyop leaflets cannot be assessed.

Psyop leaflet messages are effective in that approximately two-thirds of large samples of NVA and VC ralliers believe that the leaflet messages played a part in their decision to rally.

TABLE 9
EFFECTS OF HAVING READ LEAFLETS ON
DECISION TO RALLY

<u>Effectiveness Requirement</u>	<u>Before Reading Leaflets</u>	<u>Attitude Toward Defection</u>	<u>After Reading Leaflets</u>	<u>NVA (100)</u>	<u>VC (100)</u>
Dominant Factor (6a)	No prior thought of defection	Would not have defected	Rallied	32%	21%
Major Factor (6a)	Considered other method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to Rally	03%	03%
Major Factor (6a)	Undecided about method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to rally	07%	03%
Major Factor (6a)	Already considering rally	Would not have rallied	Did rally	05%	03%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Considering other method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to rally	03%	16%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Undecided about method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to rally	11%	12%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	No prior thought of defection	Would have defected in some way	Chose to rally	05%	05%
-	Leaflets Affected Decision To Rally. . . .			66%	63%
?	Already considering rally	Would have rallied	Did rally	06%	17%

Significance Ascribed to Messages

Table 10 shows the percentage of each sample and the total sample who reported that leaflet messages influenced or determined their decision to rally.

TABLE 10
SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAFLETS
IN DECISION TO RALLY

<u>Question</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>(200)</u>
Leaflets made positive contribution to rally decision?	63%	66%	64.5%
Would not have rallied if had not read leaflets?	30%	47%	38.5%

Sixty-three percent of the sample of VC soldiers stated that leaflet messages had a positive influence on their decision to rally (87% had read leaflets). Sixty-six percent of the NVA sample also attributed a significant role to leaflet messages in their decision to rally (89% had read leaflets).

In considering the degree to which the leaflet messages had influenced rally decisions, 30% of the total VC sample maintained that it was a determining factor because they would not have rallied if they had not read the messages. If this percentage is based only on those who read messages (87% of the sample), it would be increased to 34%; if based on the 63% who were influenced by the leaflets, the percentage of those who felt the leaflet messages were the determining factor in their having rallied would be 48%.

In the NVA total sample, 47% reported that they would not have rallied if they had not read leaflet messages. If this percentage is based only on those who read messages rather than on the total sample, it would be 53%. If based on the 66% who felt that the leaflets exerted some influence on their decision to rally, the percentage for those who rated the leaflets as the determining factor in their having rallied would be 71%.

Effective Themes In Influential Messages. Although those who read leaflets had read an average of about twenty and could recall a variety of themes, 56% of the VC soldiers and 50% of the NVA soldiers, or 53% of the total sample, said that a specific leaflet message had contributed to their decision to rally. The themes most frequently cited as specifically influential are shown in Table 11.

TABLE 11
THEMES OF INFLUENTIAL LEAFLET MESSAGES

<u>Leaflet Theme</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>(100)</u>	<u>NVA</u> <u>(100)</u>
Family Sentiment	17%	10%
Death	15%	16%
GVN Welcome	08%	12%
Hardship	06%	---
Chance for New Life	04%	---
Useless sacrifice in NLF	04%	---
Other	<u>02%</u>	<u>12%</u>
TOTAL	56%	50%

Nearly one-third had a leaflet with them when they rallied, 19% of the VC and 37% of the NVA. The primary reason given for not rallying sooner was the constant surveillance; the next most frequently cited reason was the fact that they had not yet come to believe what the leaflets said.

The Rally Decision Process. The process of reaching and acting on a decision to rally was probed with a structured series of questions about attitudes that existed when the term "Chieu Hoi" was first heard, at the time of actual rally, and at various times after rally.

Knowledge of the Chieu Hoi Program and arrival at some degree of confidence that the GVN will act in accordance with the policies it proclaims emerge as the primary factors in the constellation of developing attitudes that eventually lead to rally. Motivation is two-factored:

there can be motivation to leave the NLF and there can be motivation to join the GVN; the two motivations are separate and do not necessarily appear together. The two factors work together to move the individual in one direction; while the factor impelling the individual away from the Front ranks is fear and distrust, the factor impelling him to rally is some measure of hope and trust. In 200 responses, 200 different situations may be described at a "total detail" level of analysis. But overall there is a clearly discernible consistent general pattern that starts with initial disbelief, perhaps even intense dislike for the term "Chieu Hoi". This is followed by growing recognition of evidence of the truth of the messages, and a slow transition to acceptance of the belief that the GVN descriptions of the Chieu Hoi Policy are made in good faith. Once arrived at this opinion, if some factors motivate the individual to leave the Front and at the same time others motivate him to move toward the GVN, the decision to rally and the actual rally becomes only a matter of finding or making an opportunity.

Almost all of the ralliers placed their first consideration of the possibility of rallying at a point in time between one and two years before actually rallying. The most frequently cited reason was the fact that they did not yet believe fully in what the leaflets said. Investigation of the time lag between consideration of rallying and actually doing so, in cases where there was a considerable time gap between having made a decision to rally and the actual rally, indicate the primary reason was constant surveillance -- the validity and generality of this reason is documented by the Program II, Task 1 Study of Obstacles to Enemy Defection.

Thus knowing about the Chieu Hoi Program, knowing how it works, knowing how to rally, knowing what to expect, believing that good treatment will be received, and staying alive long enough for accretion of credibility is essential in inducing rally. Family urging of the prospective rallier is particularly effective for VC, and for NVA where relatives or friends exist; the family can explain the program, can cite the well-being of other ralliers, and assist by escorting him to the rally point or by making prior arrangement for a safe reception when rallying.

The thinking and feeling processes that lead to a decision to rally operate over a one to two year time period if unusual situations do not occur. Results of this series of studies are entirely consistent with the prediction based on Theory 2 that, in the absence of high pressure situations, the usual incubation period for a decision to defect is typically between one and two years.

Summary

Two hundred ralliers, 100 VC and 100 NVA, responded to a structured interview designed to probe their reasons for rallying and the processes involved in arriving at a decision to rally.

Psyop leaflet messages were effective in that approximately two-thirds of the samples of NVA and VC ralliers maintain that the messages played an important or determining role in their decision to rally.

All respondents described the process of their decision to rally from attitude on first hearing the term "Chieu Hoi" to the first thought that they themselves might rally, reasons for not rallying soon after learning about the Chieu Hoi Program, further development of the thought until it became a decision to rally, the actual act of rallying, their attitude two weeks after rallying, and their attitude at the time of the interview. Every rallier responded fully to these questions. Analysis shows that opportunity to acquire some knowledge, and time to develop some faith or hope in the truth of the Chieu Hoi Policy were primary factors in rallying for the majority, and that leaflets were the primary informing agents about the Chieu Hoi Program.

A consistent pattern for evolutionary growth of acceptance of the psyop messages is found for both VC and NVA ralliers. The time period required for inception, growth, and actualization of the decision to rally is shown to be between one and two years. These findings are consistent with the predictions based on Theory 2 that, in the absence of high-pressure situations, the usual incubation period for a decision to defect is typically between one and two years under the conditions existing in Vietnam.

Small-Scale Psyop And Pressure:
Tests Of Theory

To be usable with confidence, theories must have supporting data demonstrably related to the theory. The task treated in this section involved more than just a test of theory. Because the researcher cannot interfere with or modify features of ongoing military operations in wartime to suit his own needs, it was necessary to make a search for ongoing situations and activities which fit the research requirements.

Search for Means to Test Theories

In the course of a country-wide survey of psyop conducted within Vietnam late in 1969, it was discovered that, compared to 1968, there had been a pronounced shift away from project-type psyop and an increase in emphasis on generalized support of national objectives and national programs. Also, the number of 4th Psyop Group field teams, which perform under the operational control of line units in the field, had been increased.

Some of the field teams' activities can be classified into three groups based on the types of situations in which they are conducted:

- "Enemy contact": support of other units in cordon and search, seal-off of areas, contact, etc.
- "Quick-reaction exploitation": use of recent VC or NVA ralliers who can point out locations of units in the area. The differentiating feature of this situation, unless the rallier indicates otherwise, is that the same factors that caused one or more individuals in a specific group to rally may also have created the same inclination in the remainder of the group. Until some time passes or the situation changes, the group from which the rallier came may be especially vulnerable. Therefore, chances of inducing rally are increased if they are reached quickly with facilitating information. A personal touch contributed by the rallier can be convincing evidence for his former companions that it actually is possible to rally safely.

--- "Routine missions": broadcasts or leaflet dissemination with normal rather than specially sensitive target locations.

Predictions Based on Theory

With the existence of certain types of field operations known as a result of a field survey of psyop, several hypotheses were formulated as tests of Theory 1 which relates potential for defection to the presence and degree of external pressure and the timeliness with which psyop appeals are heard.

1. Psyop appeals in conjunction with "enemy contact" characterized by strong pressure are more likely to evoke near-term rally than "quick-reaction rallier exploitation" which is characterized by less external pressure.
2. "Quick-reaction rallier exploitation" characterized by the presumed existence of internal psychological stress among the rallier's comrades still free in the field, is more likely to evoke near-term rally than "routine missions" which represent no unusual pressure.
3. "Routine missions" conducted where no unusual pressure exists and which have no situationally sensitive targets are not likely to evoke near-term rally.

A search of the Monthly Operations Reports for the 4th Psyop Group for ten months in the period between November 1969 and December 1970 identified 15 instances which met specifications established for inclusion in the "enemy contact" category; that is, psyop rally appeals were made in a situation where some form of pressure from some form of contact with the enemy or suspected enemy was involved.* Table 12 shows that, in 7 of the 15 instances, ralliers were produced in accordance with the psyop objective. An additional three instances produced VC prisoners or VC suspects in fulfillment of the objectives of these psyop. It is particularly significant with regard to Theory 1 that if duration is considered in relation to production of ralliers, the longer the duration of contact the more likelihood of there being concrete results

*The reader should assume that the authors are well-acquainted with military and civilian agencies' reporting, data-handling, and records management practices.

TABLE 12

PSYOP COMBINED WITH PRESSURE

Area	In Support Of	Type of Action or Condition	Size or Type of Enemy or Target	Duration of Action	Media		Results
MR3	RTAVF	Cordon	VC area	8 days	ALS	L-A	11 VC HC
MR3	18th ARVN Div.	Cordon	6,000 people	4 days	GLS		4 VC HC
MR2	1st Brig, 4th Inf Div.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS		12 VC HC
MR2	Phuong Huong Cadre	Cordon/Search	Village	2 days	GLS		3 VCI
MR1	1st Bn, 501st Inf.	Cordon/Screen	Village	1 day	GLS		40 VC
MR2	2nd Bn, 8th Inf.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS		--
MR2	28th ROK Rgmt.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS		--
MR2	2nd Brig, 4th Inf Div.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS		--
MR3	3rd Brig, 1st Inf Div.	Seal village	Village	14 days	GLS		10 VC HC
MR2	Phuong Huong Cadre	Seal village	Village	1 day	GLS		40 VC/VC?
MR2	3rd Sqdrn, 4th Cav.	Enemy contact	--	2 days	GLS		3 NVA HC
MR2	1st Bn, 22nd Inf. Div.	Enemy contact	100 NVA	4 days	ALS	L-A	1 VC HC
MR1	RF/PF	Enemy contact	2 NVA Bns.	4 days	EW		9 NVA HC
MR1	1st Marine Div.	Enemy contact	50 NVA/VC	1 day	GLS		--
MR2	22nd ARVN Div.	Enemy contact	VC C1 Co.	2 days	GLS	ALS	--

ALS Aerial Loudspeaker
 GLS Ground Loudspeaker
 L-A Leaflet Airdrop
 EW Earlyword

in terms of ralliers or prisoners. A semantic problem is to be avoided here. Evaluation of effectiveness in these instances does not take volume into consideration. It is the ability of this type of psyop message to evoke a specific type of response -- rally -- that is being treated; the issue of number of positive responses is secondary until the first issue is settled conclusively.

Table 13 shows the same data as Table 12, with the data in the body of the table ordered on the amount of time shown in the "Duration" column.

Table 14 shows instances where quick-reaction exploitation of recent VC and NVA ralliers was undertaken when the rallier was willing to give the location of others in his unit. In 10 of the 20 instances where quick-reaction exploitation appeals were made to targeted groups at known or suspected locations, ralliers were produced. Three instances of rally appeals directed to NVA soldiers produced no results; the concept of rallying is much less applicable to NVA than it is for VC and is much less likely to be productive.

The "enemy contact" situation involves a higher pressure situation than does "quick-reaction rallier exploitation"; there is also more danger simply because of the nature of the pressure. The "quick-reaction exploitation" as a lower pressure situation has less motivating power but it also involves comparatively less danger plus the bonus of having a personal link with someone safely in GVN hands. On balance, it is theoretically possible that the two different situations might have comparable power to evoke rallying.

Table 15 shows a randomly selected sample of 20 "Routine missions" identified in the Monthly Operations Reports. It can be seen that in no instances were any ralliers produced within a time-frame that would allow them to be associated with the routine mission.

Summary

In summary, the results of the search for instances which fit the three types of conditions, enemy contact, quick-response rallier exploitation, and routine missions, show that each represents validation of Theory 1.

TABLE 13

PSYOP COMBINED WITH PRESSURE

<u>Area</u>	<u>In Support Of</u>	<u>Type of Action or Condition</u>	<u>Size or Type of Enemy or Target</u>	<u>Duration of Action</u>	<u>Media</u>	<u>Results</u>
MR3	3rd Brig, 1st Inf Div.	Seal village	Village	14 days	GLS	3 NVA HC
MR3	RTAVF	Cordon	VC area	8 days	ALS L-A	11 VC HC
MR3	18th ARVN Div.	Cordon	6,000 people	4 days	GLS	4 VC HC
MR1	RF/PF	Enemy contact	2 NVA Bns.	4 days	EW	9 NVA HC
MR2	1st Bn, 22nd Inf Div.	Enemy contact	100 NVA	4 days	ALS L-A	1 VC HC
MR2	Phuong Huong Cadre	Cordon/Search	Village	2 days	GLS	3 VCI
MR2	3rd Sqdrn, 4th Cav.	Enemy contact	--	2 days	GLS	3-4 NVA HC
MR2	22nd ARVN Div.	Enemy contact	VC C1 Co.	2 days	GLS ALS	--
MR2	Phuong Huong Cadre	Seal village	Village	1 day	GLS	40 VC/VC?
MR1	1st Bn, 501st Inf.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS	40 VC
MR2	1st Brig, 4th Inf Div.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS	12 VC HC
MR2	2nd Bn, 8th Inf.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS	--
MR2	28th ROK Rgmt.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS	--
MR2	2nd Brig, 4th Inf Div.	Cordon/Search	Village	1 day	GLS	--
MR1	1st Marine Div.	Enemy contact	50 NVA/VC	1 day	GLS	--

ALS Aerial Loudspeaker
 GLS Ground Loudspeaker
 L-A Leaflet Airdrop
 EW Earlyword

TABLE 14

QUICK-REACTION EXPLOITATION OF RECENT RALLIERS
AIMED AT SPECIFIC TARGETS

<u>Area</u>	<u>Enemy Exploited</u>	<u>Media/Type of Quick-Reaction</u>		<u>Results</u>
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		3 VC Ralliers
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		15 VC Ralliers
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		Mont'ard tribe
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR4	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR4	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR4	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR4	VC Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS	QRL-A	47 VC Ralliers
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS	QRL-A	--
MR2	VC Rallier	ALS	QRL-A	--
MR2	VC Rallier	ALS	QRL-A	--
MR3	VC Rallier	ALS-L		3 VC Ralliers
MR4	VC Rallier	ALS-L		--
MR2	VC Rallier	QRL-A		1 VC Rallier
MR3	VC Rallier	QRL-A		--
MR1	VC Rallier	GLS		6 VC Ralliers
MR2	VC Rallier	GLS		1 VC Rallier
MR2	VC Rallier	GLS		1 VC Rallier
MR3	VC Rallier	APT		25 VC Ralliers
MR3	NVA Rallier	ALS-QRT		--
MR4	NVA Rallier	ALS-L		--
MR4	NVA Rallier	QRL		--

ALS Airborne loudspeaker
 ALS-L Airborne loudspeaker-live
 QRT Quick-reaction tape
 QRL Quick-reaction leaflet
 QRL-A Quick-reaction leaflet - airdrop
 GLS Ground loudspeaker
 APT Armed Propaganda Team

TABLE 15

PSYOP WITHOUT PRESSURE: ROUTINE MISSIONS

<u>Area</u>	<u>In Support Of</u>	<u>Location/ Type of Enemy Target</u>	<u>Media</u>	<u>Results</u>
MR3	1st Bde, 1st ACD	Enemy Elements	ALS LFTS	--
MR3	3rd Bde, 1st ACD	Enemy units	ALS	--
MR4	G5	7 Mts. Region	ALS L-A	--
MR4	S2	Chau Duc Prov.	ALS	--
MR1	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	Huong Hoa Dist.	GLS	--
MR2	MACV #42	Phu Xuan Hamlet	EW	--
MR2	MACV #42	Binh Dinh	ALS L-A	--
MR2	MACV #58	Lam Son Hamlet	GLS	--
MR1	1st Marine Div	Quang Ham Prov.	GLS	--
MR2	2/1st Cavalry	Binh Thuan Prov.	ALS	--
MR1	1st Marine Div	Quang Nam Prov.	GLS	--
MR1	Americal Div	Quang Tin	GLS	--
MR2	MACV #37	Phan Thiet	GLS L-S	--
MR1	1st Bde, 5th Inf Div	Mai Linh Dist.	GLS	--
MR2	MACV #37	Muong Mon	GLS L-A	--
MR1	23rd Inf Div	Enemy units	ALS	--
MR3	VIS	Enemy unit	EW	--
MR1	101st Airborne Div	Thua Thien Prov.	ALS	--
MR2	MACV #42	Hoai Nhon Dist.	GLS	--
MR2	MACV #26	Dalat area	ALS	--

ALS LFTS Airborne Loudspeaker, leaflets
 ALS L-A Airborne Loudspeaker, leaflet airdrop
 ALS Airborne Loudspeaker
 EW Earlyword
 GLS Ground Loudspeaker

Based on Theory 1, it was predicted that ralliers would be produced in the "enemy contact" situation if the appeal is made under the correct conditions and with the right timing. In 7 of the 15 instances the appeals were made and ralliers were produced. This represents positive validation of predictions derived from Theory 1.

Based on Theory 1, it was predicted that, in quick-reaction rallier exploitation situations, ralliers would be produced if timely appeals are made to a target group for which they have special reference, i.e., where the exploited rallier had recently come from that group. In 10 of 20 instances, appeals were made to such groups and ralliers were produced. This also constitutes validation of the prediction based on Theory 1.

Based on Theory 1, it was also predicted that routine missions conducted in the absence of military pressure or a specific sensitive target are less likely to produce ralliers than are rallier exploitation and enemy contact situations. A random sampling of 20 instances which met the specifications for classification as routine missions produced no identifiable results in terms of ralliers or enemy troops who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner. This represents positive validation of the negative implications of Theory 1.

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SECTION V

CASE STUDIES OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT:
LARGE-SCALE PSYOP PROJECTS

SECTION V

CASE STUDIES OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT: LARGE-SCALE PSYOP PROJECTS

In this section, two case studies of measurement of the effectiveness of medium-sized and large-scale complex psyop projects are described.

The two psyop projects are usefully illustrative of the concepts, planning, materials used, procedures employed, problems encountered, and quality of execution of most psyop projects in Vietnam between 1968 and 1971.

A third study treats results of measurement of the most enigmatic of all psyop -- the psyop effect of actions. A fourth sub-section describes in exhaustive detail, the process by which measurement procedures are designed and applied to psyop projects. The distinction being made here merits considerable emphasis. The two sub-sections devoted to case studies of large psyop projects describe the nature, conduct, and outcome of the psyop project itself. The sub-section titled "Procedure for Psyop Project Evaluation" emphasizes the problems, principles, and practices involved in designing and applying measurement procedures to a psyop project.

Background

Opportunities to make successful measurements of psyop effectiveness -- even in the case of the simplest, least complex, small-scale activities, -- are limited drastically in Vietnam by the nature of current operating practices. A vast majority of the psyop activities undertaken by the personnel of the 4th Psyop Group are not of a nature that produces quantifiable results in a time-span which allows the results to be identified as associated with a specific psyop. In this situation only a small percentage of the psyop activities undertaken have the potential to be effective in the sense of producing countable or measurable results. In turn, only some percentage of these "measurable"

activities that are intrinsically capable of producing countable near-term results do, in fact, produce quantifiable results. This becomes more and more true as activities grow in size and number to become a psyop project. The activities that are measurable and may produce quantifiable results are not of a type that would normally involve personnel trained to design and conduct measurements; if such personnel did happen to be involved, there would be many other more important demands on their time. Such activities do not have sufficient significance in the overall situation to come to the attention of researchers. In addition, the type of situation in which opportunities for measurement occur is such that researchers or those capable of research would not normally be present. Also, other considerations, dominant in the situation such as assuring achievement of a military operational objective or safety, preclude diversion of any attention or effort for research activities.

Conversely, the type of psyop that is most likely to come to the researcher's attention, which therefore is the kind most likely to be looked at most often by researchers, is almost certain to be the psyop project that is characterized by some advance notice, planning, discussion, and consideration at higher levels. There are several reasons why such psyop are the most difficult to investigate systematically. Because of the size and importance of such operations, they are complex and many-faceted; their complexity reduces or eliminates the possibility (under current conditions and practices) of gathering the kind and amount of valid comprehensive data needed for evaluation. Also, as noted elsewhere, large psyop operations are of the kind that have delayed and dispersed or diffused and overlapping or masked effects rather than having effects that are distinct, near in time, and concentrated in location.

Certain factual aspects of wartime conditions must be considered.

1. Unlike laboratory or peacetime research, research in Vietnam must be done within the limits of ongoing military operations. There is no possibility for controlled experimentation. The military and civilian agencies' activities cannot be manipulated in any way in the interest of research.

In plainer terms, the research cannot interfere with conduct of wartime operations. Basic data must be collected (if indeed it can be collected at all) from activities undertaken and controlled by others, without reference to the needs or objectives of the researcher.

2. Psyop, in comparison with other types of military functions or operations is considered relatively unimportant in just those situations where the possibility of successful measurement is greatest, i.e., in the execution of offensive operations and clean-up operations. It is almost invariably a subordinate activity conducted in the context of a larger situation dominated by the presence of many stronger and more pervasively influential factors; these factors dampen or eliminate effects attributable to psyop.

3. Psyop is an uncharted field with very little history of previous research devoted to measurement of effectiveness or even to most of the functions within psyop. Therefore, there are few precedents to use as a guide in looking at the whole spectrum of psyop in order to select opportunities for measurement.

4. Many forms of psyop do not produce any kind of quantifiable and measurable results. For instance, their objectives -- if or when specified -- require changes in opinion or attitude that are necessarily qualitative in nature and are not easily rendered into measurements on an equal-interval scale. Other types of psyop objectives may be in the nature of "conditioning"; that is to say, the objective is merely to prepare targeted audiences for some other activity that will follow.

5. The time frame applicable to most large-scale psyop and to strategic psyop is much more extended than the duration of the usual type of psyop research studies. At this stage in the development of psyop as an art or science, it is necessary for the researcher to become involved with a large-scale psyop or strategic psyop activity in the early planning stages in order to insure that measurable objectives are stated explicitly and that corresponding measurable features exist or are built into the plan. It is also necessary to obtain ongoing data and be present to adapt to changes during execution of the psyop. Because of the need to maintain some form of surveillance of external factors that may affect the psyop impact on the target audience after the psyop has been completed, while waiting for the psyop to have had a chance to be assimilated by the target and cause some discernable measurable reaction, the researcher must remain involved well past the point in time where the psyop activity is completed in order to measure the end-result. To quantify this abstract description, the time frame for a psyop from conceptualization to production of effects can be two to five years; for instance, the average incubation period for rallying in non-pressure situations is 12 - 24 months.

Only a large semi-permanent field research center can possibly hope to handle the problems involved in measurement of complex or strategic psyop set in extended time frames. It is significant that during cold war situations, strategic psyop increases in importance. Because of its softer impact, longer time-frame, and greater relative importance during cold war, it is important that a mechanism for assessment of strategic psyop come into being.

6. Records and data files do not stay in existence long, if they come into existence at all under wartime conditions. Researchers must obtain needed records and data at the point at which they do or can come into existence in order to be sure they are preserved for research purposes. For instance, in a study of four cases of mass defection in Vietnam, even though all had occurred within six months with the most recent only one week old, interrogation records could not be located and the individuals themselves had to be tracked down throughout the country. They were located -- not through records but by a combination of logic and persistent questioning of individuals.

The foregoing items represent general background considerations of concern to the researcher looking at complex psyop projects. There are more specific operational or administrative problems that exist in actual practice regardless of what manuals may say:

1. For large-scale activities, orders and responsibilities may be laid down explicitly and precisely but a low level of compliance is usual; i.e., the existence of an order tasking individuals or units to record, collect, and forward data does not mean that the data will be collected or become available, if it is collected at all. For instance, as will be seen in the description of Project Searchlight, of the information requested from the field in a project authorized by a Corps Headquarters message, more data is missing than was collected. There may be and usually are, good reasons but that is immaterial -- blame is not involved. The existence of conditions that prevent measurement from occurring must be recognized and identified or efforts at measurement that are doomed to failure will continue to be made and wasted.

2. Many different messages, which may be in use in the same area in any given period of time plus the effects of a variety of messages recalled from the past, may combine and conflict to cause uncertainty, doubt, or ambivalence about all messages.

3. In combined or cooperative actions, different units have different understandings or interpretations of their mission, different attitudes toward the enemy which affect interpretation of orders, and different styles of conducting their operations. For example, Unit A captures a VC who is found to be carrying two rally leaflets; they give him an option of being treated as a rallier. Unit B captures the same man and treats him like any other PW. For instance, as will be seen in the description of the Affection Campaign, although described as having been coordinated with unusual thoroughness, the Vietnamese J1, who controls ARVN PW's was not included in the initial planning or tasked in the subsequent operations order. Consequently the part of the operations order that called for holding PW's separate for campaign purposes was not honored in execution and one of the two most needed indices for measurement of effectiveness was lost.

The following sub-section describes results of an intensive case study of the Tinh Thuong (Affection) Campaign, a large-scale joint US/ARVN psyop project.

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A CASE STUDY IN PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS
THE TINH THUONG (AFFECTION) CAMPAIGN

A Case Study Of A Large-Scale Psyop Project:

The Tinh Thuong (Affection) Campaign

Evaluation of a major psyop campaign was required by its sponsors in order to assess its effect and to furnish guidelines for other campaigns.


Problem

By late 1969, only a very small number of NVA troops had rallied to the Government of South Vietnam. Was the NVA open to rally appeals? Could they be persuaded to lay down arms voluntarily and allow themselves to be captured as prisoners of war if rallying to the GVN seemed too great a step? Would special appeals addressed to the NVA soldier induce him to rally or surrender? A special joint campaign intended to answer these questions was conducted during the last six weeks of 1969 in the heart of a VC/NVA operations area near the Cambodian border known as the Iron Triangle.

Historical Background

Inception of the large-scale psyop campaign was the suggestion of JUSPAO supported by MACV that a special effort be made to determine if "saturation" of an area with an appeal to specific audiences could, in fact, increase a hypothesized tendency of NVA forces to respond to rally appeals and to see further if appeals directed to this group to intentionally become prisoners of war would be effective.

A recent rise in NVA ralliers during a period of low-intensity conflict had suggested that intensified psyop efforts directed to the NVA soldier to rally or surrender and a program designed to induce the local civilian audiences to encourage NVA and VC to rally or surrender might be productive. The situation was seen as one in which NVA vulnerabilities were lack of food, medicine, and popular support. Obstacles to defection by NLF/NVA personnel were fear of harsh treatment if captured and lack of information on how to rally.



MR III

Outline Map of Military Region 3

Conditions Encountered

The Tinh Thuong (Affection) Campaign was the first joint effort of its kind to be undertaken in Vietnam. It represented a first attempt to use every psyop technique directed to a specific area with inter-agency, inter-organizational, and military-governmental-civilian coordination and cooperation. This joint effort was called upon for its first task to conduct a psychological operations campaign with a newly-conceived goal: induce North Vietnamese Army soldiers to rally to the South Vietnamese Government or to permit capture as prisoners of war to that government.

One "Special Area", primarily within Binh Duong Province, was the focus for an intensive "saturation" psyop effort. The joint US/ARVN campaign used all available psyop resources in the area, including high altitude leaflet drops. Three additional areas along the Cambodian border contained within Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Tay Ninh Provinces where NVA troops entered the Republic of Vietnam, also received high altitude leaflet drops. Altogether, four provinces were designated "Campaign Provinces": Binh Duong, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Tay Ninh, with Binh Duong the site of concentrated effort.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of the evaluation study was to furnish the psyop community a systematic assessment of their planned campaign to induce NVA troops to rally or voluntarily permit capture as prisoners of war. The inquiry was also a major initial effort in ongoing long-range investigation of criteria of effectiveness. The evaluation effort served further as a review of current psyop approaches, projects, and materials to identify significant factors requiring systematic research and development, as part of a concurrent long-range study of psyop activity and problems.

Approach to Evaluation

The study approach to the evaluation of the Tinh Thuong Campaign was conceived both to assess the campaign and also to furnish a basis for development of evaluation procedures for future use.

The plan had been developed, the operation order written, and the start date was imminent when HSR's participation was requested for design and conduct of an evaluation study. It was necessary from that point in time to quickly analyze the project plans, work out agreements with sponsoring agencies as to scope of evaluation, establish performance objectives to be evaluated, specify data required to assess the campaign in terms of these performance objectives, establish sources from which to obtain needed data on a timely basis, and determine the feasibility and utility of various levels of assessment.

The overall approach to evaluation was to determine evaluation requirements (what did sponsoring agencies want the evaluation to tell them?), the sources and flow of information needed to fill these requirements (what information would answer sponsor questions and where could it be found and how could it be obtained?), and evolve procedures for using this information to respond to user requirements. This section describes the approach taken in terms of (1) the requirements, (2) the plan, and (3) the procedures.

Determining User Requirements

Requirements to be fulfilled by the study were those questions posed by JUSPAO and MACV sponsors.

A first step in the approach was to meet with the heads of the agencies responsible for the campaign (JUSPAO's Director of Policy, Plans and Research; MACV's Director of Psychological Operations) to learn their requirements of the evaluation. JUSPAO asked questions such as "Where is the enemy?" "Did the leaflets reach him?" "Did materials used follow policy and guidelines?" MACV (at J3-11, Psychological Operations) requested assessment in terms of two principle questions: 1) Would a psyop campaign in fact contribute to an increase in number of NVA ralliers? 2) Would it induce a number of NVA to surrender as prisoners of war? And a third question: 3) If answers to the first two questions should be negative or results non-discernible, what could be suggested for future efforts?

Requirements the study was to fill were essentially three:

- 1) Evaluate the campaign as an operational joint effort.
- 2) Evaluate the result of the campaign to induce NVA soldiers to rally or surrender.
- 3) Provide recommendations for future campaign planning and conduct.

The Evaluation Plan

Based on campaign plan, campaign order, and meetings with responsible agencies, an evaluation plan was drawn up to obtain data from reports generated in the field, from statistical records at MACV Headquarters, and from interview of any ralliers and prisoners taken in the area during the campaign.

Data Needs. Information was to be gathered from various sources for specific uses.

1. Official daily reports and summary records of all activity by each group was to come from Campaign Headquarters through the II Field Force G5 office for use in overall assessment of the joint effort, the delivery and dissemination of materials, and types and density of coverage.
2. Samples of each item of psyop material used in the field, for use in answering sponsors' questions as to adherence to guidelines and policy.
3. Information from the field as to local populace awareness of and attitude toward campaign goals (i.e., that they assist and encourage NVA to defect to the GVN). While this requirement could be met more validly by some pre-campaign measure of local populace awareness and attitude followed by post campaign measures, obviously this was impossible with a campaign already underway. The factor represented by local populace reaction to the campaign could only be treated through general observation and by analysis of responses from rallier/prisoner interview data.

4. Statistics and detailed information on each rally and capture. This item anticipated that "fact sheet" information on each individual would be available from prisoner and rallier reception center records furnishing, as a minimum, data such as name, unit, where individual had operated, tactical conditions at the time of rally or capture, whether the individual had surrendered, etc., together with the full initial interrogation report. Such information would provide a count of all detainees with precise data as to location and circumstance which would enable a measure of campaign effect in terms of number of ralliers and prisoners from a specific area at a specific time. In addition, it would permit the keeping of a roster of names of individuals to be interviewed and the dispatching of an interview team to these individuals at the earliest time.
5. Location of enemy troops in the special area; movement of these troops; and also movement, location, and strength of troops throughout the four campaign provinces. This information was needed to answer questions as to whether the psyop material was on target, and to answer questions as to effect on the enemy.
6. Enemy troop strength. The number and condition of his own side's forces would represent an important environmental factor for the NVA soldier.
7. Friendly troop strength. Strength of opposing forces could be a significant factor.
8. Number of operational contacts. Contacts initiated by allies would represent pressures exerted on the enemy; those initiated by the enemy could represent both strength and stress in the total situation under assessment.
9. Number of casualties, enemy and friendly. Number killed, wounded, captured or detained would represent critical factors in the situation in which the psyop message was received.
10. Number of heavy bombing missions (B-52) with index of volume or intensity, needed as a critical factor in the total situation in which the psyop campaign was received by the NVA soldier.

11. Interview data to be collected from ralliers as soon after rally as possible. These interviews were to be conducted with a questionnaire especially designed for NVA ralliers to determine, among other factors, the vulnerabilities and obstacles represented in the situation to which the rallier responded, the personal response to the environmental situation, and the psychological and tactical pressures exerted during the time. To determine also, if possible, the extent of any civilian assistance proffered, and to determine awareness of attention to psyop material.
12. Interview data to be collected from prisoners as soon after capture as possible. These interviews were to be conducted with a questionnaire especially designed for NVA PW's to determine, among other factors, the vulnerabilities and obstacles represented in the situation and the effect upon the individual; to learn his attitude toward defection and to determine awareness of and attention to psyop material.
13. A flagging request was to be inserted into interrogation records for six months following the campaign to identify any individual received as prisoner or rallier who had been operating in the area during the special campaign period. Interview of samples of those individuals so identified would permit some measure of effect on the men who might have been persuaded by the Tinh Thuong Campaign to consider rally or surrender but who only found an opportunity to do so at a later date and in another location.
14. Summary records of tactical operations, prisoners taken, ralliers received, and psychological operations activities over all of South Vietnam for the year preceding and the six months following the campaign, for comparative assessment of campaign intensity and results within a broader framework.

Procedure

Methods of data collection used were field observations, official statistical records, and survey.

One member of the research team devoted full time during the campaign to collection of data from field areas and was responsible for maintaining accurate records during the six-week activity as to conduct of the campaign, coordination between agencies, actual activity as it varied from planned activity, interagency and inter-governmental cooperation, and the collection of pertinent data.

Sources of needed statistical records data were located, form and content for computer output specified, and delivery arranged.

A five-member all-Vietnamese interview team under direction of a Vietnamese supervisor was employed and trained to administer two specially developed comprehensive compartmentalized questionnaires, one for NVA ralliers and one for NVA prisoners during the campaign. One member of the HSR research team devoted full time during the latter part of the campaign to running the field interview program.

Data which was furnished from the field included: Weekly Report from Combined Campaign Headquarters via G5 Advisor's Office; Weekly Summary of significant activities from II Field Force; Monthly Tabular Report of Psychological Operations Activities from MACJ3-11; Weekly and monthly Chieu Hoi Returnee Reports from National Chieu Hoi Center; Prisoner of war records compiled from files of Senior Advisor, G2, III Corps; Leaflet drop and loudspeaker broadcast records compiled by map coordinate from Campaign Headquarters.

Statistical records data was obtained from the Combined Intelligence Center (CICV) and from MAC-V's Data Management Agency (DMA).

Survey data was obtained from twenty-two ralliers and prisoners (all who could be reached for interview).

Results of these three types of data collection are shown in Case Studies Appendix I which is to be found in Volume II.

A discussion of the results based on those findings follows.

Discussion

How effective was the psyop effort? To those who regarded its only measure as the number of NVA troops (the principal target audience) obtained as ralliers or prisoners in return for the vast expenditures in terms of man-hours, leaflets, loudspeaker hours, aircraft flying time and cost, etc., the yield of 60 NVA soldiers per 114,000,000 leaflets, per 1,400 hours of loudspeaker time, per six-week multi-unit, multi-organization effort seemed to represent far less than success if not failure.

Psyop campaign effectiveness must be assessed in terms of the psyop campaign objectives. Assessment is made possible to the extent that objectives are clearly recognized and that conduct of the project provides means for determining the extent to which objectives are reached.

Objectives stated in the operations order in terms of three tasks did not represent the primary campaign objectives, but the operational means by which campaign objectives were to be reached.

The large objective stated in the guidance, "to get the NVA out of the war", is a major overall objective of the entire effort the United States is supporting in Vietnam. The special campaign, designed to promote this larger objective, but more particularly to examine various ways of accomplishing it, held specific objectives that dealt with (1) effect of various psyop appeals and (2) conduct and utility of an intensive psyop campaign. Questions asked of the campaign by its sponsors were:

1. Are NVA troops responsive to appeals to rally?
2. Are NVA troops responsive to appeals to surrender or deliberately permit capture?
3. Do messages offering medical care and food hold appeal and do messages describing rally and surrender procedures and the kind of treatment that can be expected in friendly hands overcome obstacles to defection?
4. Will civilian populace and government and military units encourage and assist rally or surrender and carry out promises of fair treatment to defectors?

These four questions were asked within the campaign that asked three additional questions of itself:

5. Would saturation of an area by a psyop effort produce an effect different from a normally intensive psyop effort?
6. Could a joint GVN and US effort, more extensive than any attempted previously, function in this special campaign?
7. If the campaign did not produce the results desired, what guidelines could be furnished for subsequent campaigns?

Situational and operational factors did not provide for nor permit collection of data that would furnish information needed to answer these questions properly. However, the study did provide answers which are particularly meaningful because the information on which they are based permits only conservative statements. A most important question, posed by the MACV Psyop Director, was answered fully: valuable guidelines and workable procedures for the next campaign were made available.

Assessment of Effect of Psyop Appeals

Four major appeals were used: (1) rally appeal; (2) surrender/permit capture appeal; (3) appeal to vulnerabilities; (4) appeal to local populace and government and military units to encourage and assist VC and NVA troops in defection.

1. Rally Appeal to NVA Troops. NVA troops are responsive to rally appeal. NVA troops have rallied to the GVN in spite of the large factors (family consideration, difference in present freedom and future prospects for the soldier from the North as compared with those factors for the soldier from the South) which militate against it. The numbers that would consider rally could be expected to continue to be small, but the option should be extended as long as the program is operative. All of the NVA troops who might consider it are not reached, and if reached, do not find opportunity. This was indicated by the fact that three of the seventeen prisoners interviewed stated they had considered rallying and four stated they had considered leaving the NVA ranks by means other than rallying.

All of the ralliers interviewed had read leaflets urging rally; only nine of the seventeen prisoners had seen rally leaflets.

2. Surrender Appeals to NVA Troops. Although campaign results in terms of prisoners taken do not provide information on this point, results of interviews of available prisoners who were captured within the campaign provinces during the campaign period indicate that NVA troops may become receptive to appeals to surrender or intentionally permit capture. More than one-fourth of the prisoners interviewed said they had considered it before capture. Two of the ralliers had considered surrender before coming into the GVN. While most of the twenty-two NVA troops interviewed (13 of the 17 prisoners and 4 of the 5 ralliers) said they had never heard of people putting themselves in situations where capture would be inevitable, half of the total (8 prisoners and 3 ralliers) said they could visualize a soldier intentionally putting himself into such a situation.

Only four of the seventeen prisoners saw messages suggesting surrender to military forces as a prisoner; one rallier saw such a message.

3. Appeals and Vulnerabilities. The trip south was hard for all the men and their units, but both food and medical needs seemed to be supplied more adequately along the way than after reaching RVN for the group interviewed. Food needs were not reported as greatly undersupplied by either group when questioned directly on the point. One rallier reported in general not having enough food; one prisoner reported having been at some time without food for so long a period that strength and energy were depleted.

Further, the group as a whole indicated they had not undergone excessive hardship. However, when reporting the circumstances and condition at time of being received by the GVN, hunger and illness were emphasized.

This could indicate that direct appeal based on presumed needs for medical care or food would not be readily perceived as an adequate inducement to rally or surrender, but rather that hunger and illness represent conditions that increase receptivity to information about procedures that may make rallying or surrendering more safe and increase the likelihood that a good opportunity to defect will be seized.

4. Civilian/Government/Military Support of Appeals. One striking factor commented upon by principal observers of the campaign and confirmed by the survey results was the effectiveness of appeals to the civilian populace and to the participating groups and units to support the campaign goals. Observers were impressed with the extent of the face-to-face instruction given the civilian populace in the three-district intensive area, and the support the general populace expressed for the program. Survey results revealed that three of the five Hoi Chanh rallied with assistance of civilians who saw they were taken to the proper authorities; two of these were persuaded to rally by families they visited.

Participating groups and units responded to appeals to provide fair treatment promised defectors in the messages. Ralliers all reported being treated well both at time of rally and between that time and reaching the classification center.

Assessment of Psyop Campaign

The questions asked of the campaign itself concerned (1) effect of saturation, (2) multi-unit multi-organizational functioning, and (3) guidelines for future campaigns.

1. Saturation Effect. Would saturation of an area with an intensive psyop effort produce an effect different from normally distributed psyop? Information available does not provide an answer to this question. While the province containing the three-district "saturation area" produced more ralliers than the other three provinces during the campaign, this had been the case for about six of the twelve months during 1969.

Figures from the field report on the psyop effort raise a question regarding the extent of "saturation". From reported dissemination area-wide, scheduled materials used as leaflets and loudspeaker messages did not represent extraordinary quantities for the area involved, and did not seem to direct proportionately the appeals to the NVA soldier that campaign policy goals required.

2. Multi-Organization Functioning. Observational reports from all campaign monitoring groups attested to the success of the area of multi-organizational functioning. The six-week campaign from ARVN headquarters represented successful initiation of complex joint operations. Inter-agency, inter-governmental coordination and cooperation

was extensive and represented a new degree of such cooperative effort. There were, as would be expected normally, difficulties where newly developing procedures and operations are rapidly extended across organizational boundaries. Identification of these difficulties and methods of overcoming them were part of the objective of the effort and results in this regard furnished guidelines for future campaigns.

3. Guidelines for Future Campaigns. The campaign provided immediately useful results in the form of guidelines for future campaigns. The study designed to assess the Tinh Thuong campaign revealed newly-developed organizational structures and the relationships between them and the communication channels that were forming and those that were not forming but should exist. Personnel requiring communication between sources of information must know these channels but because they are current and changing, time required to delineate them cannot be invested anew for each assessment. At the same time, they can be stipulated for future assessments only to a limited degree as the needs will vary with variation in campaign area, conduct and objectives. For example, one lesson learned in the Tinh Thuong Campaign was the necessity for bringing other military functions formally into the campaign organization where the campaign requires data from areas under that function's control. Campaign-designed handling, recording, and obtaining of information from prisoners was lost because this factor was missing. However, for some future campaigns this guideline would be unnecessary. Certain types of information are peculiar to a time or operational framework.

Any psyop campaign must be assessed within the situation and under the conditions in which it is conducted with regard to specific objectives. It was recommended that future similar campaigns be planned in consultation with the research group who will conduct evaluation and that this group be part of every pre-planning and planning stage. Primary attention should be given to selection of area on the basis of explicit factors, to the stating of objectives in operational terms that permit either comparative or absolute counts, and to consideration of research requirements in implementation of the campaign plan.

It was suggested that two of the projected follow-on campaigns be planned and conducted in two non-adjacent areas.

It was suggested that Vietnamese personnel from the military units involved and from JUSPAO be brought increasingly into the evaluation process to permit cross-transfer of information and techniques

between United States and Vietnamese research effort, with the thought that evaluation of a third campaign be conducted entirely by Vietnamese.

It was suggested that particular efforts (such as ground loud-speaker operation) be re-examined in view of some of the reported findings.

Conclusions

The six-week campaign directed from ARVN headquarters represents successful initiation of highly complex joint operations. Inter-agency, inter-governmental coordination and cooperation was extensive and represented a new degree of such cooperative effort. Many major difficulties were encountered. These concerned problems of controls, coordination, communication, with added complications of adjacent area campaigns. Difficulties are normally expected where newly developing procedures and operations are rapidly extended across organizational boundaries. Experience and lessons learned furnish guidelines for future operations.

There is evidence that the enemy audience did see, and a proportion attended, the psyop messages. The degree to which the effort contributed to the number of ralliers and prisoners received cannot be assessed under the conditions which prevailed. Findings from the interviews conducted can improve future efforts.

Indoctrination of the local populace to encourage and facilitate enemy rally and surrender was reported highly successful on the basis of field observation, and campaign management comment. Further evidence of this success was found in interviews with ralliers who were induced to and assisted in rallying by local population.

The campaign did produce NVA ralliers and prisoners although, as represented in latest figures, the rate did not increase. A primary goal was to reach the NVA soldier with appeals offering alternatives of rally or surrender and to do so by appealing to two major vulnerabilities (need for food and need for medical care) and by attempting to overcome two major obstacles to defection (fear of bad treatment and ignorance as to how and where to rally). From responses of ralliers and prisoners interviewed, medical care may not be a critical vulnerability in the four-province area at this time, and food may be less critical. The two obstacles identified (fear of expected GVN treatment and not knowing how to rally) are currently operative in the NVA sampled.

A CASE STUDY IN PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

A Case Study Of A Medium-Size Psyop Project:

Operation Searchlight


A special joint campaign conducted throughout Military Region One by XXIV Corps and I Corps was designed to intensify appeals to enemy soldiers to rally to the GVN during the TET truce period. After a week's preparation period, implementation was scheduled for the period, 19-29 January, culminating with illumination of giant searchlights at selected US/ARVN bases to indicate special rally points on January 27, 28, 29.

Problem

Sponsoring agencies wished to know the effect of the campaign, both as a measure of the special effort and as a source of guidelines for future efforts. Questions of interest were: Would the enemy rally to the specially-designated areas? If so what messages, what media were most widely attended? What specific locations and local procedures facilitated rally? What could be learned to improve future efforts? Could it be determined if it was the media, the message or the opportunity which most succeeded in or failed to bring the enemy to the special points for rally?

Background

During an earlier test of use of a searchlight rally-point on the January 1 New Year's Truce, 11 Hoi Chanh said they rallied because of the searchlight. That operation was only 3 to 4 days in preparation and in addition to limited planning, weather conditions hampered wide dissemination of the psyop messages. The positive results suggested further use of the device of giant searchlights to signal rally-points during the Vietnamese New Year's truce period. XXIV Corps and I Corps anticipated more ralliers during TET, both because of the special meaning of the holiday to the Vietnamese and because the campaign itself would receive lengthier planning, coordination, and specially-prepared psyop media which had not been possible for the earlier operation. Also, because again temporary cessation of hostilities should make it seem more safe to rally or surrender.



OUTLINE MAP OF MILITARY REGION I

Concept Of Operation Searchlight

An MR1-wide joint XXIV Corps/I Corps Chieu Hoi campaign utilizing twenty-two selected searchlights was conducted in two phases. Phase I, conducted between 13 and 17 January 1971 was a one-week preparation phase. During this time, psyop media developed and produced in Bien Hoa and Da Nang was distributed to U.S. military units and GVN agencies at the Province, District, and Special Zone level by the MR1 Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC). US/ARVN Divisions and Brigades submitted targets to CPOC to arrange for aerial loudspeaker and leaflet psyop support by Flight A, 9th USAF Special Operations Squadron, and the 110th VNAF Squadron. In addition, US/ARVN and Special Zones planned for targets to be flown by organic or other special mission aircraft and teams.

Phase II, conducted between 19 and 29 January, was a ten-day implementation phase. During the period the combined assets of US/ARVN military audio-visual and loudspeaker ground teams, psyop-equipped helicopters and planes, US advisory teams and GVN governmental agency radio, television, Armed Propaganda Teams, Political Indoctrination Cadre, Cultural Drama Teams and other POLWAR personnel distributed leaflets, posters, handbills, and made air and ground loudspeaker appeals to the enemy soldier to rally to the GVN. The actual searchlight illumination occurred during three days within the implementation phase. Searchlights were illuminated from 1900 hours on 26-27-28 January to 0700 hours the following mornings. This three-day period corresponded with the last day of the Vietnamese lunar month of the old year and the first and second days of the New Year, TET TAN HOI or Year of the Boar, and was the period of a 3-day cease-fire.

Because of proximity to the demilitarized zone, illumination sites in Quang Tri Province, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry (Mechanized) area of operations were to be few in number, but a concerted Chieu Hoi appeal was scheduled, based upon the traditional precepts of TET.

The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was scheduled to use six lights, located primarily at bases near the three brigade headquarters.

The 2nd ARVN Division and 1st Marine Division were each scheduled to use five lights throughout their area of operation.

The 23rd Infantry Division was also scheduled to employ five lights in the southern provinces of Quang Tri and Quang Ngai.

These scheduled sites are listed in Table 16.

Sites scheduled for searchlight illumination were necessarily subject to change. The organization commander providing security for the lights (the "King of the Hill") was responsible for deciding exactly where lights would be employed. Where bases preferred not to illuminate their perimeters, clearings were made outside the base for ralliers to enter.

Themes for Operation Searchlight Chieu Hoi Campaign. The major psyop theme used was "Rally to the Light of Freedom and Start a New Life with the GVN". This was considered especially appropriate for the period. The TET holiday begins the spring of the Vietnamese year when people try to clear all debts, both financial and societal. A second theme employed in the TET Campaign was one of family appeal to relatives to encourage their loved ones to rally and start a new life together. This was considered a strong appeal because of the importance of the family unit in Vietnamese culture.

Psyop Media. The special Operation Searchlight themes were carried through posters, handbills, leaflets and tapes supporting the campaign. Plans called for production of 6 million leaflets, 500,000 handbills, 10,000 posters and two types of loudspeaker tapes in sufficient quantity for all military and civilian supporting agencies to use. Sample copy of one of the leaflets together with the English translation is shown in Appendix I.

Psyop Message. In general, the messages furnished rally instructions with the appeal to accept the GVN offer of a new life and a new freedom. The appeals instructed the VC or NVA soldier to rally in the vicinity of the US/ARVN base or location of the light. Would-be ralliers were encouraged to wait until daylight to turn themselves in. This would assure safe conduct, prevent possible injury from security guards on duty in darkness, and prevent unnecessary alarm of personnel at the bases involved. Ralliers were further instructed to hide their weapons and to retrieve them after rally, to receive rewards and prevent being fired upon as an armed enemy.

Operations Message. XXIV Corps and I Corps issued operations messages to their respective areas rather than formal operations orders. The XXIV Corps message is shown in Appendix II.

Approach to Evaluation

In an attempt to provide fact-based answers to sponsor questions regarding campaign effectiveness, a plan was developed in discussion with the XXIV Corps Project Officer.

TABLE 16
SEARCHLIGHT SITES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SEARCH- LIGHT</u>	<u>GENERAL VICINITY</u>
a. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div		Mai Loc
b. 101st Abn Div (Ambl)	G24	Camp Eagle
	G26	Camp Evans
	G28	FSB Birmingham
	G31	Phu Bai
	G36	FSB Bastogne
	G37	FSB Rakkason
c. 1st Mar Div	G38	LZ Ross, relocated to Que Son (D) Hq.
	G46	LZ Tucson (Hill 190)
	G54	LZ Baldy, relocated to Moc Bai
	G59	Crows Nest
	G52	Nui Lo (Hill 65)
d. 2nd ARVN Div	G45	FSB Muir (Hill 55)
	G49	Ha Nha (Hill 52)
	G69	Tra Bong
	G70	Nui Ong
	G71	OP 1
e. 23rd Inf Div	G35	Stinson
	G44	FSB Fat City
	G67	Montezuma
	G51	LZ Center
	G64	FSB Mary Ann

Evaluation Plan

The plan defined (1) scope of evaluation; (2) performance objectives to be evaluated; (3) data needed to assess the extent to which the objectives were attained; (4) proposed sources of this data; (5) handling of the information; (6) type of analysis; (7) type of report.

1. Scope of the evaluation to be undertaken by HSR was a two-week analysis of data collected by the G5 Division of XXIV Corps and furnished to HSR on or before 15 February 1971.
2. Performance objectives to be evaluated were:
 - (a) Induce the enemy to rally to the proximity of the searchlight area in accordance with Operation Searchlight rally instructions.
 - (b) Persuade the enemy to rally by means of printed and verbal messages; by face-to-face communication; by appeal to family members to encourage/assist their kin to rally.
 - (c) Coordinate a joint campaign over a 15-day period to provide inducement to and facilitation of enemy rally.
3. Data needed to assess the extent to which these objectives were met:
 - (a) Number and identification of individuals who did present themselves at each of the 22 locations as ralliers during the special period.
 - (b) Number and identification of individuals who were actually classified as Hoi Chanh.
 - (c) Information obtained from Hoi Chanh as to reasons for, method of, and effective inducement to rally.
 - (d) Chieu Hoi Center records on Hoi Chanh received day by day for 2-month period 15 December 1970 to 15 February 1971.
 - (e) Number and identification of individuals who decided to rally as a result of the campaign, who came in at alternate dates and/or locations.

- (f) Exposure to and registration of various media and messages on the individuals who did come in.
- (g) Extent of family encouragement and assistance in rallying.
- (h) Location of and detailed specific operational procedures in use by each of the 22 sites functioning during the special period; any unusual occurrences.
- (i) Examples of each type of psyop material used, with pattern/volume/rate of distribution over the 11-day period, 19-29 January.
- (j) Types/volume/rate/target and distribution of all other psyop material used in MR1 during three 11-day intervals; 28 December-7 January; 8-18 January; 19-29 January.
- (k) Location and strength of enemy throughout MR1 as of: 1 January; 15 January; 1 February.
- (l) Tactical operations reports (large scale unit, small unit, enemy initiated) in MR1 during month of January.

4. Proposed sources of data:

- (a) Intelligence records on each individual attempting to rally at the specified locations with special questionnaires (to provide items 3-a, 3-c, 3-f, 3-g).
- (b) Intelligence records on ralliers and prisoners received 26 January - 15 February (to provide items 3-b, 3-f, 3-g).
- (c) Chieu Hoi records on Hoi Chanh received day by day for period 15 December 1970 - 15 February 1970 (to provide items 3-c, 3-f, 3-e, 3-f, 3-g).
- (d) Order of battle (to provide item 3-k).
- (e) Operations reports from US/ARVN units involved in the campaign (to provide items 3-a, 3-b, 3-h, 3-i, 3-j).
- (f) Operations reports of tactical action (to provide item 3-l).

5. Data to be collected at G5 Headquarters; when furnished to HSR, to be tabulated, summarized, translated into English from Vietnamese where indicated, and analyzed.
6. Analysis to be directed to the questions regarding performance objectives.
7. A brief summary report to give a resume of performance objectives and of the evaluation plan itself, describe the extent to which the performance objectives were met as revealed by the data obtained, and make recommendations for future efforts.

Procedure

The information called for in the plan was to be accumulated by the Project Office at XXIV Corps; all data that had reached them by 15 February was to be delivered to HSR for use in a report to be prepared on the first of March. This would provide an early report for XXIV Corps use, and allow the results to be included in the HSR overall technical report on psyop effectiveness studies.

The Project Officer felt that the needed data would assuredly be obtained from US groups; he would request and expect to receive it from ARVN groups.

The primary data source for questions of particular interest regarding reasons for and inducement to rally and attention to psyop messages was expected to be obtained from intelligence sources. The message sent out from U.S. Headquarters in MR1 authorizing the operation, called for special questions to be used by interrogators to furnish certain information. Interrogation teams can be asked to furnish especially-needed information by means of Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) forms. Questions which the G5 office in XXIV Corps had in effect already by SICR seemed to cover psyop media adequately and would be obtained in accordance with current procedure.* Five new questions were suggested in addition, to be asked after personal data (unit, rank, etc.) questions had been completed, to obtain a more valid response to the question about reasons for rallying. These are shown in Table 17 in English and in Table 18 in Vietnamese.

*To be found in Case Studies, Appendix III in Volume II.

Name of Respondent: _____ Date of Birth: _____

Date and Place of Rally: _____

Date Questioned: _____

1. How long ago did you learn about the Chieu Hoi program?
2. How long ago did you think of rallying?
3. Could you give three reasons why you didn't rally earlier? Which of these three (these) reasons do you think was most important to you?
4. Could you give three reasons why you rally at this time? Which of these three reasons (these) do you think is most important to you?
5. How did you rally?

TABLE 17

Special Questions to Probe for Reason for Rally for
Inclusion in Routine Questioning Procedure for
OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

Tên của đáp viên _____ Ngày sinh _____

Ngày và nơi về hồi-chánh _____

Ngày phỏng vấn _____

1. Lần đầu tiên (thứ nhất) anh biết về chương-trình Chiêu-Hồi là bao giờ, được bao lâu rồi?

2. Lần đầu tiên (thứ nhất) anh nghĩ về Chiêu-Hồi là bao giờ, được bao lâu rồi?

3. Anh có thể cho ba lý do tại sao anh không Chiêu-Hồi sớm hơn không?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

Anh có thể cho biết trong ba (mấy) lý do này, lý do nào đối với anh quan trọng hơn cả không?

4. Anh có thể cho ba lý do tại sao anh lại về Chiêu-Hồi lúc này không?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

Anh có thể cho biết trong ba (mấy) lý do này, lý do nào đối với anh quan trọng hơn cả không?

5. Anh về Chiêu-Hồi bằng cách nào?

TABLE 18

Vietnamese Translation of
Special Questions to Probe for Reason for Rally for
Inclusion in Routine Questioning Procedure for
OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

The questions in Table 17 were designed by HSR for use especially at the initial point of rally, as well during questioning which occurs at a later time when ralliers are being processed, to probe for additional information about the decision to and reason for rallying. Basic information to be obtained as a minimum, whether or not intensive questioning was conducted, was the identity of every individual approaching the specially-designated sites to rally in accordance with Operation Searchlight instructions. This identification data was necessary to make a reasonably accurate initial count of ralliers and to enable later comparison with Chieu Hoi or PW records to obtain further information needed for the analysis planned. Names alone for ralliers are not sufficient for reliable identification; date of birth, and date and place of rally in addition to name would be considered minimum identification. The five special questions were to be asked by the interrogator or interviewer after personal data (unit, rank, etc.) questions were completed before specific questions as to media awareness or Operation Searchlight awareness were asked. While asking these questions, if no reference to Operation Searchlight had been made through question 5, then the questions on media and awareness of the operation would follow.

Actually, only the first three questions were added to the SICR, together with a number of other special items XXIV Corps wanted to include (see Table 19*). In order to assess the effect of the campaign to the extent possible, it would be necessary to continue collection of some of this information for a period following the campaign in order to determine if any later ralliers had been influenced by messages heard during the campaign but did not have an opportunity to leave their units until later or could only rally or surrender to another location. Therefore, the G5 office was planning to continue collection of data by SICR for an indefinite period of time, for use in further assessment.

Information available from the Regional Chieu Hoi Center was to be obtained from their Information Sheets from each prisoner. The extent of data available on each individual rallier from these records can be seen by a list of headings:

- Name
- ID Number
- Age
- Place of Birth (Hamlet, Village, or District)

*To be found in Case Studies Appendix II, in Volume II.

- Date Rallied
- Place Rallied
- Date Arrived at Chieu Hoi Center
- Category (whether military, political or other)
- Area of Operation (Hamlet, Village or District)
- Rank or Position in VC/NVA
- Time with VC/NVA
- VC/NVA Unit or Organization
- Reason for Rally
- Inducement to Rally

The last two categories of information have certain pre-selected categories for response. Reasons for rally can be:

- Lack of food
- Lack of clothing
- Lack of medicine
- No pay or low wages
- Hard living conditions
- Tired of fighting
- Reunite with family or relatives
- Sick
- Danger of being hurt or killed
- Promises not kept by communists
- Opportunity for better life in the Chieu Hoi Program.

Pre-selected responses under "Inducement to Rally" include:

- Letter received
- Leaflet
- Aerial broadcast
- Radio broadcast
- Television
- Person-to-person contact
- Military operation

Inspection will show that it would be possible, given the name of the would-be rallier, the date and place of rally, and date of birth to identify each individual and obtain useful information by tabulating and analyzing the items of information indicated by the headings.

Order of battle, operations reports from US and ARVN units involved in the Campaign, and operations reports of tactical activity over the period of interest were expected from cognizant command sources. Data on the psyop activity would center in the Project Office.

When G5 Headquarters could not furnish these items of information, supplementary sources were sought by HSR. Order of battle information was furnished by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) where records are continuously updated on the reports as to strength and location of enemy forces at specific times. Tactical operations data was obtained from the Command Operations Center (COC) Ground Operations Weekly Summary reports, giving early estimates on large-scale operations, small unit action and enemy initiated action including losses incurred.

Findings

The incursion into Laos by ARVN forces was initiated at the end of January. This seems to have disrupted normal communications of operations reports and activities in other areas. Little information was received at G5 Headquarters and the Project Officer was away from Headquarters in the north from the inception of the Laotian Operation.

The G5 office provided HSR with information received there up to 9 February and reported no additional information through 15 February and little additional information received through mid-March. This provided HSR with:

- all preliminary planning information
- pre-campaign samples of psyop materials
- 37 responses to a 5-item questionnaire from a group who rallied between January 1 - 22.
- verbal summary of spot reports received from US bases during the "lights on" period.

Further information was anticipated and to be furnished later when the Project Officer returned to Headquarters. To assist the evaluation, pertinent information was sought from other sources; all that was received through 15 April is indicated in the following checklist.

A check list of the information items needed for evaluation with the status of information received is shown below.

<u>DATA REQUESTED</u>	<u>15 APRIL STATUS</u>
a. Number and identification of individuals who did present themselves at each of the 22 locations as ralliers during the special period.	No information received to indicate any ralliers at special location. With current general procedures, no firm information is available on ralliers until they are formally registered at Chieu Hoi Centers.
b. Number and identification of individuals who were actually classified as Hoi Chanh.	As consolidated with item "a", not obtained. Records for ralliers from National Chieu Hoi records obtained. See Table 20.
c. Information obtained from Hoi Chanh as to reasons for, method of, and effective inducement to rally.	As consolidated with item "a", not obtained; 37 5-item questionnaire responses obtained from sample group; also data included on some Chieu Hoi Information Sheets. See Tables 20, 21, 22; App. III, IV, V.
d. Chieu Hoi Center records on Hoi Chanh received day by day for 2-month period 15 Dec 70 to 15 Feb 71.	Obtained; Regional Chieu Hoi Center and National Center summaries. See Table 23.
e. Number and identification of individuals who decided to rally as a result of the campaign, who came in at alternate dates and/or locations.	Not obtained. Would be provided by special intelligence information on ralliers and prisoners of war coming in over a period subsequent to the campaign.
f. Exposure to and registration of various media and messages on the individuals who did come in.	Obtained in part from 5-item questionnaire and some Provincial Chieu Hoi records. See discussion section.

<u>DATA REQUESTED</u>	<u>15 APRIL STATUS</u>
g. Extent of family encouragement and assistance in rallying.	Obtained in part from 5-item questionnaire and some Provincial Chieu Hoi records. See Discussion section.
h. Location of and detailed specific operational procedures in use by each of the 22 sites functioning during the special period; any unusual occurrences.	Location of operating sites obtained but no special operational reports.
i. Examples of each type of psyop material used, with pattern/volume/rate of distribution over the 11-day period, 19-29 January.	Pre-campaign examples obtained; no post-campaign data on pattern/volume/rate of distribution.
j. Types/volume/rate/target and distribution of all other psyop material used in MR1 during three 11-day intervals: 28 Dec - 7 Jan; 8-18 Jan; 19-29 Jan.	Not obtained.
k. Location and strength of enemy throughout MR1 as of: 1 Jan; 15 Jan; 1 Feb.	Obtained from CICV for 31 Dec, 31 Jan, and 28 Feb. See Table 42.*
l. Tactical operations reports (large scale operation, small unit, enemy initiated) in MR1 during month of January.	Obtained from MACV COC records. See Table 43.*

*To be found in Case Studies Appendix II, in Volume II.

LOCATION	January						Total		February				Total	
	1-2	3-9	10-16	17-23	24-30	Jan.	1-30	1/31	7-13	14-20	21-27	Jan 31	Feb 27	
								2/6						
Quang Tri	0	0	0	1*	3**	4		0	1	0	1*	2		
Thua Thien	1	0	0	1	0	2		0	0	0	1	1		
Quang Nam	2	14*	32	38	7	93		11	11	12	10	44		
Quang Tin	2	66	11	24	0	103		53	19 ⁺	15 ⁺	12	99		
Quang Ngai	18	46	42	57*	0	163		43	31	14	11	99		
<u>Total</u>	23	126	85	121	10	365		107	62	41	35	245		

*One NVA included
 **Three NVA who refused repatriation to NVN
 + Three NVA included

TABLE 20
 National Chieu Hoi Center Record of
 Returnees in January-February 1971
 by Province in MR1

TABLE 21

RALLY DECISION OF SIX HOI CHANH
WHO RALLIED DURING OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

ID#30

1. I knew that the Chieu Hoi program was initiated in 1965.
2. I thought of rallying a long time ago but was influenced by communist threats. I decided to rally in February 1970.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) My wife and child were wounded and my child was young.
 - (2) Was under constant surveillance.The most important reason was VC control.
4. I rallied at this time because at Tet people moved back and forth forth and I took advantage of this opportunity to come out.
5. At first my older brother sent me a letter and I went on foot to present myself at Phu Thanh village.

ID#33

1. I learned about the Chieu Hoi program in 1967, three years ago.
2. I thought of rallying in 1969, 20 months ago.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) I was influenced by communist propaganda and threats that they would initiate violence in towns,
 - (2) I was still suspicious of the Government Chieu Hoi program,
 - (3) Family situation; I was afraid the communists would send my family to attend thought reform.

Of the reasons above, the most important was my fear for my family.

TABLE 21 (Cont'd)

4. I rallied at this time because:

- (1) I was too disillusioned with the communists, a totalitarian Party regime. They squeeze you to the last drop and throw you away later. They take out on your family if they can't get at you.
- (2) I had read many GVN leaflets and also I was able to contact my brother who was living in a GVN area and who told me of the treatment the GVN reserved for ralliers.

Of the above reasons, the most important reason was my family's assurances of GVN good treatment toward ralliers.

5. I sent my wife out first so she could contact local officials before I came out.

ID#37

1. I first learned about the Chieu Hoi program in March 1970, about 10 months ago.
2. The first time I thought of rallying was in August 1970, four months ago.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) The communists threatened us with thought reform if caught rallying,
 - (2) The communists threatened us that ralliers were dumped in the sea by the GVN,
 - (3) The communists threatened us with death if caught rallying.
4. I rallied at this time because:
 - (1) The communists didn't make good their promises and I was too tired of the war,
 - (2) I had been deceived by the communists but now I realized the truth about the GVN,
 - (3) The GVN stepped up the Chieu Hoi program during Tet.

The most important reason was shorten the war, restore peace, shorten the days of suffering. I was deceived by the communists but now I realize the truth about the Chieu Hoi program; it is a humane program reserved for those who have taken the wrong direction.

TABLE 21 (Cont'd)

ID#6

1. The first time I learned about the Chieu Hoi program was in 1968.
2. I wanted to come out in 1968 after I learned about the program; sometime in October 1968.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) Communist false propaganda that ralliers were put in jail,
 - (2) Was not able to contact my brothers and relatives living in GVN controlled areas,
 - (3) Was under constant surveillance.

The most important reason was inability to contact family in GVN areas.

4. I rallied at this time because:
 - (1) Was able to contact my family and understood the Chieu Hoi program,
 - (2) Believed in the Government leniency.

The most important reason was I wanted to be reunited to my family. I returned to the Government as a lost citizen.

5. I came out to rally at night time and presented myself to the administrative organizations at Son Khuong.

ID#15

1. I first learned about the Chieu Hoi program in 1969 but was unable to leave because VC control was too strict.
2. I thought of rallying in 1969 but couldn't come out because of VC control.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) Couldn't come out sooner because of VC control,
 - (2) Didn't know how to earn my living,
 - (3) I had been well-indoctrinated by VC propaganda and their threats.

The most important reasons were communist's propaganda and threats.

TABLE 21 (Cont'd)

4. I decided to rally at this time because I realized what the Chieu Hoi program was all about.
5. I rallied by escaping the communists at night time and presented myself at the village council at Son Loi.

ID#30

1. The first time I learned about the Chieu Hoi program was in 1968, about three years ago.
2. The first time I thought of and wanted to rally was about three years ago.
3. I didn't rally earlier because:
 - (1) I was influenced by VC false propaganda that ralliers were jailed,
 - (2) VC threatened us that ralliers might step on mines on the road and would be caught by guerrillas.

The most important reason was fear of being caught by the VC.

4. I came out to rally because:
 - (1) Was afraid of the bombing and of getting killed,
 - (2) I wanted to stay alive.
5. I came out to rally at night, walking in the jungle and presented myself to GVN officials.

TABLE 22

RALLY INDUCEMENT

Date of Rally			Self-Report in 5-item Questionnaire		As reported from Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet
<u>Self</u>	<u>CH</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Other</u>	
1/19	1/21	6	Able to contact family and understood Chieu Hoi Program.	Reunion with family; GVN lenience.	Letter received
1/19	1/21	20	To stay alive .	Fear of bombing and of being killed.	Letter received.
1/20	1/22	37	Understood Chieu Hoi Program from leaflet and loudspeaker.	Realized VC causing death and suffering to many.	Letter received.
1/20	1/22	30	Older brother sent letter.	Took advantage of general movement during Tet.	Radio broadcast.
1/20	1/20	33	Learned of GVN treatment and of ralliers from leaflets and from brother.	Disillusionment with Communists.	Radio broadcast
1/20	1/21	15	Realized what Chieu Hoi Program meant.		Aerial broadcast.

Responses of 6 Hoi Chanh
Who Rallied During Operation Searchlight

CH - Chieu Hoi

ID - Questionnaire Identification

TABLE 23

Ralliers Received During Operation Searchlight
 Compared With Pre- and Post-Campaign Period
 From Province Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet Records

<u>Province</u>	<u>Pre-Campaign Period 12/20 - 1/18</u>	<u>Campaign Period 1/19 - 1/29</u>	<u>Post-Campaign Period 1/30 - 2/15</u>
Quang Tri	--	4 (0)*	1
Thua Thien	1	1 (0)*	--
Quang Nam	89	10 (2)*	12
Quang Tin	185	28 (22)*	13
Quang Ngai	121	34 (7)*	9
TOTAL	396	77 (31)*	35

*Rallied within "Lights-On" Period

Results

Agreement to undertake evaluation of the Operation Searchlight campaign provided for HSR (1) to furnish a brief report to the XXIV Corps G5 Project Officer and (2) to use the project and the study as a case history for the long-range research program on measurement of psyop effectiveness in which HSR was under contract to OSD. Results are presented here in terms of this dual purpose.

The assessment plan furnished XXIV Corps after HSR agreed to undertake the evaluation provided for a brief summary report on the basis of information received by 15 February. This report was to describe the extent to which the performance objectives were met as revealed by the data obtained, and make recommendations for future efforts. Results are discussed below in terms of the three performance objectives (in relation to ralliers, psyop inducement to rally, and campaign coordination), and recommendations are made.

Information obtained from regional Chieu Hoi records and national Chieu Hoi reports together with the data from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) and from Command Operations Center (COC) reports provide some figures on ralliers received and give situational data on enemy strength and tactical activity in MR I during the special psyop campaign and during the preceding and following periods. This data together with the full information provided by the Project Officer prior to the campaign and the 37 rallier responses to the 5 special questions do furnish a basis for cursory assessment as well as valuable information for future rally appeals. However, no attempt at effectiveness measurement can be made until complete data is received. For example, information sheets from province Chieu Hoi records were received on 77 VC who rallied during the 10-day campaign implementation period, 31 of these during the 3-day "Lights On Period". Until interrogation reports and/or special interviews are received, however, there is no way of determining what part Operation Searchlight or any psyop activity played in the rally decision for these individuals. This is especially true for those individuals reported as rallying between 31 January and 13 February. This is a period during which some who were persuaded to rally might

have left their units but spent Tet with their families before rallying. Intelligence reports obtained over this period from prisoners might also be used to determine the number of any who intended to rally but were captured first or who considered rally, but did not act on it, and were later captured.

Other data which would be needed to assess the fact that none rallied to the searchlight rally-point is incomplete. Again, intelligence reports are needed as well as unit operation reports and report of psyop activity, to add to situational data on enemy strength and movement and tactical activity which was received.

While information was furnished prior to the campaign on special psyop material and distribution plans, no information has been received on overall psyop effort in MR1 during the period of interest. We do know from information on hand that tactical activity as reported was light in terms of large scale action, small unit action, and enemy initiated action; that in view of reported enemy strength, casualties were inconsequential for the NVA/VC forces; that their numbers, having remained fairly steady for some time, were increasing during the period of interest.

It can be assumed that surveillance increased greatly during the intensified psyop campaign. This factor too can be assessed only from intelligence information and rallier/prisoner self-reports obtained later. This factor might also serve as a measure of effectiveness of a psyop effort. Enemy resources directed to prevent defection of their own troops, are diminished for tactical activity.

The information received from 37 ralliers who responded to 5 specific questions giving their reasons for rally can be especially useful in planning future psyop activity directed to this target audience. For these 37, analysis of the time between first thinking of rallying and actual rally (1 - 2 years), the reasons for not rallying earlier (close surveillance and control, no opportunity, lack of belief in or information about the Chieu Hoi Program), and the reason for rallying in January 1971 (confidence in GVN promises, opportunity), should prove of great assistance in future planning.

As described under "Procedure", the small 5-item questionnaire was designed for administration by an interviewer or as the initial part of an interrogation. In this case it seems to have been used as a single instrument and self-administered in a group.

Thirty-seven Hoi Chanh who rallied in Quang Ngai Province during January responded to a 5-item questionnaire handed to all ralliers in the Quang Ngai Province Chieu Hoi Center who had rallied during the month of January. Even as a self-administered instrument and in the face of certain other apparent difficulties, examination of the responses is enlightening.

For one thing, it is seen that where a group does not rally under combat, the process of deciding to rally is not usually immediate. Examination of the 37 responses shows that 70% had first thought they might rally from one to two years before doing so. A pattern emerges of a pre-rally decision process starting with dissatisfaction with the Front, and, while being restrained from rally by surveillance and control, a major element of restraint seems to be lack of sufficient trust in the Chieu Hoi Program. This is evidenced by comments as to reason for not rallying earlier: "Did not yet understand the Chieu Hoi Program;" "Suspicious of Chieu Hoi Program;" "Communists hide truth about GVN lenience toward ralliers." It is evidenced further by comments as to reason for rallying at the time: "Realized GVN lenience in the Chieu Hoi Program;" "Able to inquire and learn about Chieu Hoi Program;" "Able to contact family and therefore able to understand GVN policy;" "Read leaflets and heard broadcasts, realized ralliers were well-treated."

This points to the fact that while a single message may have great influence in the rally decision, it does not usually prompt immediate action. Psyop messages can increase disaffection with Front forces, can build conviction that the Chieu Hoi program can be trusted, can provide reliable instructions on how to rally; after that the main factor seems to be the occurrence of or making an opportunity.

Intelligence reports containing responses to questions contained in the SICR which would provide an array of such information for the entire military region are especially needed for determination of attention to and influence of psyop appeals. Again, the brief questionnaire, together with partial information on this point from the Chieu Hoi Information Sheet with all the headings described in the "Procedure" section, provided some information on this point.

The desirability of probing for reason for and inducement to rally is illustrated in the two independent sources of information. In the free response answers by 37 ralliers to the question: "Give three reasons why you rallied at this time; which reason is most important?", psyop rally appeals or family inducement is cited by 25 of the 37; they mention the media shown in the following figures while Chieu Hoi Information Sheet records for the same 37 individuals show pre-recorded items for rally inducement for 27 of the group as follows:

<u>Free response mention of rally appeals (27)</u>		<u>Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet mention of rally appeals (27)</u>	
Broadcast	0%	Radio	30%
Leaflet	24%	---	---
Loudspeaker	8%	Air Broadcast	37%
Letter	8%	Letter received	33%
Family	44%	---	---
GVN rally appeal	<u>16%</u>	---	<u>---</u>
	100%		100%

These data are supplemental; not necessarily contradictory.

Conclusions

From the analysis of information received, we can report the following results in terms of the three campaign performance objectives which pertained to (1) ralliers, (2) appeals, (3) campaign.

The first performance objective to be evaluated was: Induce the enemy to rally to the proximity of the searchlight in accordance with Operation Searchlight rally instructions.

No individuals are reported to have rallied to the searchlight.

One spot report indicated two VC taken by RF and thought to be detained at a PW camp, had claimed to be going to the searchlight to rally. No other information was received to indicate NVA and VC soldiers approached any of the 22 sites to rally during the three-day "Lights on" period.

The second objective to be evaluated was: Persuade the enemy to rally by means of printed and verbal messages; by face-to-face communication; by appeal to family members to encourage/assist their kin to rally.

According to National Chieu Hoi records, 77 ralliers were reported to have come into the Chieu Hoi Program in MR1 during the campaign period, 31 of them during the three-day searchlight phase. No other information is available for this group.

Another data input provided information from 37 ralliers in one province of MR1 during January who responded to a questionnaire, giving information on reason for and inducement to rally. Data on this group is augmented by the information contained in the Chieu Hoi Information Sheet. Approximately 65% of this group mention psyop messages, and 54% of the number mention family assistance or urging to rally. (As more than one answer was given, the total is more than 100%). No information has been received as to those who might have been persuaded to come in during the campaign but could not attempt it or as to those who attempted to rally but were prevented from doing so.

A third performance objective to be evaluated was: Coordinate a joint campaign over a 15-day period to provide inducement to and facilitation of enemy rally.

The preliminary planning and preparation of materials was thorough. Post-campaign information does not provide means for assessment of this objective. Location of sites used was received, but no reports from those sites are available. Pre-campaign examples of psyop material was furnished but no post-campaign reports of actual campaign effort was received. No information at all was made available as to MR1-wide psyop effort.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to assist in future psyop evaluation and to provide information helpful in planning future psyop activity:

Obtain on a regular basis the detailed records on ralliers prepared by MR1 Province Chieu Hoi Centers, and maintain this Information Sheet data for continuing analysis for planning purposes and for assessment.

Obtain, on a regular basis, the IPW reports in response to psyop SICR requests on each rallier and prisoner in MR1 for continuing analysis for planning purposes and for assessment.

Coordinate information received from SICR responses with Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet items for more comprehensive analysis.

Include in message or order for each psyop project or campaign, specific tasking requirements necessary to insure receipt of data needed for assessment.

A CASE STUDY OF PSYOP EFFECTS OF ACTIONS:
PSYOP EFFECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

A Case Study Of Psyop Effects Of Actions:
Psyop Effects Of The Cambodian Incursion

The "psyop" aspect of "actions" represents some very intricate semantic problems and problems in definition. It seems unnecessarily laborious to insist on the many small distinctions that must be carefully developed and summated in order to demonstrate the extent to which the concept of the psyop aspect of actions invites misinterpretation. Nevertheless, it may be necessary because so much lip service is given to what may be somewhat erroneous concepts of "psyop by action".

The notion that all actions, whether or not psyop is involved, have a psyop aspect or effect is considered to be a sophisticated viewpoint but the notion is actually spurious and misleading. Any action that impacts humans can be said to have a "psychological impact" but it cannot also be argued that there was a "psychological operations" impact unless the action was part of a psyop. A distinction must be made between a "psychological effect or impact" and a "psyop effect or impact" or the concept of "psyop" becomes as broad as all human behavior. Four conditions that describe any action which affects other humans can be distinguished:

1. An action may be taken with no consideration of psyop aspects and no intention of achieving a psyop effect.

This action may have a psychological effect; it cannot have a psyop effect.

2. An action may be taken with the recognition that there may be some psyop effect but this consideration is ignored.

This action may have a psychological effect; it cannot have a psyop effect.

3. An action may be taken for which the probability of some psyop impact was contemplated; adjustment of the original concept of the action might or might not have been made because of the predicted psyop impact.

This action may have a psychological effect. It may or may not be considered to have a psyop effect.

4. An action may be taken because of an expected psyop aspect or effect; the action might not be taken if it were not for the expected psyop effects.

This action may have a psychological effect; if it does, it also has a psyop effect.

If an action is conceived and executed with no consideration of psyop aspects then the action cannot be said to have had any psyop objective or intent. In the absence of a psyop objective established by the decision maker, it would be impossible to evaluate the psyop effects of the action. Of course, objectives could arbitrarily be established by the researcher for measurement purposes but these would enable measurement of a psychological impact -- not a psyop impact.

In short, the concept of psyop aspects of actions should be restricted to instances where the expected impact of the psyop aspect of actions was considered in the planning and execution of the actions, or in cases where the predicted psyop effect was the major reason for undertaking an action. In either case, psyop objectives should have been established in the planning stage.

When the surprise Allied incursion into Cambodia occurred, a most unusual opportunity presented itself. NVA PW's and VC PW's had been interviewed at several locations within RVN one or two months prior to the incursion. HSR was asked to devote all resources to a study of the Cambodian incursion's effects upon the attitudes and morale of the NVA soldiers in Cambodia. It was immediately obvious that a reinterview of the PW's previously interviewed would permit a before-and-after comparison of the effect of receipt of news of the Cambodian invasion upon the PW's attitudes and opinions. The "already-PW's" opinions and attitudes compared to the "new PW's" newly taken during the Cambodian Operation would provide a base-line to give an indication of the extent of the impact of the incursion upon the morale of soldiers captured in Cambodia. Additionally, the reactions of a large number of prisoners captured in Cambodia could be compared with responses to identical questions asked of NVA PW's taken before the Cambodian incursion. Thus, several kinds of comparisons would be made possible.

In reports released early in 1970, it has been concluded that NVA morale was high and firm. Analysis had indicated that morale was based on what, from the American point of view, was an almost delusory conviction -- created by their pervasive indoctrination and thought control programs -- that the NLF was assured of victory.

HSR predicted that an extravagant surprise Allied action would be required to move their perception of the external world in the direction of reality with a consequent severe negative impact on their morale; the illustration offered at that time was a surprise resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.

The Allied Cambodian invasion was precisely the kind of surprise action that had been said to be necessary to damage NVA morale.

In making comparisons between those who were already prisoners before the Allied incursion occurred and those who were captured in Cambodia, it was reasoned that the NVA and VC PW's in GVN prisons before the incursion were isolated from the danger and thereby much less affected. As such, they represented one approach to use of control groups. The NVA who were operating within Cambodia and who were captured were expected to display definite signs of shock, surprise, and damaged morale because of their complete conviction that Cambodia was a sanctuary.

Table 24 somewhat paradoxically shows that it was the prediction of both the NVA prisoners and the VC prisoners in GVN that both the NVA and VC morale in the field would be increased rather than decreased by the Allied incursion. This is due, in very large part, to the content of the indoctrination to which they had been subjected before imprisonment. The reasoning is something like that of the boy who says in surprise when hit by a bigger boy who had allowed himself to be teased for some time without retaliating, "Oh! You want to play that way, now I am really going to get tough with you." The untested boy has no notion whether he can make good his claims or not but his self-image allows no doubt to occur. In contrast, the NVA prisoners captured in Cambodia predicted a considerable decrease in morale for both NVA and VC.

Table 25 shows that the GVN prison camp samples were about equally divided on the question of whether the ARVN strength was increased or decreased in their estimation as a result of the incursion, but the Cambodian-captured PW's showed a large increase in estimate of ARVN strength.

Table 26 shows that the VC and NVA PW's in GVN prison camps suffered a mild reduction in the degree of their conviction of ultimate victory. The Cambodian-captured NVA PW's showed a striking increase in the number who now thought the GVN would win or who were now uncertain about the outcome.

TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S
CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970
WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S
INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970
AND REINTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"As a result of the Allied entry into Cambodia,
what is the effect on NLF soldiers' morale? "

<u>Response</u>	<u>NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)</u>	<u>VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</u>	<u>NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</u>
NVA Morale Increased	13%	52%	72%
No Change	08%	16%	16%
NVA Morale Decreased	58%	20%	10%
Not Sure/No Opinion	21%	12%	02%

VC Morale Increased	11%	56%	72%
No Change	10%	10%	14%
VC Morale Decreased	47%	22%	08%
Not Sure/No Opinion	32%	12%	06%

TABLE 25

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S
 CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970
 WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S
 INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970
 AND INTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"Have you raised or lowered your estimate of
 ARVN strength since their entry into Cambodia?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)</u>	<u>VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</u>	<u>NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</u>
ARVN Strength Increased	66%	33%	18%
About the Same	10%	30%	34%
ARVN Strength Decreased	05%	18%	36%
Not Sure/No Opinion	19%	19%	12%

TABLE 26

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S
CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970
WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S
INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970
AND REINTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"In March 1970, before the Cambodian incursion,
who did you think would win the war? "

"Now (after the Cambodian incursion), who do
you think will win the war? "

<u>Response</u>	NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)		VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)		NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)	
	<u>March</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>August</u>
NLF	48%	21%	82%	78%	96%	86%
Stalemate	11%	16%	6%	2%	4%	6%
RVN	17%	34%	8%	16%	-	4%
Not Sure/No Opinion	24%	31%	4%	4%	-	4%

Since the results of much of the research that has been done indicates that belief in their operational superiority and the conviction of ultimate victory has been a mainstay for VC and NVA morale and motivation, the effects of the Cambodian incursion are considered to have had an extremely damaging psyop effect.

The summary reports for NVA and VC PW reinterviews are presented here in full. Results of the survey of PW's taken in Cambodia during the Allied invasion can be found in Volume II, under Task 7.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PRISONERS OF WAR

INTERVIEWED BEFORE AND AFTER THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

One hundred prisoners of war (PW's), 50 North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and 50 Viet Cong (VC), interviewed prior to the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, were reinterviewed in July and August. This section reports findings on the 50 NVA PW's reinterviewed.

Objectives

An attempt to evaluate the impact of the Allied entry into Cambodia upon the enemy soldier involved three related studies. NVA soldiers taken prisoner in Cambodia were interviewed shortly after capture to evaluate the immediate direct impact upon those personally endangered; NVA and VC soldiers captured within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) were interviewed shortly after capture to evaluate the impact upon those indirectly affected; and NVA and VC prisoners who had already been interviewed prior to initiation of the Cambodian operations were reinterviewed after the US withdrawal from Cambodia to evaluate the effect upon enemy soldiers remote from and not endangered by the Allied incursion. This report treats the 50 NVA PW's reinterviewed at PW Camps in Military Region 1 (MR1) and Military Region 4 (MR4).

Background

In HSR reports released early in 1970, it was concluded that NVA morale was high and firm, showed only the most minor signs of a trend toward deterioration, and that an extravagant surprise Allied action would be required to seriously impact their morale. The Cambodian incursion represented just such an extravagant surprise.

Questions were asked such as what is the impact of such a significant event upon the opinions and attitudes of NVA and VC soldiers within prison camps? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation be changed as a result? The study described here was designed to treat such questions with regard to NVA prisoners.

Procedure

A sample of 50 NVA PW's was drawn randomly from 100 NVA PW's interviewed previously. Twenty-five NVA PW's were reinterviewed in the Northern part of RVN and 25 NVA PW's were reinterviewed in MR4 in the Southern part of RVN. The initial interviews had been conducted between February and April 1970, and reinterviews were conducted in July and August 1970.

A questionnaire designed to assess knowledge and impact of the Cambodian incursion included questions selected from the questionnaire used for previous interviews. Interest was focused upon comparison of the individuals personal experience in SVN compared with what he had been told during indoctrination, evaluation of RVN military strength, quality and success of their own military leaders and operations, and expectations of victory.

The same all-Vietnamese team of interviewers who had conducted the first interviews was trained in administration of the specially designed questionnaire. After necessary official administrative and logistical arrangements were completed, interviews were conducted under the supervision of an HSR research scientist.

Workplace arrangements in the PW camps afforded adequate interview conditions. In MR1, facilities made available were inside the camp dispensary and where two interviews were conducted simultaneously, the men were not in view or hearing of each other. In MR4, each interview was conducted in a separate room.

The absence of significant consistent differences in the pattern of responses made it advantageous to combine the two sub-samples.

Results

The results are treated in terms of possession of knowledge of the Cambodian entry, immediate reaction to news of the Cambodian entry, personal knowledge of South Vietnam versus indoctrination, and evaluation of military strength and possibility of victory.

Knowledge of the Cambodian Incursion

Only a very small percentage of the NVA soldiers in PW camps in MR1 and MR4 had heard about the Allied entry into Cambodia (point 1). The 6% who had heard about it prior to their interview learned of it either in mid-May or late June (point 2); their source of information about the entry into Cambodia was varied (point 3). The remaining 94% of the PW's heard about it for the first time in their reinterview. A number of other prisoners also claimed to have heard about the Allied entry but subsequent exploration of the details placed the dates between February and April, well before the entry actually occurred. Rumors or speculation about the possibility of an Allied invasion might be inferred to be the source of such claims but further probing provided no supporting evidence; the existence of such rumors had been noted in earlier studies.

A majority of the NVA PW's were aware that NVA troops (point 4) and VC troops were in Cambodia (point 5) and their possession of that knowledge is validated by their repetition of the same assortment of reasons for NLF presence in Cambodia that is obtained consistently from other similar samples of PW's; i.e., Cambodia is a safe haven, a rest and regroupment area, and a launching pad for attacks on RVN (point 6).

About one quarter of the sample had visited or stayed some time in Cambodia (point 7).

1.	Have you heard about GVN/ US troops entering Cambodia?	Yes:	06%
		No:	94%
2.	When did you first hear about it?	Median:	9 wks ago
		Range:	6 wks-3 mos ago
3.	From what source did you hear of GVN/US entry into Cambodia?	Did not hear	94%
		Guard/other official	02%
		Newspaper, magazine	02%
		Radio/loudspeaker	---
		Another PW	02%

4.	Did you know NVA troops were in Cambodia?	Yes:	56%
		No:	34%
5.	Did you know VC troops were in Cambodia?	Yes:	56%
		No:	34%
6.	Do you know why NLF troops are in Cambodia?	Yes:	62%
		No:	38%
7.	Have you ever been in Cambodia?	Yes:	28%
		No:	72%

Immediate Reaction to News of the Cambodian Incursion

Almost all of the sample had learned about the Cambodian incursion for the first time at the beginning of their reinterview. Perhaps partly for this reason, the NVA PW's varied greatly among themselves in their personal reactions. Early in the interview many of the PW's in the sample initially prefaced their responses by such phrases as "if what you say is true". As the interview progressed, the tendency to qualify answers evaporated quickly; this does not mean that there was a change in the nature of the responses or the viewpoint from which they were made, however.

No claims of foreknowledge of the entry were made (point 8). Apparently the possibility of an Allied entry into Cambodia seemed so unlikely that it had never been a subject of speculation among friends and acquaintances (point 9). Opinions about ARVN strength declined slightly as a result of their entering Cambodia (point 10); the nearest to a logical explanation for the decrease that could be obtained was "the GVN must be desperate and are creating a distraction by widening the war". A majority felt that the morale and fighting spirit of both the NVA soldiers (point 11) and the VC soldiers will be increased (point 12); they explain that "difficulties increase the fighting spirit, and force will be met with equal force by supporters of the 'Just Cause'". It is thought to be very probable that the NLF leaders will react by intensifying offensive operations (point 13).

In March 1970, the NVA PW was convinced that NLF would win the war (point 14). The news of the Allied entry into Cambodia apparently had only a minor effect on his thinking because in August only a small change was evident in his judgment of the eventual victory (point 15). It is likely that he believes by more than a 2-to-1 margin that the duration of the war

will be shortened now, mainly because he reasons that the Allies already had more than they could handle in South Vietnam, have now spread themselves too thin, acquired new enemies, and made themselves weaker by creating a situation in which they must fight on two fronts (point 16).

8.	Did you know Allied troops were going into Cambodia before it happened?	Yes:	02%
		No:	94%
9.	Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, did other people think the GVN and Allies might enter Cambodia?	Yes:	08%
		Not sure	34%
		No:	58%
10.	Have you raised or lowered your estimate of ARVN strength since their entry into Cambodia?	Increased	18%
		Same	34%
		Decreased	36%
11.	What will be the effect on the morale of NVA soldiers now?	Increased	72%
		Same	16%
		Decreased	10%
12.	What will be the effect on the morale of VC soldiers now?	Increased	72%
		Same	14%
		Decreased	08%
13.	How will the top leaders in Hanoi react to the Cambodian entry?	Intensify operations	80%
		Do not know	16%
		Decrease operations	02%
14.	In March, who did you think would win the war?	NLF:	96%
		Stalemate	04%
		GVN:	---
15.	In August, who do you think will win the war?	NLF:	86%
		Stalemate	06%
		GVN:	04%
16.	What effect will this have on duration of the war?	Lengthen war	26%
		No effect	02%
		Shorten war	62%

Experience in SVN vs Indoctrination

In March, the NVA PW's judged that the determination on the part of the RVN general public to continue to resist the NLF was even less than he had been told; his opinion remained essentially the same in August after hearing of the Allied Cambodian incursion (point 17). In March, it was judged that the effectiveness of the ARVN soldier is less than it had been said to be; that opinion remained essentially the same in August (point 18). His very positive attitude toward the quality of his leaders, in March, i.e., about 40% of the sample rate them as even better than had been expected, remained unchanged in August (point 19).

In early 1970, 40% of the NVA PW's judged the NLF military operations to be even more successful than expected and in August, after learning of the Allied Cambodian operations, this figure increased by 60% (point 20). Apparently, the NLF military leaders are given credit for devising clever military operations which lured the GVN/US troops out of the "quagmire of SVN into the quicksands of Cambodia", thereby causing the RVN/US forces to be spread even more thinly in more new and unfamiliar areas (point 20).

		Pre	Post
17. How does the determination of the general public to keep on fighting against the NLF compare with what you were told?	No answer	42%	18%
	More resist NLF	04%	08%
	Same	28%	50%
	Less resist NLF	26%	22%
18. How does the fighting ability and effectiveness of the GVN soldiers (such as ARVN, RF's, PF's) compare with what you had been told about them?	No answer	32%	08%
	ARVN better	12%	10%
	Same	22%	48%
	ARVN worse	34%	34%
19. Overall, how did the quality of your military leaders (their skill, courage, determination) compare with what you had expected them to be?	No answer	20%	02%
	NLF leaders better	38%	40%
	Same	38%	50%
	NLF leaders worse	04%	08%

20. Overall, how did the general effectiveness and success of your military operations compare to what you expected it would be?	No answer	20%	---
	More successful	40%	64%
	Same	28%	20%
	Less successful	12%	16%

Evaluation of Military Strength/Victory

In March, seven times as many NVA PW's judged RVN/US military power to be less than that of NLF/NVN compared to the number that judged it to be greater than NLF/NVN. In August, the corresponding ratio was nine to one (point 21); i.e., the number of PW's that judged GVN/US to be weaker increased by 33% between March and August.

When GVN's military strength without the aid of allies was compared to that of NLF/NVN in March, almost three-quarters of the PW's judged GVN to be much weaker. In August, after the RVN/US entry into Cambodia, that number was increased by more than 25%, suggesting that RVN would be overwhelmed without its allies (point 22).

In March, more than 80% of the NVA PW's judged that NLF would win the war even if the US continued to support RVN with money and manpower. In August, that figure was raised to slightly more than 90% (point 23).

More than 90% of the NVA PW's believe in August, as they did in March, that NLF will win if the US continues to support RVN with money and supplies but withdraws its manpower (point 24).

Both in March and August about 95% of the PW's expected that SVN will join with NVN as an equal partner after it is "liberated" (point 25).

		Pre	Post
	No answer	14%	---
21. How does the military strength of the GVN/US and their allies compare to the military strength of NLF/NVN and their allies?	GVN/US stronger	08%	08%
	Same	24%	20%
	GVN/US weaker	54%	72%
22. How does the military strength of GVN alone (without allied manpower) compare with the NLF/NVN military strength?		12%	---
		04%	02%
		12%	06%
		72%	92%

23. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with manpower and money?	No answer	06%	---
	NLF loses	08%	06%
	Stalemate	04%	---
	NLF wins	82%	94%
24. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with money and supplies and equipment but withdraw their manpower?	No answer	06%	---
	NLF loses	04%	04%
	Stalemate	---	---
	NLF wins		
25. Will SVN be joined with NVN as an equal partner if SVN is liberated?	No answer	02%	---
	Won't merge	---	04%
	Will merge	98%	96%

Discussion

In this section, the results are considered in relation to the question of whether news of the Cambodian incursion reached the PW's, the source of the information, reactions to the news, and subsequent shifts of attitudes.

Did News of the Cambodian Incursion Reach NVA PW's?

Only 6% of the NVA PW's sampled had heard of the Allied entry into Cambodia although the news had reached 90% of VC PW's sampled in the same camps at the same time. Such news obviously does not reach them through normal channels.

However, it did reach 100% of them because of the reinterview. In essence, the interviewer, as the first source of the news, was right on the scene when each PW first learned of the Allied Cambodian operations during their reinterview.

How Did He Hear About It?

The 6% who had previous knowledge of the Cambodian incursion had heard of it from three different types of sources. The remaining PW's - an overwhelming majority of the sample - first heard about the Cambodian entry from the civilian Vietnamese interviewer after the interview began.

The length of time before the news reached this sample as a whole is one of the more striking findings. While the incursion had taken place three months before the reinterview, only 6% had known of it for as much as two months at the time of the reinterview and 94% had not yet heard of it more than three months later.

What Was His Reaction?

Although almost all of the sample learned about the Allied Cambodian entry for the first time early in their interview, there were no overt signs of impact. No excessive emotions were aroused, speech remained normal, there were few departures from the normally expectable propaganda and indoctrination-inculcated pattern and content of responses, and the interviews were completed in normal fashion.

About one-quarter of the PW's commented to the interviewer that his mention of the Cambodian entry was the first that they had heard; this is true also for an additional two-thirds of the sample, although they did not discuss it so straightforwardly. About 10% of the sample carefully explained why they could not believe that it had happened just because they were told so. More than 10% of the NVA PW's complained specifically of being shut off from all news contact and therefore they could not help feeling detached and uninvolved.

The odd combination of suspiciousness, objectivity, literal-mindedness, analytical tendencies, and sheer naivete that often seems to characterize NVA PW's makes it very unlikely that the interviewer was regarded as a credible source of information. However, although the source was "foreign" and questionable, the news was apparently sufficiently intriguing to command the NVA PW's interest. Most of the sample, including those who remarked that the interviewer was the source of the information and even those who verbalized their doubts, answered the remaining questions as though they accepted the truth of the information or prefaced their answers with such phrases as, "If I were to believe what you say" or "If what you say is true".

There was a strong expectation of a counterattack directed from Hanoi and both intensified NLF military offensives and strong political denunciation were expected from Hanoi leaders by the respondents.

Did Previously-Expressed Attitudes Shift?

Two main areas of change are found in the results. The number that judged NLF's military operations as being "even more successful than expected" rose by 60% and the judgments that GVN, with or without allies, is weaker than NLF/NVN increased considerably in August.

The second major area of change was a greatly increased willingness to express an opinion in the reinterview in August. The number of "no opinion expressed" dropped sharply in all instances.

The continued belief that RVN/US forces are weaker than NLF/NVN and the increased conviction that NLF military operations are successful even in the face of the havoc wrought by the Allied operations in Cambodia can be explained by a combination of factors. One is simple disbelief or reserved judgment; unless his own leaders say something, the NVA soldier seldom accepts anything that he has not seen himself or that is not

familiar to him. Also it has been explained to him that it is their leaders' strategy to spread out the RVN/US forces so they can be killed more easily; the entry into Cambodia is therefore a serious error of judgment on RVN's part, as the NVA PW sees it.

For the group as a whole, belief in NLF victory shifted downwards slightly, although the overwhelming majority retained their assurance of an NLF victory.

Slightly more than two-thirds judge that the war will end more quickly as a consequence of the Cambodian entry.

Conclusions

Five major conclusions are as follows:

1. News of the Allied Cambodian incursion had not reached a great majority of the NVA PW's sampled in Military Region 1 (MR1) and Military Region 4 (MR4) more than three months later.

2. After hearing of the Cambodian entry for the first time during their post-Cambodian interview, the NVA PW's behavior during the interview demonstrated that news of the event -- although the truth of the report was questioned -- did have an impact. In the reinterviews, there was a striking increase in willingness to make judgments compared to their much more cautious response patterns in the pre-Cambodian interviews. Most of the responses were in the reverse direction from what -- by objective logic -- would be expected. For instance the unusual, unexpected, and aggressive entry of ARVN troops into Cambodia was interpreted as evidence of increased ARVN weakness. This interpretation, however, is logical in terms of what would be expectable based on the content of propaganda and indoctrination they have received in North Vietnam. Therefore, the psychological impact was sufficient to affect behavior to a limited extent, i.e., stimulate involvement and evoke responses, but was not sufficient to disrupt verbalization of their indoctrination-inculcated information, assumptions, and lines of reasoning.

3. Personal reactions to the Cambodian incursion were extremely varied, indicating the probable absence of prior mention of the possibility of such an event in propaganda or indoctrination.

4. A majority of the NVA PW's knew NLF troops were in Cambodia and had the usual conviction that Cambodia was their safe haven.

5. The NVA PW's were convinced that their leaders would intensify military offensive operations in reaction to the incursion. The apparent failure of the NLF to do so to date may be exploitable to GVN's advantage.

VIET CONG PRISONERS OF WAR INTERVIEWED
BEFORE AND AFTER THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

One hundred prisoners of war (PW's), 50 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and 50 Viet Cong (VC), interviewed prior to the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, were reinterviewed in July and August 1970. This section reports findings on the 50 VC PW's reinterviewed.

Objectives

An attempt to evaluate the impact of the Allied entry into Cambodia upon the enemy soldier was approached in three ways. NVA soldiers taken prisoner in Cambodia were interviewed shortly after capture; NVA and VC soldiers captured within RVN were interviewed shortly after capture; and NVA and VC PW's who had already been interviewed prior to initiation of the Cambodian operations were reinterviewed after the US withdrawal from Cambodia.

This report treats the 50 VC PW's reinterviewed at PW camps in MR1 and MR4.

Background

In HSR reports released early in 1970 it was concluded that VC morale, already evidencing extensive deterioration, would be further damaged by a surprise extravagant Allied action. The Cambodian incursion represented just such an extravagant surprise.

Questions were asked such as what is the impact of such a significant event upon the opinions and attitudes of NVA/VC soldiers within prison camps? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation be changed as a result? The study described here was designed to answer these questions with regard to VC prisoners.

Procedure

A sample of 50 VC PW's was drawn randomly from 100 VC PW's interviewed previously. Twenty-five VC PW's were reinterviewed in Military Region 1 (MR1) in the northern part of RVN and 25 VC PW's were reinterviewed in Military Region 4 (MR4) in the southern part of RVN. The initial interviews had been conducted between February and April 1970, and reinterviews were conducted in July and August 1970.

A questionnaire designed to assess knowledge and impact of the Cambodian incursion included questions selected from the questionnaire used for previous interviews. Interest was focused upon comparison of the individual's personal experience in SVN compared with what he had been told during indoctrination, evaluation of RVN military strength, quality and success of their own military leaders and operations, and expectations of victory.

The same all-Vietnamese team of interviewers who had conducted the first interviews was trained in administration of the specially designed questionnaire. After necessary official administrative and logistical arrangements were completed, interviews were conducted in MR1 and MR4 PW Camps under the supervision of an HSR research scientist.

Workplace arrangements in the PW camps afforded adequate interview conditions. In MR1, facilities made available were inside the camp dispensary and where two interviews were conducted simultaneously, the men were not in view or hearing of each other. In MR4, each interview was conducted in a separate room.

The absence of significant consistent differences in the pattern of responses made it advantageous to combine the two sub-samples.

Results

The results are treated in terms of possession of knowledge of the Cambodian entry, reaction to the Cambodian entry, personal knowledge of South Vietnam versus indoctrination, and evaluation of military strength and possibility of victory.

Knowledge of the Cambodian Incursion

VC PW's in MR1 and MR4 had heard about the Allied entry into Cambodia (point 1), most probably during the first week in July (point 2), from other prisoners or from newspapers or magazines distributed in the PW camp (point 3).

It was known that NVA (point 4) and VC troops were in Cambodia (point 5). This knowledge is validated by their repetition of the same assortment of indoctrination-derived reasons for NLF presence in Cambodia that is consistently obtained from other similar samples of PW's; Cambodia is a safe haven, a rest and regroupment area, and a launching pad for attacks on RVN (point 6). None of the sample had ever been in Cambodia (point 7). There was no prior knowledge of the entry into Cambodia (point 8) and no speculation about the possibility of such an event (point 9). Apparently the VC soldiers felt completely secure in their belief that Cambodia would not be entered.

1. Have you heard about GVN/ US troops entering Cambodia?	Yes: 90% No: 10%
2. When did you first hear about it?	Median: 3.5 weeks ago Range: 2 weeks- 2 months ago
3. From what source did you hear of GVN/US entry into Cambodia?	Guard/other official: 28% Newspaper/magazine: 24% Radio/loudspeaker: 22% Another PW: 16%
4. Did you know NVA troops were in Cambodia?	Yes: 46% No: 50%

5.	Did you know VC troops were in Cambodia?	Yes:	46%
		No:	50%
6.	Do you know why NLF troops are in Cambodia?	Yes:	46%
		No:	54%
7.	Have you ever been in Cambodia?	Yes:	02%
		No:	98%
8.	Did you know Allied troops were going into to Cambodia before it happened?	Yes:	---
		No:	98%
9.	Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, did other people you know think the GVN and allies might enter Cambodia?	Yes:	08%
		No:	68%

Reaction to the Cambodian Incursion

The VC PW's varied greatly in their personal reactions. Opinions about ARVN strength were raised slightly as a result of their entering Cambodia (point 10) but a majority feel that the morale and fighting spirit of both the NVA soldiers (point 11) and the VC soldiers will be increased because he has a feeling of outrage at the aggressive invasion of a small innocent country and the NLF soldiers will feel the same way (point 12). Despite considerable uncertainty, if the PW holds an opinion about the probable reaction of the leaders in Hanoi, he very probably expects them to intensify offensive operations (point 13). In March 1970, the VC PW very probably held a strong conviction that NLF would win the war (point 14). The news of the Allied surge into Cambodia apparently had little adverse significance in his thinking because in August only a very minor change was evident in his judgment of the eventual victory (point 15). It is likely that he believes by a 5-to-2 margin that the duration of the war will be shortened now mainly because he reasons that the Allies already had more than they could handle in South Vietnam, have now spread themselves too thin, and also have acquired new enemies (point 16).

10.	Have you raised or lowered your estimate of ARVN strength since entry into Cambodia?	Increased	33%
		Same	30%
		Decreased	18%

11.	What will be the effect on the morale of NVA soldiers now?	Increased	52%
		Same	16%
		Decreased	20%
12.	What will be the effect on the morale of VC soldiers now?	Increased	56%
		Same	10%
		Decreased	22%
13.	How will the top leaders in Hanoi react to the Cambodian entry?	Intensify operations	52%
		Don't know	28%
		Decrease operations	16%
14.	In March, who did you think would win the war?	NLF	82%
		Stalemate	06%
		GVN	08%
15.	In August, who do you think will win the war?	NLF	78%
		Stalemate	02%
		GVN	16%
16.	What effect will this have on duration of the war?	Lengthen	26%
		No effect	02%
		Shorten	66%

Experience in SVN vs Indoctrination

VC PW's are unlikely to find many differences between their experiences in RVN and what they are told about it by their leaders; the proportion of those who judged that there are "few differences" to those who saw "many differences" was essentially unchanged between April and August (point 17).

Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, the proportion of those who judged that the RVN general public's determination to resist NLF was the same or even lower than they had been told to those who found it higher was about 4 to 1. In August, the proportion was reduced to 2 to 1; i.e., those who judged that more of the RVN general public resisted the NLF increased by more than 100% (point 18).

In April, one-quarter of the VC PW's rated the fighting ability and effectiveness of RVN soldiers as being somewhat better than they had expected. In August, this figure increased to about one-third of the sample; i.e., the number of those who judged the ARVN soldier better than he had expected increased by about 50% (point 19).

In March, one-third of the VC PW's judged the quality of their military leaders to be even better than they had expected, while in August one-quarter of the sample made this judgment; i.e., the number of those who found their leaders even more able than expected was reduced by almost 50% (point 20).

The modest reduction in the appraisal of the NLF military leaders is reflected in the PW's judgment of the success of NLF military operations. In pre-Cambodian interviews, one-fifth felt that NLF military operations were generally less effective and less successful than had been expected. In August, two-fifths of the sample found them less successful: i.e., the number of those who might be disappointed in NLF military operations increased by about 80% (point 21).

		<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>
17. Your cadre should have told you many things about GVN and GVN people. If you have had an opportunity to form your own personal opinions, in general, how does what you yourself have seen and heard about GVN compare with what you were told about it?	No answer	42%	12%
	Few differences	50%	66%
	Many differences	16%	20%
18. How does the determination of the GVN general public to keep on fighting against the NLF compare with what you were told?	No answer	30%	02%
	More resist NLF	14%	30%
	Same	26%	24%
	Less resist NLF	30%	34%
19. How does the fighting ability and effectiveness of the GVN soldiers (such as ARVN, RF's) compare with what you had been told about them?	No answer	14%	02%
	ARVN better	24%	36%
	Same	30%	40%
	ARVN worse	32%	22%
20. Overall, how did the quality of your military leaders (their skill, courage, determination) compare with what you had expected them to be?	No answer	22%	04%
	NLF leaders better	36%	26%
	Same	30%	54%
	NLF leaders worse	12%	14%

21. Overall, how did the general effectiveness and success of your military operations compare with what you expected it would be?	No answer	14%	04%
	More successful	50%	50%
	Same	14%	06%
	Less successful	22%	40%

Evaluation of Military Strength/Victory

In early 1970, VC PW's were uncertain about whether the RVN/US allies were stronger or weaker than the VC/NVN allies, although slightly inclined in VC/NVN's favor. In August, after the entry of RVN/US troops into Cambodia, the balance shifted in favor of VC/NVN being stronger; i.e., the proportion of those who judged VC/NVN to be stronger compared to those who thought RVN/US stronger increased from about 4:3 to more than 5:3 (point 22).

In March 1970, when the VC PW's compared the military strength of RVN alone without allies to the military strength of VC/NVN, the number who judged RVN to be weaker than VC/NVN was two and one-half times as large as those who thought GVN to be stronger. In August, the ratio increased to four and one-half to one (point 23).

The VC PW's in March, by a margin of more than four to one, judged that NLF would win the war even if the US continues to support RVN with money and manpower; that proportion remained essentially unchanged in August (point 24).

In early 1970, it was judged, by a four to one ratio, that NLF would win if the US continued to support RVN with money and supplies but withdrew US manpower. In August, after the Cambodian incursion, that proportion increased to about six to one (point 25).

The belief that SVN will join with NVN as an equal partner after liberation remained unchanged (point 26).

22. How does the military strength of the GVN/US and their allies compare to the military strength of NLF/NVN and their allies?		<u>Pre</u>	<u>Post</u>
	No answer	06%	---
	GVN/US stronger	34%	30%
	Same	18%	16%
	GVN/US weaker	42%	54%

23.	How does the military strength of GVN alone (without allied manpower) compare with the NLF/NVN military strength?	No answer	10%	---
		GVN stronger	24%	16%
		Same	06%	12%
		GVN weaker	60%	72%
24.	Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with manpower and money?	No answer	10%	---
		NLF loses	14%	18%
		Stalemate	06%	06%
		NLF wins	70%	76%
25.	Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with money and supplies and equipment but withdraw their manpower?	No answer	08%	---
		NLF loses	18%	14%
		Stalemate	---	---
		NLF wins	74%	86%
26.	Will SVN be joined with NVN as an equal partner if SVN is liberated?	No answer	14%	08%
		Won't merge	04%	10%
		Will merge	82%	82%

Discussion

The study was designed with such questions in mind as what is the possible impact of the Cambodian incursion upon VC soldiers within prison camps in RVN? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation shift as a result? Findings are discussed here in terms of these questions.

Did News of the Cambodian Incursion Reach VC Prisoners?

Most of the total sample (90%) had heard of the GVN/US Cambodian incursion prior to the interview and the majority (72%) indicated they believed it had occurred.

How Did He Hear About It?

The length of time before the news reached this sample as a whole is one of the striking findings. While the incursion had begun in May, three months before the re-interview, only 30% had heard about it by mid-June, more than six weeks after initiation of the Allied Cambodian operations. Some 10% of the sample learned of it for the first time from the interviewer. It is most probable that he learned about the Cambodian operation through some semi-official source connected with the PW camp.

What Was His Reaction?

Despite the fact that they had learned of it slowly, VC prisoners expressed strong reactions to the news of the Cambodian incursion. Even those who said they had no opinion expressed very cogent feelings as to why they could not form an opinion.

Of those expressing personal responses, many reflected analytically on what will be the probable effect of the incursion on the progress and outcome of the conflict with particular concern for NLF soldiers and for themselves personally. Others viewed the effects of the incursion in terms of political ideology and strategy. The variability of the responses indicated a lack of previous indoctrination concerning such an event.

Two-thirds of the entire sample expected that the NLF troops would counterattack while one-fifth felt they would withdraw.

Both military offensive and strong political denunciation were expected from Hanoi leaders by the respondents.

Most said the event had changed their thinking about the war. The majority of those spoke of the disadvantage for their forces, indicating general concern about the war, while still expressing confidence that NLF would win. A small minority considered that GVN had gained some advantage.

Did Previously Expressed Attitudes Shift?

There was a 50% increase in the number of PW's that judged the ARVN soldier to have more fighting ability than expected.

The number of those who judged that a higher-than-expected percentage of the RVN people are determined to resist the NLF more than doubled.

The judgment that NLF military leaders were of a quality even better than expected dropped by fifty percent.

Those who found the NLF military operations to be less successful than expected increased by about eighty percent.

After hearing about the Cambodian invasion there was an increase in the proportion of those who judged the VC/NVN to be stronger militarily than RVN/US and the proportion of those who judged RVN alone to be weaker than VC/NVN almost doubled.

One striking factor was a greater willingness to express an opinion in the second interview. The number of "no opinion" responses dropped sharply for every item.

For the group as a whole, the conviction of eventual NLF victory remained essentially unchanged despite the Allied Cambodian offensive. The assumptions and line of reasoning that allow them to maintain this view also contribute to their belief that, as a result of the Cambodian entry, the war will end more quickly.

Conclusions

Eight major conclusions are as follows:

1. News of the RVN/US entry into Cambodia had a definite impact upon the attitudes and opinions of VC soldiers who were prisoners of war in RVN at the time the Allied Cambodian operations began.

2. VC prisoners had the usual conviction that Cambodia was the NLF safe haven. The news of the Cambodian incursion does appear to have contributed to changes in previously-expressed attitudes and opinions. There was additional evidence of psychological impact in that there was a much greater readiness to express an opinion, rather than state that a basis for opinion did not exist, than had been the case in earlier interviews.

3. Favorable judgments about the quality of the NLF leaders dropped sharply and negative judgments for the success of NLF military operations increased sharply.

4. Belief that NLF strength is greater than RVN's increased because the VC PW's reason that RVN is now spread too thinly, NLF troops' fighting spirit is aroused because RVN invaded a neutral country and murdered innocent civilians, and NLF has more-than-adequate additional resources to draw upon.

5. Belief in eventual victory remained high; most felt that, as a result of the Cambodian operation, the war would end more quickly in NLF's favor.

6. Personal reactions to the Cambodian incursion were extremely varied, indicating the probable absence of previous exposure to any propaganda inculcated explanations. This in turn could suggest the absence of any expectation of a need for such preparation.

7. It was expected that Hanoi would respond to the Cambodian entry with greatly intensified military offensive operations and by political denunciation. The failure of the NLF to date to make any significant counterattack may be exploitable to GVN's advantage.

8. News apparently reaches VC prisoners in PW Camps in Military Regions 1 and 4 slowly, if at all, even in the case of an event having the significance of the Allied Cambodian incursion.

PROCEDURE FOR PSYOP PROJECT EVALUATION

Method And Procedure
For Evaluation Of Psyop Projects

Detailed reports of the two psyop campaigns serve to demonstrate how certain psyop activities could be evaluated, why they are not measured, and what must be done if measurement of this vital component of present-day military strength is desired.*

The attempt to determine criteria for psyop measurement is essentially the attempt to state the relationship between psyop communications and the outcome these communications were designed to produce. Expressed another way, psyop criteria must relate to the psyop objective.

It has been the thesis of the HSR approach to this problem that not all psyop activities can be measured as to effect; that some can be measured routinely if the needed procedures are instituted as part of the ongoing operational activity to insure receipt of criterion data and information as to situational factors within which the criterion data must be assessed; that even with this latter stipulation, the effect of some psychological operations can be measured only with great difficulty and by trained researchers experienced in real-time field assessment of complex issues. It has been a further thesis of this investigation that there is no need to measure each project. When a number of psyop activities of a specific type have been shown to be effective under certain situations, it should not be necessary to go through the tediously careful process of an evaluation study each time that type of psyop project is conducted.

Two plans are involved in evaluation of psyop and it is necessary to distinguish between them. There is the plan for the psyop project itself and there is the research study plan for the evaluation of that project. It is important to keep in mind this distinction between the project plan and the evaluation plan. The two plans are necessarily involved together in any evaluation of a psyop project at this period of development of the state of the art. This is true because the evaluation plan for any psyop project must be specific so that project and evaluation criteria must be derived from the psyop project objective.

*Those who have read the case studies carefully may have been dismayed by the amount of data and detailed analysis involved. It should be recognized that this wealth of detail is required during these early exploratory studies because one of the main objectives is to determine which sources of data are useful and can be used. Eventually, standardization of methods and procedures for specification of data requirements, data acquisition and data-processing will ease the requirements considerably.

Evaluation Plan

The evaluation process outlined on the following page lists the step-by-step procedure for an evaluation study in three phases.

The six steps in the Definition Phase begin with explication of the objective and move to the finished detailed evaluation plan. This phase defines data to be collected, its source and means of collection and handling. Two types of data are required: criterion data and control data, called "situational data". The term "situational data" is used here, as control implies a greater degree of precision than is warranted.

Criterion data defined for a project is derived from the project psyop objectives.

Situational (control) data defined for a project is derived from the criterion data.

Criterion data measures the outcome of the project ("n" number of ralliers received).

Situational data permits assessment of this measure to determine how the outcome relates to psyop activity and the other factors working with or against the psyop activity ("x" number of enemy troop build-up; number of ralliers in adjoining area").

For example, the rally rate is "up" in campaign areas; situational data shows it also "up" country-wide, and therefore the rise may have little relation to the single-area campaign. Other situational data is needed to assess this fully.

Or the rally rate is down in the campaign-area. If situational data shows it is also down over the surrounding area, it may not indicate lack of success of the project. Or criterion data may show the rate is down only in the campaign area. Perhaps there was a build-up of enemy forces or greater control exercised to prevent rally as a result of the campaign.

To determine this, it is necessary to have the best information possible for the pertinent time-frame for these situational factors.

Psyop Evaluation
Research Procedure

Phase I - Definition

- Step 1. Determine Psyop Project Objective
- Step 2. Determine Criterion Data Needed
- Step 3. Assess Availability of Needed Criterion Data
- Step 4. Establish Sources and Means for Obtaining Criterion Data and Situational Data
- Step 5. Establish Data Handling and Analytical Procedures
- Step 6. Specify Criterion Research Plan:
 - Criterion Data
 - Means of Obtaining Data
 - Method of Handling Data

Phase II - Execution

- Step 7. Task Appropriate Units to Obtain Data
- Step 8. Collect Data Systematically

Phase III - Analysis

- Step 9. Tabulate, Translate, Summarize Data As Required
- Step 10. Prepare Summarization of Findings for Comparison and Analysis
- Step 11. Evaluate and Interpret Results

Definition Phase

1. The first step in evaluation is to review the psyop project plan with the project planners as it is being developed to make explicit the objective or the outcome sought as a result of the psyop effort. The objective should be stated in the plan and features to be used as criteria related to this objective should be included.

2. The next step is to specify those items of information that could provide some count relevant to the desired psyop project outcome if they could be obtained.

3. Next, the evaluation team must determine, with the psyop project planners, which set of information can be obtained, whether from already-available sources or from special data collection efforts.

4. It is then necessary to establish the source of data, both for criterion factors and for situational factors within which the criterion data is to be assessed. At the same time, if data is already available from other sources, it must be determined in what form and by what means and on what schedule it can be obtained from the originating sources. If it must be especially collected, sources and means must be established.

5. Data handling procedures must be set up at the same time so that information can be accumulated in a form to facilitate analysis; data handling and the form of data keeping must be planned at the time data sources and transmission methods are established.

6. The final step of the definition phase is preparation of an evaluation study plan that specifies each of the elements decided upon as to data, data source, and data handling.

Execution Phase

1. In the execution phase, units are tasked to obtain data. When tasking appropriate units, consideration should be given to all steps between the originating data source and the data reporting and communication process to get the information to the evaluation team on a timely basis, keeping in mind the data handling methods which will be used.

2. The second step in the Execution Phase is to implement the data handling methods as planned under the Definition Phase so that data is processed and maintained systematically; each type of information must be organized for continuing review and post-project analysis.

Analysis Phase

1. The three-step Analysis Phase is the time-consuming phase. Data must be tabulated, translated where necessary, and summarized in the various categories.

2. Next, these findings must be summarized along various dimensions for comparison and analysis.

3. And finally, the results must be evaluated and interpreted in terms of psyop project objectives and in terms of the evaluation study objectives.

The procedure outlined is straightforward. That is not to say that it is easy to do in any circumstances; it is particularly difficult in the military situation in Vietnam. However, it is precisely such a situation in which it is imperative to measure the effectiveness of psyop efforts. Many factors in the current situation in Vietnam which contribute to the difficulty in measurement also contribute to other operational difficulties, and these can be identified; some of them could be eliminated.

Evaluating The Two Campaigns

A major problem encountered in evaluation of the Tinh Thuong Campaign recurred in the evaluation of Operation Searchlight. Particular problems in the evaluation of the two campaigns are discussed here with the sole purpose of bringing these factors to light in the hope that they will be eliminated for future efforts.

The criteria by which effectiveness of a psyop effort is to be measured must be central to the objective of the specific effort. As stated repeatedly, there are no across-the-board criteria to be applied to "psyop activity" generally. Criterion data are psyop-project specific.

Measures appropriate for a specific project or campaign must be included in the pre-planning or planning of the psyop project. And the military command structure which insures disciplined response to other military orders must undertake to include in those military messages and orders the requirements for taking the measure, communicating data to all functions involved in the area concerned with the measure, and reporting the information on a timely basis if measurement of effect is desired.

Considerations necessary to permit valid assessment must be imposed on the project. In simplest terms, if the objective of a psyop campaign is to increase the number of ralliers over the number from the same area who rallied a month before, as a minimum, arrangements must be made to obtain a clear unambiguous count of the ralliers. Situational data is needed to place criterion data in proper perspective; the specific kinds needed will vary slightly with each project but will be selected to answer such questions as; What number rallied from the area a year before? What other factors operated in each situation that might account for differences in the figures other than the psyop campaign? It is necessary to impose responsibilities in the operations order or message for obtaining a count of ralliers within the time-frames established, and to include some means -- either arbitrary or empirical -- of attributing the rallier to the campaign.

Planning for and control of acquisition of psyop data requires the same order of control as is exercised over other elements of a military operation.

Evaluating the Tinh Thuong Campaign

Certain focal points permit evaluation of psyop projects and will, conversely, defeat attempts at evaluation. Problems encountered during the Tinh Thuong Campaign concerned points of control, communication, and reporting procedures and channels. Consideration of the factors which hampered the effectiveness of that campaign illustrates principles which can aid in measurement of future campaigns and also improve the design, conduct, and the outcome of such campaigns.

In the Affection or Tinh Thuong Campaign, the psyop project objective was to have NVA soldiers voluntarily leave their units by entering the GVN Chieu Hoi Program or by seeking capture by GVN forces as prisoners of war. The count, which would provide a criterion

measure for the project and a major criterion measure for the evaluation study, was the number of Hoi Chanh who rallied to the GVN during the special period or as a result of the special effort, and the number of prisoners of war who surrendered or put themselves in a position to facilitate their capture. Neither count was easily or immediately available; when obtained, each was equivocal.

In the sections on "Approach to Evaluation" in each report, the items of information needed for evaluation are shown in detail. (See the Evaluation Plan in each report.

The G5 Campaign Headquarters Office furnished items of information obtainable within its area of control, going to extraordinary lengths to assist the evaluation effort; it was due largely to G5's efforts that any assessment of the Tinh Thuong Campaign could be made at all. The official summary records, samples of psyop materials and their own field observation comments were supplied with some time delay but as soon as it was possible for them to do so. That office also attempted to provide information on ralliers and prisoners; this issue is discussed later in more detail. Supplementary data needed to provide situational factors was obtained with great difficulty and over many weeks after the source of such data was determined. The flagging request needed for delayed effect assessment was not provided; follow-up statistical records data was furnished later in 1971 after months were consumed in re-establishing access to the information, but the data was found to contain serious errors which made it unuseable.

Within the evaluation study for the Tinh Thuong Campaign, the major task was not only to get data to evaluate the one campaign. Much more important was the opportunity to identify adequate sources of reliable data and the form in which these data could be made available; this information is a basic requirement for formulation of general approaches to evaluation of other similar projects in the future.

The items requested for criteria after consultation with the directing principals who had planned the campaign were the following:

- Count of each rallier coming in under the campaign.
- Count of each prisoner coming in under the campaign.
- Initial intelligence/interrogation report on each rallier.
- Initial intelligence/interrogation report on each prisoner.

- Interview data from each rallier.
- Interview data from each prisoner.
- Count of ralliers and prisoners received over the first six months of 1970 who had been in the campaign area during the last six weeks of 1969, for follow-up interview.
- Observer's report on local populace attitude toward supporting VC and NVA rally.

Situational (control) data requested to create a framework within which the criterion data could be interpreted meaningfully included the following:

- Record of all campaign operational activity.
- Samples of each item of psyop material used in the campaign.
- Record of distribution of all campaign psyop materials within the special campaign area.
- Records of distribution of psyop materials throughout all of RVN for the campaign period and for the preceding and succeeding period.
- Number and location of enemy troops in campaign area.
- Number and location of friendly troops in campaign area.
- Number of tactical operations contacts.
- Number of casualties, enemy and friendly.
- Number and intensity of heavy bombing missions in area.
- Monthly summary records on each of above six items for a year preceding and six months following the campaign period.
- Number of prisoners and ralliers over pre- and post-campaign periods.

Numerous meetings were held with psyop directorate personnel, campaign personnel, and other US Mission personnel and visits to ARVN and US military agencies in order to locate sources for these items. The search for each item, the location of and experience in receiving information from each source, was instructive and of value for continuing effort in Vietnam. Time and personnel resources would not permit reduplication of the identification search for, and re-establishment of sources each time a study is needed; the duration of most campaigns is not sufficient to allow this to be done. A prime function of studies such as this one is to identify the types of data, data sources, and communication channels that the psyop community must work with.

Sources for all of the items were located, formats and schedules for furnishing the information were determined, and responsible individuals agreed that it could and would be furnished, with the exception of information on friendly troops.

The Evaluation Plan called for approximately twenty items of criterion data and situational data.

Eight were criterion data items for measuring the effect of psyop effort.

Four were criterion data items for evaluating conduct of the campaign as requested.

Eight were controls -- situational data items within which criterion data could be interpreted.

Each of these items is discussed below as to why it was needed, what it could furnish to measure effects, the source from which it was expected to be obtained, and the actual data set, if any, received for the Tinh Thuong Campaign.

1. Count of each rallier coming in under the campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

-- Needed to measure the effect of the campaign to induce NVA to rally to the GVN in terms of number who actually rallied.

Campaign plans called for each rallier to be brought to a special center for special handling; this information was expected to be readily obtainable from campaign records. Additionally, due to the importance of this item, information was to be telephoned to the evaluation team. This item anticipated that "fact sheet" information on each individual would be available from rallier reception center records: as a minimum, it was expected that the fact sheet would contain the name, unit, where individual had operated, and conditions of rally. Such information would provide a count of all ralliers with precise data as to location and circumstance which would enable a measure of campaign effect in terms of number of ralliers from a specific area at a specific time. In addition, it would permit the keeping of a roster of names of individuals to be interviewed and the dispatching of an interview team to these individuals at the earliest time.

Data received was ambiguous. The field report stated of this primary data: "Of all the figures that were within the campaign reporting area, those that reflected an accurate accounting of the Hoi Chanh received on a weekly basis were the most difficult to ascertain." This seemed to stem from both the institutional problem of delay that occurs in processing and classifying ralliers and the fact that subsequent reclassification or changes of status causes variation in cumulative statistics. Campaign headquarters faced these obstacles in keeping a firm and current count of the actual number of Hoi Chanh. Additionally, basic figures on the number of ralliers per province and category for each week were received, but changes were not reflected in the cumulative total in succeeding weeks -- nor was the make-up of the group detailed.

Ultimately, seven NVA ralliers were reported and were made available for interview by the HSR survey team: their protocols were obtained. Comparison of the records of the seven ralliers offered for interview with the final official campaign figures which now furnished names and other identifying data, showed that the seven interviewees were not the seven officially credited to the campaign. It required considerable diligence and energy, exercised in two languages, to locate five of the seven official Tinh Thuong Campaign NVA ralliers. These were interviewed, and information pertinent to the campaign reported.

2. Count of each prisoner coming in under the campaign --
Criterion Data Item.

Needed to measure the effect of the campaign to induce NVA to surrender or voluntarily permit capture.

Campaign plans called for prisoners to be brought to a specially-prepared collection point for the campaign; information on prisoners was expected to come from campaign records. Source of this item was expected to be at least "fact sheet" information on each individual from PW prison records furnishing data such as name, unit, where individual had operated, tactical conditions at the time of capture, whether the individual had surrendered or voluntarily assisted in his capture. Such information would provide a count of all prisoners with precise data as to location and circumstance which would enable a measure of campaign effect in terms of number of prisoners from a specific area at a specific time.

No official campaign data was received on this item, and only peripheral information could be abstracted from files. No official or systematic count of prisoners taken during the campaign period was maintained by any of the staff or agencies involved in its execution. Consequently, no reporting formats, campaign summaries, briefing charts, etc., included reference to prisoners gathered from the immediate or general area of the psyop campaign. It was only during the last weeks of the campaign, when HSR, charged with obtaining interviews from the prisoners in accordance with the approved evaluation plan, was adamant in presenting access authorization (signed by the ARVN Commanding General in the Corps Area) and insisted on definite action that it was learned that prisoners were not being collected and held as called for in the operation order. Differences in allocation of responsibilities between the organizational structure of ARVN and that of the U.S. forces had been overlooked and the ARVN staff section responsible for control of prisoners had not been included in coordination of the campaign. Campaign plans had included the intent to collect and retain both prisoners and Hoi Chanh in special centers for the duration of the campaign. Authority over prisoners is a function of another ARVN command, and this responsibility apparently prevented fulfillment of the campaign purpose with respect to prisoners in a campaign which was the responsibility of G5. No valid or reliable count of prisoners within the campaign area has ever been obtained. One of the strangest features of this attempt to trace out a primary data source, that seemed by campaign plan and discussion to have been arranged with precision, was that all during the campaign inception discussion sessions, the special collection, handling, and interviewing of prisoners was discussed by all parties concerned as an assured fact. Weeks of unsuccessful attempts to locate prisoners to be interviewed were explained as delay in administrative processing of authorizations for access

to prisoners, so no one was aware of the fact that prisoners were not within campaign purview. The problem was eventually identified when the HSR Project Director, who had the III Corps Commander -- General Tri's full cooperation, insisted that the ARVN Chief of Staff get an explanation of why HSR interviewers arrived at one location, were told that it would be necessary to appear at another location, or were told to return to meet with another official, or some other story that did not reveal that the prisoners were not available.

While no count of prisoners appears in Tinh Thuong Campaign reports, other non-campaign agencies having primary intelligence and internment control over prisoners of war furnished partial information on a general plane on the volume and range of PW's taken. The G2 at II Field Force provided the campaign office with figures abstracted from his files, which are reported in the results section of the campaign's report.

In a concurrent effort to determine enemy vulnerabilities and the obstacles to enemy defection, HSR had interviewed 50 prisoners in III Corps. Inspection of the protocols showed that 17 of these were taken during the six-week campaign period and within the campaign area. These 17 protocols then were examined with respect to the campaign project evaluation objectives, and that is the source of the data shown under "Survey Data" in the campaign report.

3. Initial intelligence/interrogation report on ralliers coming in during the campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure the effect of the campaign in terms of ralliers received with identifying information in addition to count, to provide circumstances of rally; would furnish validating cross-check for special interview data to be collected and would enable drawing on the appropriate group of individuals for further questioning.

Expected from intelligence reports. No interrogation reports received.

4. Initial intelligence/interrogation report on each prisoner coming in during the campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure the effect of the campaign in terms of prisoners received with identifying information in addition to count, to provide also some of the circumstances of rally and the situational background, would furnish initial indication of possibility of surrender

or voluntary capture and would furnish validating cross-check information for special interview data to be collected, and would enable drawing on the appropriate group of individuals for further interview.

Expected from intelligence reports.

No intelligence reports received.

5. Interview data from each rallier -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign on the individual; to furnish information on the decision to rally, on vulnerabilities and obstacles represented in the situation to which the rallier responded, on personal response to the environmental situation, on the psychological and tactical pressures exerted during the time as seen by the individual and his attitude toward them; to measure the effect of appeals to civilians to assist ralliers in terms of reports of such assistance by the individual; to measure the effect of the campaign in terms of awareness of and attention to psyop material.

This data was expected to be obtained by the specially-trained HSR interview team. Interviews were to be conducted with a questionnaire especially designed for NVA ralliers and the ail-Vietnamese interview team especially-trained to administer them. Preparations were made to maintain the survey team in the field during the campaign period so that ralliers could be reached as quickly as possible after their reception.

As described under Criterion Item 1, ralliers as reported under the campaign made the field stay unnecessary. Five of the seven campaign ralliers were located and interviewed after the close of the campaign, and during the two-week period in which the report was being prepared.

6. Interview data from each prisoner -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of the campaign in terms of prisoners induced to surrender or voluntarily permit capture; to measure effect of the campaign in terms of vulnerabilities and obstacles operating in NVA forces; to measure effect of the campaign in terms of awareness of and attention to psyop material.

This data was expected to be obtained from interviews conducted by the HSR survey team using a questionnaire especially designed for NVA prisoners of war. The team was trained in its use and preparations were made to maintain the survey team in the field so that interviews could be conducted immediately and as shortly after capture as possible. However, as described under Criterion Item 2, no prisoners were identified within the campaign function.

Prisoner interview data which furnished information on the group of prisoners from enemy forces operating in the campaign area while it was going on was obtained by abstracting from a group of 50 interviews taken under a concurrent HSR study effort, 17 whose protocols indicated that they had been operating in the campaign area and were taken during the six-week period.

7. Count of ralliers and prisoners received over the first six months of 1970 who had been in the campaign area during the last six weeks of 1969 -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of the campaign on those influenced by the psyop messages but who did not rally or surrender at the time.

Data was to come to J3-11 in response to a Special Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) they agreed to levy. Number and identification of those identified would comprise a group of subjects who had possibly been influenced; interviews were anticipated with the group in order to measure any such delayed effect.

No data could be obtained: the SICR was not instituted; reasons were not given.

8. Observer information on local populace attitude toward supporting VC and NVA rally -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign in terms of support given to campaign goals by local civilians.

Data was expected from observer reports as contained in campaign reports, and from interview data from individuals taken.

Data was received from the field containing general observations as to local populace awareness of attitude toward campaign goals, and was supplemented by data obtained from ralliers during the HSR interviews.

9. Record of campaign operational activity -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign in terms of its conduct and to meet sponsor requirements to assess the conduct of the campaign.

Data was expected to be received from campaign field reports.

Data was received from campaign field reports, and furnished full information on campaign activity and the psyop effort.

10. Samples of each item of psyop material used in the campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to evaluate adherence to policy and guidelines in materials used; also needed to provide supplementary situational data for assessing criterion data obtained.

The appeals themselves were a part of the data set to assess extent to which ralliers and prisoners had been or had not been responsive to these appeals.

Data was expected from J3-11 and JUSPAO for materials produced prior to the campaign. Quick-response items were expected from the field.

Pre-campaign items were received. Quick-response items produced in the field, while understood to be within policy, were not received.

11. Record of all distribution of all campaign psyop materials by schedule, area, and volume -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to evaluate campaign conduct as requested by sponsor and also needed as situational data for evaluating criterion data obtained to answer questions: Was psyop material directed to areas where the enemy was located? Was the psyop effort a saturation effort?

Data was expected from campaign reports and from J3-11 reports.

Data was obtained from campaign reports and J3-11 reports.

12. Record of distribution of all non-campaign psyop materials within the special campaign area -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign within other psyop efforts reaching the enemy at the same time.

Data was expected to be received from J3-11.

Data was received from J3-11.

13. Record of distribution of psyop materials throughout all of RVN for the campaign period and for the preceding and succeeding period of six months -- Situational Data Item

--- Needed to assess campaign effect as a psyop function within a larger time frame to assess such factors as: What psyop material had reached the enemy in the months before the campaign? Did the campaign represent a significant departure from usual psyop efforts both in terms of appeal and intensity?

Data was expected from J3-11.

Data was received from J3-11 for an eight-month period prior to and during Affection Campaign; six-month post-campaign data was not furnished.

14. Number and location of enemy troops in the campaign area, and in all other provinces -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to evaluate the criterion data to determine if psyop material was on target; to evaluate the extent to which strength, position, and condition of their own troops may have contributed to the decision to rally or may have prevented rally.

Data was to be furnished by the Combined Intelligence Center - Vietnam (CICV) in printout form for the special area and for each province.

Data was furnished by CICV, both in printout and enemy troop movement was plotted and shown in computer printout on a map overlay for use in briefing report of campaign conduct and results.

15. Number of tactical operations contacts -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of enemy situation and tactical pressures and stresses exerted with the psyop appeals; to assess strengths that might be implied by the number of enemy-initiated contacts during the campaign period.

Data was expected to be furnished by the Data Management Agency on request through J3-11.

Data was furnished by the Data Management Agency by computer printout by the week for the six-week campaign. It was summarized and reported in the end-of-campaign period.

16. Number of casualties -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of enemy situation and the stresses experienced in terms of battle casualties.

Data was expected to be furnished by the Data Management Agency on request through J3-11.

Data was furnished by the Data Management Agency at MACV by computer print-out, included in the tactical operations data shown in item 15.

17. Number and intensity of heavy bombing missions in area -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of enemy situation and the stresses experienced in terms of bombing strikes.

Data was expected from the Data Management Agency.

Data was furnished by the Data Management Agency for the early part of the campaign. However, the lead time required for computer processing did not provide the immediate information necessary to evaluate the campaign within the two weeks provided for the end of campaign report. Some of the earlier difficulties experienced in locating data sources was present, but the J2 office, informed of the need for the figures, furnished them by map coordinate so that this set of data was complete.

18. Monthly summary records on each of above six items for the year preceding and six months succeeding campaign period -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess campaign effect within an eighteen-month time frame to provide comparative measure of campaign intensity and results.

Data was expected from sources providing the original six items.

When the set was to be obtained from DMA, it was found that changes in personnel made an entirely new round of requesting procedure necessary, which required two months. When the request was finally put through, data furnished had obvious discrepancies and ambiguities so serious it could not be used for the purpose. For this reason, the other data was not requested as the extended time frame assessment could not be undertaken.

19. Number of prisoners and ralliers over preceding year and succeeding six month period -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess campaign effect within the broader framework as set within an eighteen-month time frame and to provide comparative measure of campaign results in terms of ralliers received and prisoners taken for the year preceding and the six months following the campaign.

Data expected from MACV and Chieu Hoi Center records.

The extended time frame assessment, actually planned for didactic purposes after the Affection Campaign, was abandoned as noted under item 18.

Evaluating Operation Searchlight

It was thought that more than a year later in the Operation Searchlight Campaign the same problems would not occur. For one thing, Operation Searchlight was concerned only with ralliers. Furthermore, the population of central interest was the number who might rally to twenty-two specifically indicated military sites and each of these came under campaign military message or orders. However, as seen from

the report, neither operations reports from the bases nor interrogation reports were received for evaluation. Conclusions must be that no ralliers presented themselves to any one of the twenty-two sites, although this may be only lack of information rather than a criterion measure of zero.

Operation Searchlight is an example of a psyop campaign whose effect is measurable. Its clearly-stated objective was defined in time and geography, with specifically-designed psyop appeals, and a specific recordable response to the major appeal. The fact that this campaign could not be measured does much to point clearly to the central problem in attempting to measure psyop effectiveness: data required for assessment is not made available to the psyop function.

Data items to be used for assessment were determined in consultation with the project planner. The need for each in the evaluation, the source expected to provide them to the G5 Office, and the data actually received through mid-April (two months later) are discussed below.

Twelve items of information were stipulated for evaluation of Operation Searchlight. All were expected to be furnished to the G5 Office at XXIV Corps and assembled there for delivery to HSR on 15 February for a two-week analysis. In terms of the step-by-step psyop evaluation procedure outlined earlier, seven of these items were Criterion Data items and five were Situational Data items. Delivery of items is as of mid-April:

1. Count of individuals coming to any searchlight site on 27-28-29 January to rally, with identifying data and response to a 5-item questionnaire -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign inducement to rally in terms of number who tried to rally according to its instructions.

To be obtained from unit operational reports and IPW team interrogation reports.

No interrogation reports obtained for evaluation. No unit operation reports were received. A verbal summary of telephoned reports through 9 February was received which indicated no units had reported rally attempts at searchlight sites.

2. Count of those who came to the searchlights who were classified as Hoi Chanh -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign inducement on number of those who came to rally who were received as ralliers.

Data expected to come from Chieu Hoi Information Sheet daily records for comparison with IPW and Unit Operations Reports.

Not applicable, as IPW team and base unit reports were not received from item 1.

3. Count of those who were influenced to rally by the psyop campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign on rally decision, rally method and rally inducement.

Data expected to be received from IPW interrogation reports.

IPW interrogation reports not received.

4. Count of all individuals who rallied during two-month period encompassing campaign period, with following information on each -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign inducement to rally in terms of proportion of the campaign ralliers to total number of ralliers during the campaign period and for comparison with pre-campaign and post-campaign period.

Expected to be received from Regional Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheets, whose headings represent the items of information listed above.

Data was received from the Regional Chieu Hoi Center direct to HSR, but it was found that not all provinces use the detailed Information Sheet. These sheets did provide count requested, as reported in the Region.

5. Count of individuals whose response to IPW team interrogation at Chieu Hoi centers or at PW camps indicated influence of Searchlight Campaign -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign inducement to rally in terms of number who were influenced to rally but could not rally to the special sites.

Expected to be received in IPW interrogation reports.

IPW interrogation reports were not received.

6. Count of mention of media and messages heard, believed, remembered, from response to IPW team questions -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure exposure to and registration of various media and messages on ralliers in response to project office request.

Expected to be received from IPW interrogation reports.

IPW interrogation reports were not received.

7. Count of number of ralliers whose response to IPW team questions indicate their family induced them to rally to searchlight -- Criterion Data Item.

--- Needed to measure effect of campaign inducement to families to urge their kin to rally.

Data expected from IPW reports.

No IPW reports received.

8. Description of searchlight project participation and procedures used for rallier reception at each site -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess results in terms of unusual occurrences at rally sites that may have prevented rally and in terms of types of rallier reception at sites that may have promoted larger numbers of ralliers.

Data expected from site unit operations reports.

No operations reports received.

9. Counts of psyop materials showing volume and distribution by map coordinate -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of actual delivery of psyop material and media and to assess campaign conduct in terms of campaign plans.

Data expected from units responsible for conduct of psyop.

No unit reports received.

10. Counts of non-campaign psyop material disseminated, with volumes and pattern of distribution -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of special campaign psyop activity as related to regular ongoing psyop activity and as related to pre-campaign and post-campaign psyop activity.

Data expected from MR1 Psyop units or MACJ3-11.

No data received.

11. Number and location of enemy in MR1 for period of campaign and for pre- and post-campaign periods -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of enemy strength and location to determine if enemy were present, if psyop was on target, and to assess strength as a factor in decision to rally.

Data expected from XXIV Corps sources.

Data received directly by HSR from CICV.

12. Count of large-scale operations, small unit actions, enemy initiated action and casualties in MR1 over the campaign period, and over pre- and post-campaign periods -- Situational Data Item.

--- Needed to assess criterion data in terms of tactical situation to consider other pressures on the enemy that might induce or counter rally.

Data expected from XXIV Corps sources.

Data received directly by HSR from MACV-COC.

Three observations should be restated here: Operation Searchlight is an example of a psyop campaign whose effect is measurable. Data required to do so can be and was specified. Measurement of effect cannot be made unless the data is furnished to the evaluating agency.

The data required for measurement is collected routinely and can be used in the format in which it is normally contained. It is neither collected nor maintained with the timeliness and accuracy required for use as a measure, and it is not normally furnished to psyop personnel. This point is a highly critical factor in the difficulty in measuring psyop effect. The data required for measure is collected routinely but it is for the most part collected for other purposes by various units outside the control of the psyop functions. No effort, in addition to normal tasking of these units need be imposed; but completeness of detail, accuracy of reporting, and timely reliable transmission of the data -- which is now lacking -- must be obtained if effectiveness of such psyop programs is to be measured. For this to occur, it is necessary for the originating sources to recognize the importance of the data for use in psyop evaluation efforts.

Comment

In almost every instance when an organization has been approached for specific types of information desired for use in psyop assessment, the first reaction is expressed disbelief that it is needed for psyop or could be used by psyop. One outstanding exception is the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), who has responded fully and immediately to each request.

One major factor may be the widespread belief that the effect of a psyop effort cannot be measured. This affects the approach of the directors of psychological operations and it affects the psyoperators, who, nevertheless, are asked to report on the outcome of the activities. The belief that psyop cannot be measured also affects the attitude and response of other command functions whose cooperation and data input are required if any meaningful assessment is to be made.

These factors are encountered by military within the military, by military interacting with civilian agency and by civilian agency interacting with civilian agency.

The two campaign reports have been furnished here with an exceedingly detailed account of the approach to and process used in the attack on the problem of psyop effectiveness measure. This is done with the thought that use of examples will permit discussion of the problem in tangible terms. It is to show the need for various items of data and the function each item serves in evaluation of psyop activity to demonstrate the importance of having the data supplied.

Hopefully the description of two campaigns and the assessment plan and procedure designed for evaluation will arouse some greater involvement in the problem and result in psyop evaluation efforts receiving proper data. Only if this is done can psyop effectiveness be measured.

SECTION VI
DISCUSSION

SECTION VI

DISCUSSION

All work undertaken on the project reported here, as described in the original proposal, represents an effort to make the same set of tasks serve several different purposes because the project workload was composed of two very different types of work requirements having two very different origins. Program I is composed of basic research studies selected entirely at the discretion of the research team (with ARPA-V's agreement) while Program II consists entirely of applied research tasks having objectives specified entirely by a Program Advisory Group (PAG) composed of members of the psyop community. Time pressures and sudden shifts of objectives and priorities that characterized the PAG tasks seriously inhibited opportunities to design PAG task research plans in a manner that would have utility for Program I purposes.

Nevertheless, an enormous amount of work has been completed. Approximately one thousand NVA and VC prisoners and ralliers from all four military regions within RVN and from Cambodia have been given interviews which averaged over three hours in length. Other questionnaire surveys covered more than two thousand civilian subjects. More than twenty reports have been released in the field.

It is important to recognize that each successive task built upon the results and insights gained from earlier tasks.

Because of the developmental nature of the overall task -- essentially a requirement to create a science -- almost all the content that would usually appear in a "Discussion" section is included in Sections IV and V. In Section IV, each sub-section combines the subject matter that would ordinarily appear in separate sections under such headings as "Procedure", "Results", and "Discussion" since the sequential character of the content, with each successive study growing from the preceding one, makes it necessary to explain the relationship of adjacent activities. In Section V, the studies are wholly independent of each other.

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SECTION VII
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

SECTION VII

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Results and conclusions are included in the section or subsection devoted to each task or study in both Volume I and Volume II.

Some results and conclusions that emerge from integration of the results from different studies, and some of the more important conclusions in the main body of the report, are mentioned here.

1. A basic theory has been formulated which describes the dynamics of how and in what way psyop can affect human behavior. It describes (1) the process by which the human mind and body function in reaction to reception of externally- and internally-originated stimuli of various kinds, various intensities, and varied patterns of transmission rates; (2) describes the typical pattern of human reaction to varied kinds, levels and assortments of stress; and (3) relates internal psycho-physiological processes and external stress-inducing conditions to potential for psyop exploitation.

The various ingredients of the theory are based upon a massive body of research data in the literature of physiological, experimental, and clinical psychology; hard data from a study of enemy mass defections in combat in Vietnam provided initial operational confirmation of the applicability of the theory.

Two specific theoretical constructs derived from the general theory were formulated, tested, and validated by a series of empirical studies.

The theory can be generalized, with sufficient additional effort, to psyop under all conditions. Systematization of psyop can be brought about by downward explosion of the general theory into a body of constructs, theorems, postulates, and eventually procedures. Because the theory treats internal psychological states, external situational conditions, and timing, the theorems and postulates provide guideposts and anchoring points for cost/yield evaluation of alternative decisions about which type of psyop to use under given sets of conditions depending on objectives and the time-frame for achievement of objectives.

2. Effectiveness of psyop leaflet messages has been measured and the psyop messages are shown to be effective in producing ralliers -- both VC and NVA. This point has extraordinary significance and many far-reaching implications because all psyop reduces to messages.

Fractionation of the issue of effectiveness into six aspects or dimensions -- proximity of media, clarity of reception, language appropriateness, thematic comprehensibility, credibility, and evocation of behavioral response -- and step-by-step examination of these dimensions demonstrated that leaflet rally appeals contributed to the defection of two-thirds of the VC soldiers and two-thirds of the NVA soldiers sampled. Almost one-third of the VC and one-half of the NVA ralliers maintain they would not have defected if they had not read leaflet messages.

3. Effectiveness of three specifically defined categories of small-scale psyop activities has been measured.

Based on two theoretical constructs derived from the general theory it was predicted that rally appeals in the context of some form of external military pressure or internal psychological pressure would produce ralliers near in time to the delivery of the messages; also appeals transmitted in the absence of either of the foregoing conditions would not produce ralliers near in time.

The results of studies designed to test these predictions supported all three predictions and represent validation of the two theoretical constructs. Rally appeals do produce ralliers, close in time to delivery of the appeal, when made under specified appropriate conditions. Messages delivered on routine missions do not produce ralliers in the near term.

4. In the past, in the absence of proof of psyop effectiveness, the quality of psyop messages and the development process for creation of messages and materials has been a continual source of concern to psyop officers. The results of studies of effectiveness of psyop messages demonstrate that, on balance, the quality of leaflets produced under current practice is adequate for psyop objectives. Much attention has been focused upon the establishment and upgrading of the materials development process embodied in the Propaganda Development Center established by the 4th Psyop Group in 1968. Attention can now be shifted to such considerations as the optimal use of time for field

teams; a country-wide survey of psyop activities and analysis of the 4th Psyop Group's operations indicated that a wide variety of activities of questionable appropriateness for psyop units have crept into the activities undertaken by field teams.

5. Procedures for measurement of effectiveness were applied to two large-scale complex psyop projects, using an assortment of direct and indirect or intermediate criteria. Results in terms of psyop project effectiveness were mixed but informative. Results in terms of facilitating development of principles and procedures for measurement were positive. Recommended principles and procedures are detailed in Section V.

Determination of whether or not such projects are effective requires that a statement of objectives be included in enabling orders and that the objectives be stated in terms of desired end results. Under current practice, objectives may or may not be specifically identified and, if stated, may or may not be worded appropriately in terms of the intent of the psyop project and the results desired.

In neither of the psyop projects evaluated did the enabling orders contain directives to insure collection of data for the measurement of effectiveness. Criteria were established for research purposes after consultation with those responsible for direction of the projects; the needed criterion data was identified and delivery was arranged. In both cases much of the evaluation data that was requested and promised for delivery could not be obtained.

Assessment of the results of application of the measurement process to the psyop project -- an activity carried on concurrently with measurement of the psyop project itself -- identified the main problem which has hindered attempts at measurement in the past and will continue to do so unless corrected. The problem, stated with some oversimplification, is that data required for psyop assessment does not become available to the psyop function for many reasons, all correctable. The situation may be corrected by internal reconsideration of the staffing of the Research and Analysis (R&A) sub-function which is under-qualified, under-manned, and over-tasked in view of the extensive data-collection and analysis responsibilities assigned to R&A in FM 33-1. Externally, restatement of relationships and responsibilities in interaction with the intelligence community is needed. Most important, a pertinent change designed to ensure that objectives are stated and are

stated properly should be made in all manuals such as FM 101-5 that govern composition of operations orders and other documents used to initiate or authorize large scale psyop projects.

The results of two closely correlated studies of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to enemy defection, which involved a survey of literature, monitoring of the flow of current intelligence documents, interviews with psyop officials, interviewing of enemy PW's, and other research activities, showed that concepts and terminology relating to vulnerabilities were ambiguous to the point of being a serious hindrance. A method for systematic analysis and classification of vulnerabilities was developed and a set of terms was defined to make it possible to maintain necessary distinctions when discussing vulnerabilities and obstacles.

A logical and almost unavoidable conclusion from the results of the two studies is that psyop messages, contrary to the present favored and universal practice in tactical psyop of trying to tailor messages to the vulnerabilities of small groups of people who may have no special unifying characteristics, rather should target vulnerabilities or points of potential vulnerabilities that are applicable to large portions of the general population.

There are two very good reasons for doing so. Research evidence strongly supports the notion that the number of vulnerabilities with sufficient weight to affect decisions that involve significant personal danger are very few.

The most frequent and intense complaint heard from psyoperators in the field concerns inability to generate adequately informative data about groups that the psyop unit wants to target. This problem is predictable because such studies by virtue of their nature and the subject matter are very hard to do even for highly trained professionals in peace time; secondly, personnel qualified by training and experience for such tasks just do not exist in sufficient numbers.

If these problems are real, and research data says they are, then the recommendation to target true vulnerabilities, which are few and known instead of multitudinous suspected vulnerabilities which must be sought and identified accurately, is very fortunate because development of small numbers of high-quality messages instead of almost indiscriminate creation of different versions results in a tremendous

decrease in time devoted to the difficult technical tasks of area studies, audience analysis, and materials development. Therefore the demand for a type of manpower now in very short supply is greatly reduced and the breadth of use of the output of a small number of best-qualified experts is greatly expanded. The elimination of unproductive creativity and unrewarding experimentation has obvious rewards and the reduction of costs resulting from a small number of large-volume production runs instead of a large number of small runs is a large bonus.

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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE OF PSYOP MESSAGES
FOR
OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

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APPENDIX I
THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM

During the cease fire period of Tan Hoi New Year, all US, VN and other Allied bases will turn on their searchlight at night. The searchlight will help you to find freedom. Move toward the direction of the light, hide your weapon and wait until the day-light to rally. When getting close to the GVN or Allied units, shout aloud "CHIEU HOI". You will be welcomed and receive good treatment. Guide the GVN or Allied Forces to recover your weapon later for reward.


MOVE TO THE SEARCHLIGHT
DO NOT LET YOURSELF BE KILLED IN THE DARK

—ÁNH SÁNG TỰ DO—

Trong những ngày hưu chiến vào dịp Tết Tân Hợi, tất cả các căn cứ Hoa Kỳ, Việt Nam và các đơn vị Đồng Minh khác đều rọi đèn hướng lên trời vào ban đêm. Những ngọn đèn ấy sẽ giúp các bạn tìm đến tự do. Bạn hãy đi về phía đèn đỏ, giấu vũ khí, tìm chỗ ẩn nấp, đợi đến sáng rồi ra hội chánh. Khi đến gần đơn vị Việt Nam hay Đồng Minh bạn hô to : "Chiêu Hồi". Bạn sẽ được đón tiếp nồng hậu, đối xử tử tế. Sau này bạn sẽ hưởng dẫn Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hay Đồng Minh tìm lại vũ khí để lãnh thưởng.

HÃY TÌM VỀ ÁNH SÁNG TỰ DO,
ĐỪNG CHẾT ÂM THÂM TRONG BÓNG TỐI. 7.697.70.

Welcome New Year



Wishing you all the luck to find liberty and happiness.

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APPENDIX II
XXIV CORPS OPERATIONS MESSAGE
FOR
OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

APPENDIX II

OPERATIONS MESSAGE

Subject: Combined TET Searchlight Chieu Hoi Operation

1. I Corps and XXIV Corps will conduct a Combined Tet Searchlight Chieu Hoi Operation 13 Jan 71 - 29 Jan 71.
2. The concept of the operation. The Combined TET Searchlight Chieu Hoi Campaign will be conducted in two phases: Phase I (pre-campaign operations) (13-17 Jan 71). MR1 CPOC will distribute leaflets, handbills, posters, and tapes to military organizations and province headquarters. Unit PSYOP officers will provide targeting for aerial support to MR1 CPOC prior to 17 Jan 71. CPOC will prepare two special tapes for use by all aerial PSYOP aircraft.
Phase II (Implementation) (19-29 Jan 71) GVN/RVNAF/US PSYOP media will support the campaign beginning 19 Jan. Broadcasting will begin 19 Jan. and leaflets, handbills, and posters dissemination will commence 22 Jan. From 1900 hours 26 Jan to 0700 hours 29 Jan selected searchlights will illuminate to maximum capability at maximum elevation and appropriate azimuth with the intention that VC/NVA will rally to US/ARVN bases in the vicinity of the searchlight. Local commanders may move searchlights at their discretion.
3. Themes. PSYOP theme is "Rally to the Light of Freedom and start a new life with the GVN". Printed media encourages VC/NVA to rally to GVN by walking toward the "Light of Freedom", and to rally with their weapons to receive rewards. A special appeal is directed at the families of enemy soldiers to convince their loved ones to rally now and start life anew during TET.

4. Request searchlights located in the following areas plan to support this operation whenever feasible during the prescribed period as the tactical situation allows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SEARCHLIGHT</u>	<u>GENERAL VICINITY</u>
a. 1st Bde, 5th Inf. Div:	G39	Mai Loc
b. 101st Abn Div (Ambl):	G24	Camp Eagle
	G26	Camp Evans
	G28	FSB Birmingham
	G31	Phu Bai
	G36	FSB Bastogne
	G37	FSB Rakkason
c. 1st Marine Div:	G38	LZ Ross
	G46	LZ Tucson (Hill 190)
	G54	LZ Baldy
	G59	Crows Nest
	G52	Nui Lo (Hill 65)
d. 2nd ARVN Div:	G45	FSB Muir (Hill 55)
	G49	Ha Nha (Hill 52)
	G69	Tra Bong
	G70	Nui Ong
	G71	OP 1
e. 23rd Inf Div:	G35	Stinson
	G44	FSB Fat City
	G67	Montezuma
	G51	LZ Center
	G64	FSB Mary Ann

5. Special instructions.

- a. Units are authorized direct communication with 1st Bn (AW) (SP) 44th Arty, (955-2295) for searchlight coordination.
- b. Request US Division/brigade G5/S5 provide a telephonic report of activities to G5, XXIV Corps, 951-3000 at the end of each working day from 27 Jan through 29 January. ARVN units report through POLWAR channels. USAAG IC&MR1 coordinates, I Corps activities with XXIV Corps. DEPCORDS reports Province Psychological Advisor activities. MR1 CPOC provides XXIV Corps with 110th VNAP and 9th SOS daily feedback of aerial PSYOP support.

c. PSYOP personnel at division and brigade level coordinate with Interrogation Prisoner of WAR (IPW) personnel to insure that appropriate questionnaires are prepared to ascertain why Hoi Chanh rallied and what media caused them to rally. DEPCORDS coordinates with Chieu Hoi Centers within the region.

d. To facilitate coordination with GVN/RVNAF a Vietnamese translation of this message will follow by courier.

6. - - - - - is project officer for
XXIV Corps.

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APPENDIX III

FIRST CONSIDERATION OF RALLY

Responses of 37 Hoi Chanh
Rallying in MR1 in January 1971

<u>Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program</u> <u>ID</u> <u>How long ago (approx)</u>	<u>Time since first thought of rallying</u> <u>Date</u> <u>How long ago</u>	<u>Why didn't rally earlier</u>	
		<u>Prime reason</u>	<u>Secondary reasons</u>
21 Two years	1970 One year	Held back by obstacles - Communist propaganda said ralliers killed.	Unable to contact either family or GVN officials.
29 A long time	A long time	Was under house arrest.	Was caught once trying to rally; had to find a way to escape.
31 Three years	1969	Communists said GVN killed ralliers.	Unable to contact friends or local GVN officials.
26 Two years	1970	Family poor and didn't know how I would earn a living if I rallied.	Communists said ralliers killed; Did not yet understand Chieu Hoi Program.
2 Three years	1969 23 months	Indoctrinated by deceitful and threatening propaganda.	Suspicious of GVN Chieu Hoi Program; unable to arrange family affairs therefore could not.

Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program ID How long ago (approx)	Time since first thought of rallying Date How long ago	Why didn't rally earlier?	
		Prime reason	Secondary reasons
17	1970 Six months	Communist propaganda. Was told ralliers jailed or killed.	Couldn't contact family & local people; (learned about program in 1968 but parents too old, Communists took advantage in 1969) Didn't understand Chieu Hoi Prog.
22	Two years 1970	VC control too strict.	VC threats; fear of not knowing how to earn a living.
10	One year 1970 One year	Did not know about GVN just cause.	Was indoctrinated by Communists and threatened by them; not able to contact family.
7	One year 1971 Sixteen days	VC threatened that GVN would kill ralliers.	Unable to contact family and friends; under constant surveillance.
14	1970 One year	Influenced by Communist propaganda.	Communist threats.

24	Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program ID How long ago (approx)	Why didn't rally earlier?	
		Prime reason	Secondary reasons
	One year	Under constant surveillance, VC control.	Unable to contact family. Communists threats that ralliers killed.
3	Three years 1969 Two years	Threatened by Communists.	Under constant surveillance; Communist propaganda told ralliers were killed.
4	Three years 1968 Two years	Influenced by false propaganda.	Under constant surveillance; threatened by Communists.
5	Three years 1968 Two years	Needed to know more about GVN policy so sent son to contact family first.	Communist deceitful propaganda. Strict Communist control
9	Three years May, Eight months 1970	Communist control very strict and threatening. Thought reform if caught going out to rally.	Communist propaganda; ralliers dumped in sea or jailed by GVN; Communists threatened death to those caught rallying.

<u>Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program ID How long ago (approx)</u>	<u>Time since first thought of rallying Date How long ago</u>	<u>Why didn't rally earlier?</u>	<u>Secondary reasons</u>
11	Nov. 1969	<u>Prime reason</u> Communist control and Father's unwillingness.	Father didn't want to come out to rally. Still young then and could not distin- guish which cause was just.
12	Three years 1969 Two years	Communi threat that ralliers jailed, killed by GVN.	Was told GVN suspected all ralliers; was told GVN dumped ralliers in sea.
13	Two years 1970	Communists false propa- ganda that ralliers killed.	Communists said that ralliers ill-treated at Chieu Hoi Centers; and that ralliers dumped in sea or sent to islands.
16	1970 Four months	Communist threat GVN would beat, jail, kill ralliers.	Not able to get news through to family or friends. Under constart surveillance.
18	1969	VC control, threats, and deceits.	Unable to contact family; Communists said ralliers were ill-treated at Chieu Hoi Centers, dumped in rivers and jailed.

ID	Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program How long ago (approx)	Time since first thought of rallying Date How long ago	Why didn't rally earlier?	
			Prime reason	Secondary reasons
19		1969 One year	Threatened; deceived by Communists who said ralliers underwren: hunger and hardships at Chieu Hoi Centers, were jailed or dumped into sea.	Unable to contact family.
32	Three years	1970 Eight months	VC control and threats; they threatened thought reform if caught.	Communist propaganda that ralliers were dumped in sea or jailed; Communists threatened death to those caught rallying.
35	Two years	Eight months	Communists hid truth about GVN lenience toward ralliers.	Communists threatened that ralliers dumped in sea or jailed; threatened with thought reform if caught rallying.
36	Ten months	Aug. Four months 1970	Communists threatened thought reform if caught rallying.	Told ralliers dumped in sea; Communists threatened death to ralliers.
37	Ten months	Aug. Four months 1970	Threatened with thought reform if caught rallying.	Communists taught that ralliers dumped into sea by GVN; Communists threatened death to those caught rallying.

<u>Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program ID</u>		<u>Time since first thought of rallying</u> <u>Date: How long ago</u>	<u>Why didn't rally earlier</u> <u>Prime reason</u> <u>Secondary reasons</u>
8	Three years	1969 Two years	Was not able to contact people living in GVN areas. VC control very strict; told by VC that GVN dumped ralliers into the sea.
6	Three years	1968 Two years	Unable to contact brothers and relatives in GVN-controlled areas. Communist propaganda that GVN jailed ralliers. Under constant surveillance.
20	Three years	Three years	Fear of being caught by VC. Influenced by VC false propaganda that ralliers were jailed. VC threatened ralliers would step on road mines or be caught by guerrillas.
28		1971	Influenced by Communist propaganda and threats; Having just learned of Chieu Hoi Program, had not contacted family.
27	Three years	1969 Two years	Fear of not finding job to earn a living. Strict VC control; Suspicion of Chieu Hoi Program.

Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program ID	Time since first thought of rallying Date: How long ago	Why didn't rally earlier	
		Prime reason	Secondary reasons
30	A long time	VC control; threats	Wife and child wounded, child young; Under constant surveillance.
33	Three years	1969 Twenty months	Influenced by Communist propaganda and threats that they would initiate violence in towns; Still suspicious of GVN Chieu Hoi Program.
34		1969	Well-indoctrinated by VC propaganda; Suspicious of GVN intention earlier.
15		1969	VC control too strict. Didn't know how to earn a living.
23	One year	1970 Four months	Communists threatened ralliers were killed by GVN; unable to contact family or friends; Under constant surveillance

<u>Time since first learned about Chieu Hoi Program</u> <u>ID How long ago (approx)</u>	<u>Time since first thought of rallying</u> <u>Date: How long ago</u>	<u>Why didn't rally earlier</u>	<u>Prime reason</u>	<u>Secondary reasons</u>
25	Three months		A long way off. One did not know about GVN lenience.	Afraid no work and would be hungry; clung to rice field and garden to earn a living because used to that type of work.
1	One year	1970 One year	Did not know about Chieu Hoi Program.	Influenced Communist propaganda. Had not been able to contact outside.

APPENDIX IV

RALLY DECISION AND METHOD

Responses of 37 Hoi Chanh
Rallying in MR1 in January 1971

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>			<u>How rallied</u>		<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Age Yrs. Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>	
No longer have faith in VC.	Found VC became weaker and more demoralized.	49	1/1/71	Able to contact family who took me to rally.	Loc Phuong village council Dai Loc District
GVN good treatment and lenience to ralliers.	Parents, village council, urged.	34	1/11/71	Escaped	ID # 21 Son Tho Village council.
Change in convictions and ideology.	No longer believed in VC; turned to GVN Contacted family who came for him after arranging with GVN officials.	47 6	1/12/71	Family first arranged and then came for him, took him to rally.	ID # 29 Loc Hung Village Dai Loc District
Assured of food and clothing and free movement.	VC conditions miserable, life unbearable.	36 4	1/13/71	Went alone to rally at 2:00 P.M.	ID # 31 Phu Thanh village, Que Son District Quon Nam.
GVN lenience and family reunion.	Could come out; Communists too cruel; refused to live under same sky with them.	50 6	1/14/71	Escaped by hiding.	ID # 26 Phu Dien Village Council.
					ID # 2

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>		<u>How rallied</u>			
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Age</u> <u>Yrs. Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>	<u>Place of Rally</u>
Realized GVN lenience in Chieu Hoi Program.		53 9	1/14/71	Escaped from VC-controlled area to GVN-controlled area on foot.	Phu Dien village council Que Son, Quan Nam.
Made arrangements with younger brother		41	1/14/71	Able to contact family; rallied at Phu Khuong administrative headquarters.	Phu Khuong village council.
Able to inquire and learn about Chieu Hoi Program.	Wanted to be with family during Tet '971; Communists could no longer deceive.	34 4	1/15/71	Relatives took him to rally to Village Council.	Phu Phong Village Council.
Realized Communists had lied and could not stay with them.		30 2	1/16/71	Night escape to GVN controlled area; rallied to Phu Khuong Village Council.	Phu Khuong Village Council Que Son District.
Realized GVN Chieu Hoi Program would show lenience.	Too disillusioned with Communists; Rallied to GVN just cause.	31 1	1/16/71	Hid from Communists, travelled on foot.	Phu Huong Village Council Que Son District.
					ID # 14

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>			<u>How rallied</u>	
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Yrs. M.S.</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>	<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
VC control relaxed during GVN raid.		18	1/17/71 Escaped at night on foot to post.	Duc Duc District
ID # 24				
Read GVN leaflets.	Able to correspond with family; Believed GVN provided rallied com- fortable life.	50 9	1/18/71 Mass rally of 12 cadre and guerrillas together, on foot.	Duc Duc Chieu Hoi Center.
ID # 3				
Able to correspond with family.	Believed GVN would be lenient.	23	1/18/71 Came out at night, rallied to RF Company in Son Khuong Village.	Duc Duc Chieu Hoi Center.
ID # 4				
Able to contact family and therefore able to understand GVN policy - be reunited with family.	Able to contact a number of guerrillas who provided protection to rally.	44	1/18/71 Mass rally with guerrillas; walked to Son Khuong Village to GVN officials.	Son Khuong Village, Duc Duc District.
ID # 5				
Hated Communists who had deceived, and then realized Chieu Hoi Program was humane.	Wanted to shorten war and restore peace; realized Communists deceit; GVN stepped up appeals to rally during Tet 71.	34	1/18/71 Walked from VC area to GVN area to present self at Chieu Hoi Center.	Loc Quang Village, Dai Loc District.
ID # 9				

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>			<u>Age</u>		<u>How rallied</u>	
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Yrs.</u>	<u>Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>	<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
Understood Chieu Hoi Program; GVN lenience.	Realized deceived by Communists; received nothing in return (Father had passed away so free to rally).	18	8	1/18/71	Escaped at night.	Son Khuong Village - Duc Duc District.
Reunion with family; shorten time of suffering.	Ralliers could avenge families and fulfill duties toward country; Able to contact family.	23		1/18/71	Contacted family in advance; crossed river in daytime.	Phoenix Office in Dai Loc.
Understood ralliers received help from GVN. Chieu Hoi Program assurance of comfortable life & lenience from GVN.	Read leaflets about other ralliers; heard loudspeakers & was told ralliers had been his good friends.	21		1/18/71	Came out with a number of cadre in mass rally.	Son Huong Post 707.
Realized that in Chieu Hoi Program GVN showed lenience.		38		1/18/71	Arrived in Huong An where brother (a policeman) took me to Chieu Hoi Center in Quang Nam.	Cam Thanh Village, Hien Nhon District Quang Nam.
Aid and lenience from GVN.	Read leaflets and heard broadcasts; realized ralliers were well-treated.	17		1/18/71	Mass rally; group brought out weapons.	Phoenix Office Son Khuong.

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>		<u>How rallied</u>		<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Age Yrs. Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	
Aid and lenience from GVN.	Realized ralliers were well-treated from loudspeaker broadcasts. Decided betrayed country.	19	1/18/71	Mass rally; group brought out weapons. Phoenix Office Son Khuong.
Didn't want to work for Communists.				
Was deceived by Communists but then realized leniency and humane treatment by GVN and wanted to shorten the war.	Hatred for Communists & war weariness. GVN stepped up Chieu Hoi Program during Tet 71.	31	1/18/71	Loc Quang Village, Dai Loc District.
Was able to contact relatives in GVN area, heard loudspeaker and read leaflets, so learned of comfortable life.	Learned about GVN lenience; realized GVN brought prosperity to Vietnamese people.	35	1/18/71	Son Khuong Village.
Learned truth about GVN Chieu Hoi Program, GVN warm welcome and lenience.	Communists didn't keep promises; war weary; to shorten the war GVN stepped up Chieu Hoi Program.	34	1/18/71	On foot during the daytime.
Learned truth about Chieu Hoi Program; humane, for those who have taken wrong direction.	Communists didn't make good their promises; tired of war; wanted to shorten it; GVN stepped up Chieu Hoi Program at Tet.	55	1/18/71	Dai Loc District
				ID # 37

Why rallied at this time

<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Age</u>		<u>How rallied</u>	
		<u>Yrs.</u>	<u>Mos.</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>	<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
Able to persuade number of guerrillas to come out, as get away from VC control.		47	9	1/18/71 Persuaded number of guerrillas to come out to rally at night on foot.	Duc Duc Chieu Hoi Center.
Able to contact family and understood Chieu Hoi Program.	Reunion with family; return to GVN as lost citizen; believed in GVN lenience.	40		1/19/71 Came out at night to present self to administrative people at Son Khuong.	Son Khuong Village, Duc Duc District.
To stay alive.	Fear of bombing; fear of being killed.	44		1/19/71 Escaped through jungle at night; Walked to present self to GVN officials.	Duc Duc District.
Brother sent letter guaranteeing safety.	Life in VC too miserable, so had to rally.	56	6	1/19/71 Took advantage of confusion of people moving during Tet to come out.	Phu Huong Village Council, Que Son District.
Understood Chieu Hoi Program from leaflet and loudspeaker.	Realized VC causing death and suffering to many.	31	1	1/20/71 Escaped from Communists.	Son Thuan Village Council Que Son District.
					ID # 27

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>			<u>How rallied</u>		<u>Official Place of Rally</u>	<u>ID #</u>
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other reasons</u>	<u>Yrs. Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Opportunity/Method</u>		
Older brother sent letter.	Took advantage of general movement during Tet.	56	1/20/71	Went on foot to present self at Phu Thanh Village.	Phu Thanh Village, Que Son District Quan Nam.	
Learned of GVN treatment for ralliers by reading on leaflets and from brother in GVN area succeeded in contacting; family's assurance of good treatment.	Communists squeeze you to last drop and throw you away later; take out on family if can't get at you.		1/20/71	Sent wife out first so she could contact local officials before I came out.	Phu Diem Village. Que Son District.	ID # 30
Hamlet now pacified and family in safe area so no longer fear VC revenge on family.	Leaflet and loudspeaker instructions guided.	39	1/20/71	Followed leaflet and loudspeaker instructions; hid at night, rallied to GVN in daylight.	Phu Huong Village Council.	ID # 33
Realized what Chieu Hoi Program was all about.		23	2	1/20/71	Escaped Communists at night.	Son Lon Village Council. ID # 34
Realized Communists cruel and deceitful, could no longer stay.	Able to contact family at 6 A.M.; rallied same day.	35	1/20/71	Able to contact family; rallied at Phu Khuong Administrative Headquarters.	Phu Khuong Village Council.	ID # 15
						ID # 23

<u>Why rallied at this time</u>		<u>How rallied</u>		<u>Official Place of Rally</u>
<u>Most important reason</u>	<u>Other Reasons</u>	<u>Age Yrs. Mos.</u>	<u>Date</u>	
Life with VC too hard, food shortages.	Realized GVN lenience.	45	1/21/71	Quang Nam Chieu Hoi Center.
Able to inquire and learn about the Chieu Hoi Pro- gram.		17	1/27/71	Phu Phong Village Council Quang Nam.
To be with family; Tet 71; no longer believed deceitful Communist propa- ganda.		8	Had family guide; Walked.	ID # 25
				ID # 1

APPENDIX V
PERSONAL DATA
AND PRE-RECORDED RALLY INDUCEMENT
RESPONSES OF 37 HOI CHANH

From Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet Items
MR1 - January 1971

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	<u>ID #</u>
Loc Phuong Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Phuong Village - Dai Loc District	Military	Cadre	2 years	VC group	Letter received	21
Son Tho Village - Duc Duc District	Son Tho Village - Duc Duc District	Political	Teacher	3 years	Education	Letter received	29
Loc Hung Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Hung Village - Dai Loc District	Military	Assistant leader	4 years	Guerrilla unit	Aerial broadcast	31
Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Political	Cell chief	3 years	Ammo-liaison	Aerial broadcast	26
Phu Dien Village - Que Son District	Phu Dien Village - Que Son District	Political	Cadre	3 years	Farmer's Association	Aerial broadcast	2

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	ID #
Phu Dien Village - Que Son District	Phu Dien Village - Que Son District	Political	Member	2 years	Farmer's Sub-chapter	Aerial broadcast	11
Xuyen Tan Village - Duy Xuyen District	Xuyen Tan Village - Duy Xuyen District	Political	Deputy Chief	3 years	Mother and sister's sub-chapter.	Aerial broadcast	22
Phu Phong Village - Que Son District	Phu Phong Village - Que Son District	Political	Teacher	3 years	Education	Aerial broadcast	10
Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Military	Member	2 years	Guerrilla unit.	Letter received.	7
Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Political	Cadre	3 years	Communication liaison	Radio broadcast	14

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	<u>ID #</u>
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Political	Member	Unknown	Guerrilla unit	Unknown	24
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Political	Section chief	Unknown	Economics	Unknown	
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Political	Chief	Unknown	VC Group	Unknown	3
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Political	Section chief	Unknown	Requisition & purchasing	Unknown	4
Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Political	Section chief	3 years	Autonomous	Radio broadcast	5
							9

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	ID #
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Military	Member	Unknown	Guerrilla unit	Unknown	11
Loc Phuoc Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Phuoc Village - Dai Loc District	Military	Messenger	1 year	Guerrilla unit	Radio broadcast	11
Don Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Military	Squad leader	Unknown	Guerrilla unit	Unknown	12
Cam Thanh Village - Hien Nhon District	Cam Thanh Village - Hien Nhon District	Political	Cell chief	2 years	Women's cell	Aerial broadcast	13
Don Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Military	Member	Unknown	Guerrilla unit	Unknown	16
							18

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	<u>ID #</u>
Don Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Military	Member	Unknown	Guerrilla unit	Unknown	19
Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Military	Unit leader	3 years	Guerrilla	Radio broadcast	32
Don Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Political	Cell chief	Unknown	Farmer's cell	Unknown	35
Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Political	Cadre	2 years	Security	Radio broadcast	36
Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Loc Quang Village - Dai Loc District	Political	Cadre	4 years	Economics	Radio broadcast	37

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>
Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Unknown	Military	Unit leader	Unknown	Guerrilla	Unknown

Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Political	Cadre	3 years	Forward	Letter received	ID # 8
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Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Son Phuc Village - Duc Duc District	Political	Cadre	3 years	Farmer's Association	Letter received	ID # 6
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Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Political	Cell chief	4 years	Communications liaison	Letter received	ID # 20
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Son Thuan Village - Duc Duc District	Son Thuan Village - Duc Duc District	Political	Clerk	3 years	Autonomous	Letter received	ID # 28
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							ID # 27
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<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	<u>ID #</u>
Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Political	Cadre	2 years	Farmer's Association	Radio broadcast	30
Phu Dien Village - Que Son District	Son Long Village - Que Son District	Political	Cadre	5 years	Intelligence Militia	Radio broadcast	30
Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Political	Chief	3 years	Liberation section	Letter Received	33
Son Loi Village - Duc Duc District	Son Loi Village - Duc Duc District	Political	Nurse	2 years	Medic	Aerial broadcast	34
Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Phu Huong Village - Que Son District	Political	Clerk	2 years	Food pro-vision	Letter received	15
							ID # 23

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Time in VC/NVA</u>	<u>Unit or Organization</u>	<u>Rally Inducement</u>	<u>ID #</u>
Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Phu Thanh Village - Que Son District	Political	Cadre	2 years	Women's Association	Aerial broadcast	25
Phu Phong Village - Que Son District	Phu Phong Village - Que Son District	Military	Member	2 years	Guerrilla unit	Aerial broadcast	1

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